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1. Introduction  
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Thomas Pogge's remarks on the current practice of philosophy in the introductory chapter of   
Politics as Usual, What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric summarizes the main concern that 
has initiated this study. He writes that  
 
 Philosophers have not been much help, lately, in giving us ways of 
evaluating and critically modifying what we care about. Many have rejected 
the very search for such standards as inseparably tied to an outdated 
metaphysics or as incompatible with the pluralism of multicultural societies. 
And some have then seen it as their task to cure us of the ambition that their 
reductionism presents as incapable of fulfilment. These are fascinating 
views that deserve discussion, But I continue to believe that philosophers 
can illuminate what really matter.1  
 
 If we agree with Pogge (as I do) that philosophy, in particular, theorizing justice, can 
guide our action in remedying injustices in the world, we need to have clear answers to a set 
of related questions. What is the relationship between the theorizing of justice and pressing 
problems of the real world such as discrimination, human rights violations, severe poverty or 
global warming? Are theories necessary and/or helpful in identifying, understanding or 
                                                          
1 Thomas Pogge, Politics as Usual, What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric ( Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 
8.  
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overcoming such injustices? And, if they are, what method should we follow for establishing 
a connection between general normative statements of theories of justice and particular 
problems of injustice?  
  Mainstream theorizing of justice, initiated by John Rawls seminal work A Theory of 
Justice2, has recently come under criticism for its ability to devise satisfying answers to these 
questions. Within a debate on how to conceptualize ideal and non-ideal theorizing of justice, a 
number of theorists have pointed out a serious gap between contemporary theorizing of justice 
and actual problems.3 In response, those who believe that theorizing justice should address 
real problems argue for ways to breach the gap, while others have retreated to their ivory 
towers. Methodological chapters  containing empirical and theoretical assumptions as well as 
issues of implementation, feasibility and accessibility are now considered more seriously. The 
debate has resulted in important insights for improving the ability of theorizing to relate to 
actual problems.  
Nevertheless, this thesis argues that theorizing justice in the Rawlsian framework is 
inherently flawed in guiding action in real world circumstances. Due to its two stage method 
consisting in first theorizing ideal principles that govern the perfectly just society, and then 
implementing them in actual circumstances, the framework is unable to incorporate an 
essential aspect of real world circumstances. Namely, that there are equally valid reasons for 
upholding different principles of justice and equally valid reasons for different ways of 
implementing them in particular contexts. As Gerald Gaus remarks, Rawls "fails to take to 
take account of the pervasiveness of rational disagreement about the correct impartial 
                                                          
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1999) 
3 See for example, Charles W. Mills, ““Ideal Theory” as Ideology,” Hypatia 20, n. 3 (2005): 165-184, Colin 
Farrelly, “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation," Political Studies 55, n.4 (2007): 844-64, Burke A. Hendrix, 
“Where should we expect change in non-ideal theory?” Political Theory 41(2013): 116-143; cf. Ingrid Robeyns, 
“Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice,” Social Theory and Practice 34, n. 3 (2008): 341-353; John A. Simmons, 
“Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 38, n. 1 (20120): 5-36 
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morality. There is no compelling way to generate rational agreement on a specific morality in 
anything approaching the diverse and bounded social world we inhabit."4 This failure has 
major implications for the capacity of theorizing to guide action in real world circumstances. 
The two stage method is either insufficient in guiding action or detrimental by making false 
judgments. Incorporating disagreement into the theorizing of actual injustices, however, 
implies a different idea of justice, which I argue is best comprehended by a social choice 
approach.  
After I lay out my main critique of the Rawlsian method in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4, I respectively analyze two cases of policy choice in different domains of 
justice: the first regards implementing global taxes on natural resources; the second, 
reforming the European Union asylum policy. In this introductory chapter, I first briefly 
discuss the two stage method of theorizing justice and guiding action in the Rawlsian 
framework. I point out two aspects of Rawlsian ideal theorizing that have received criticism in 
the debate: the use of idealizations and practice dependence as well as the theorists’ response 
to these practices. My brief discussion, however, cannot do justice to numerous and profound 
arguments that have been raised by the theorists. Yet, by highlighting the main points, I aim to 
provide a sufficient background for my main critique. In the last section, I provide an outline 
of the subsequent chapters. 
 
1.2 The debate on ideal theorizing of justice 
Theorizing justice within the Rawlsian framework consists of two stages. The first stage 
corresponds to theorizing ideal principles that govern the perfectly just society.5 The second 
                                                          
4 Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason—A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded 
World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at xvii.  
5 Maintaining this core element, theorists have come up with various conceptualizations of ideal theorizing. In 
the Rawlsian theorizing, ideal theory prescribes principles which govern the institutions of a closed society with 
respect to socio-economic rights and basic liberties of individuals. Alternatively, ideal theorizing can be 
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stage corresponds to theorizing injustices in real world circumstances in light of ideal 
principles. In A Theory of Justice Rawls explicitly outlays his two step methodology:  
 
The intuitive idea is to split the theory of justice into two parts. The first or ideal 
part assumes strict compliance and works out the principles that characterize a 
well-ordered society under favorable circumstances. It develops the conception of a 
perfectly just basic structure and the corresponding duties and obligations of 
persons under the fixed constraints of human life. My main concern is with this 
part of the theory. Nonideal theory, the second part, is worked out after an ideal 
conception of justice has been chosen; only then do the parties ask which principles 
to adopt under less happy conditions.6 
 
Rawls not only divides theorizing into two but also prioritizes ideal theorizing over 
non-ideal theorizing. The priority of ideal theorizing derives from Rawls’ belief that it 
constitutes the sole basis for a systematic grasp of actual injustices.7 Rawls maintains that 
ideal principles project an aim and guide social reform.8 Actual injustices can be identified as 
well as ranked depending on how far they deviate from the perfectly just scheme. Even if the 
measure of the departures from the ideal is primarily left to intuition, our judgment is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
interactional  such as Robert Nozick’s theorizing concerned with procedural justice between individuals. Robert 
Nozick, Anarchy, State, And Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1974), or Peter Singer’s theorizing concerned 
with moral duties of individuals that live in developed countries. Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, n. 3 (1972): 229-243; or it can be realization based such as  Amartya 
Sen’s theorizing which takes into account the actual freedoms and capabilities of individuals. Amartya Sen, The 
Idea of Justice (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009). Or  ideal theorizing can 
be partial, such as theories that focus on only one domain or sphere of justice, or theories that are limited  in 
scope. For example, we can conceptualize ideal theorizing that focuses on only gender justice as a particular 
domain of justice or we can limit ideal theorizing by focusing on only international or global justice. Ingrid 
Robeyns, “Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice.” The main idea of ideal theorizing which persists in each 
different conceptualization is to identify moral principles that govern a perfectly just social organization.   
6 Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, 216.  
7John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 8; Rawls, The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000), 90.  
8Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 215; The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 90. 
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essentially guided by the ideal of a perfectly just society.9 In order to engage in non-
ideal theorizing, we need an ideal theory already at hand.10 Hence in the Rawlsian 
framework of theorizing justice, ideal theorizing is both logically and temporarily 
primary to non-ideal theorizing.11  
The capacity of ideal theorizing in providing the means to remedy actual 
injustices has been recently questioned. In the following three subsections, I discuss 
two related aspects of ideal theorizing that has attracted criticism, the use of 
idealizations and practice dependence as well as how theorists respond to them.    
 
1.2.1 The use of Idealizations  
The first aspect of ideal theorizing that critiques have pointed out that may diminish the 
capacity of theorizing justice for guiding action is the use of idealizations.12 Theorists use 
idealizations in order to differentiate between what is contingent and what is essential for their 
arguments. Thereby they can focus upon and address only the issues important for them.13 
Yet, idealizations often imply idealized, and therefore false predicates.14 For example, in 
arguing for his principles, Rawls makes use of the two main idealizations: ‘strict compliance’ 
and 'favorable circumstances.' The former refers to an idealized society where all individuals 
comply with the principles of justice;  the latter, to idealized background conditions such that 
                                                          
9Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 216. 
10Rawls, The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason, 89-90.   
11 For an account of the temporal and logical priority of ideal theorizing, see  Hendirx, "“Where should we 
expect change in non-ideal theory?” 
12 See for example,; John, Laura Valentini, “On the apparent paradox of ideal theory,” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 17, n. 3 (2009): 332–355; “Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,” Philosophy Compass 7, 
n. 9 (2012): 654–664, Lisa H. Schwartzman, "Abstraction, Idealization and Obsession," Metaphilosophy 37, n. 5 
(2006): 565-588 Robeyns, “Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice,” Zofia Stemplowska “What is Ideal about Ideal 
Theory?” Social Theory and Practice 34, n. 3 (2008): 319-340.  
13 Ingrid Robeyns, “Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice,” 352. 
14 For a discussion of idealizations and abstraction see Onora O'Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press,1996), at 39–44. 
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the existence of ample economic and technological developments, natural resources and 
levels of education of  citizens.  
 Idealizations are necessary for theory to make progress when considering complex 
problems of justice.15  Idealizations are also useful in achieving determinacy. In a 
comparative argument for a set of principles of justice, the effects of competing principles 
need to be isolated from contingent factors. Using idealizations a comparison can be made 
based on only those factors wholly related to  principles. Otherwise we cannot have a precise 
judgment as to what has influenced the outcome in each case.16 Two main idealizations, 'strict 
compliance' and 'favorable circumstances', enable Rawls to isolate the effects of his ideal 
principles by excluding the difficulties resulting from partial compliance and the lack of 
resources.  
Critics point out that there are two main problems with using idealizations. The first 
problem regards allocating duties defined by ideal principles in actual circumstances of non-
compliance. Ideal theorizing tells us what to do in ideal circumstance when others comply and 
where there are adequate background conditions. However, such theorizing does not tell us 
what to do when others are not doing their share or where the society does not have adequate 
background conditions.17 
Problems such as global warming and global poverty require collective action to achieve 
effective change of the status quo. When others are not doing their share, our contributions 
may lose significance. In such cases,  a number of questions arise regarding the duties implied 
by principles. Should we continue doing our share regardless of its significance because ideal 
                                                          
15 Stemplowska, “What is Ideal about Ideal Theory?”,  327. 
16 Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” 8;   Hendrix, “Where should we expect change in non-ideal theory?” 
118. 
17 In a similar vein, in cases where the society is lacking ample resources for the realization of principles of 
justice, we may have an extra duty to raise resources to create background conditions. In which case,   problems 
arise in determining which duty we should  prioritize. I discuss this particular issue in detail in Chapter Two, 
when explaining two accounts of transitional and non-transitional theorizing.   
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principles tell us so? Or should we do more than our share in order to compensate for the  
absence of others’ contributions? Is there a limit to such compensation? Or should we just do 
less than our share since without strict compliance our individual action does not accomplish 
what the principles aim to do?18 
 Liam Murphy argues for the 'collective principles of beneficence,' which require 
individuals to "promote the well-being of others up to the level of sacrifice that would be 
optimal under full compliance" in contrast to 'optimizing principles of beneficence,' which 
require  individuals "to keep benefiting others until the point where further efforts would 
burden us as much as they would help others."19 The latter is unreasonable, he argues, since it 
puts excessive demands on the agents. Murphy's principle is meaningful with regards to 
problems such as global poverty. It is unreasonable to demand that agents continue benefitting 
the extremely poor until they reach the point that they are also in similar circumstances of 
severe poverty. It is reasonable, however, to argue that agents should be obliged to contribute 
as much as they would have to under the conditions of full compliance, or at least there 
should be a limit to how much they should shoulder for the stake for others. Yet, with regards 
to kinds of problems such as global warming where significant change may come if and only 
if everyone complies with the principles, 'collective principles of beneficence' lose their 
intuitive appeal. In such cases, it is reasonable to argue that the agents should not be required 
to fulfil their share under full compliance, since it would not have any significant outcome. 
The problem with ideal theorizing is that it does not specify the means to decide which course 
of action individuals should take. 
 As Laura Valentini  points out, these cases "breed scepticism regarding the possibility 
of identifying a master-principle we can apply in circumstances of partial compliance, telling 
                                                          
18 Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,” 655, 656.  
19 Liam B. Murphy, Moral Demands in Non-Ideal Theory, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 7.  
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us precisely what each ought to do."20 Instead she proposes that "individuals ought to do what 
is reasonably within their power to respond to existing injustice."21 Different kinds of 
problems demand different kinds of duties in circumstances of partial compliance. What is 
required of an agent should be distinguished case by case in relation to the kind of problem 
the principles aim to address. This further reasoning in non-ideal circumstances comes as 
complementary to ideal theorizing of justice. As long as its centrality is recognized, a 
contextual solution to the problem of allocating responsibility does not conflict with the two 
stage method of theorizing.  
 Nevertheless, at times partial compliance may lead to a problem than would the 
allocation of duties.  As Robert Jubb  argues,  “All other agents acting according to the 
principles makes it make sense for any given agent to act according to the principles, but in 
circumstances of non-compliance the principles are inappropriate. When others do not do as 
they ought to, there are injustices to which those principles do not properly respond.”22 Jubb's 
argument brings us to the second main problem raised regarding idealization, namely the 
problem of bad idealizations.  
 Idealizations are bad idealizations when they lead to false accounts of the social 
phenomena the theory itself aims to put under moral inspection.23 In such cases, the theorist 
arbitrarily abstracts away or idealizes some influential feature of her subject that needs to be 
theorized. As Lisa Schwartzman points out, the problem is not the method of bracketing, but 
rather the degree or the form of bracketing.24 First, the more a theory makes use of 
idealization the less the theory will be able to offer good guidance in actual circumstances. 
Hence, it is important for the theorist to find the balance in simplifying particular components 
                                                          
20 Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,” 656.  
21 Ibid., 656.  
22 Robert Jubb, Tragedies of non-ideal theory, European Journal of Political Theory 11, n. 3 (2012): 229–246, at 
236. 
23 Valentini, “On the apparent paradox of ideal theory,” 352.  
24Schwartzman, "Abstraction, Idealization and Obsession," 570. 
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to focus on her subject. Second, and more importantly for the current discussion, the more the 
idealizations have some bearing for the conclusion of the theory, the more the theory will 
result in giving wrong recommendations. The problem is that the "agents and institutions who 
fail to measure up to supposed ideals may be blamed for the misfit."25 In the end, in using bad 
idealization, the theory may end up being unable to give adequate guidance, if not false 
guidance, in addressing actual issues of injustice.26  
 For example, Collin Farrelly discusses the two principles of justice and two priority 
rules that Rawls’ theorizes. The first principle guarantees equal basic liberties for all. The 
second principle arranges socio-economic inequalities for the improvement of the position of 
the worst off consistent with the just savings principle and fair equality of opportunity. The 
first priority rule gives an absolute priority to the first principles. The second priority rule 
gives priority to the second principle over the principle of efficiency.27 Farrelly   comments 
that 'strict compliance' and 'favorable circumstances' portray negative rights as costless. When 
negative rights are costless, "any society that exists in the circumstances of justice under 
reasonably favorable conditions could, if it just had the political will, guarantee the protection 
of these rights."28 Thereby, Rawls can serially order the principles of justice and give absolute 
priority to the first principle of justice. However, in real world circumstances of partial-
compliance and limited resources,   negative rights have substantial costs for states. 
Attempting to realize them according to the priority rule requires states to devote most of  
their budget to the realization of basic rights, leaving very limited, if at all, resources for the 
second principle. The bad idealization in Rawls' ideal theorizing then undermines the 
applicability of the first priority rule in real world circumstances. 
                                                          
25 Onora O'Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue, 42. 
26 For example, see Valentini's discussion of bad idealizations in Rawls' The Law of Peoples. Valentini, “On the 
apparent paradox of ideal theory,” 352. 
27Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 266.  
28 Farrely, “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation," 851. 
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 Schwartzman recognizes that idealizations are a necessary part of theorizing. In turn, 
rather than conceptualizing theorizing without idealization she suggests that we “focus more 
on the question of how to avoid employing false idealizations and oppressive or ideological 
normative ideals.”29 For better action guidance then, valid idealizations need to be 
distinguished from bad idealizations. One way to proceed is to make explicit and scrutinize 
each idealization that a theorist uses. David Schmidt argues that an idealization that is 
consequential for the conclusion of the argument can be legitimate only if "the variable 
actually is reintroduced and its centrality acknowledged."30 Yet, there are cases where this 
distinction cannot be made at the level of ideal theorizing. For example, the problem of racial 
injustice and the principles required to overcome the problem “cannot be determined 
acontextually, independently of the particular circumstances to which it is meant to apply.”31 
If there are deep stereotypes in society such as racial prejudices, which can only be observed 
in a particular context, then, there is a need for alternative principles to redress those contexts 
of injustice.32 The particular measures cannot be directly derived from ideal theory  but can 
only be established on a case by case basis in relation to the kind of problem that the 
principles aim to address.33  
 
1.2.2 Practice Dependent Theorizing  
Up to this point I have discussed a formal aspect of ideal theorizing. The conclusion we may 
draw from both problems of the allocation of responsibilities and bad idealizations is that 
idealizations need to be scrutinized in relation to the aim of theorizing with a focus on the 
                                                          
29 Schwartzman, "Abstraction, Idealization and Obsession," 574. 
30 David Schmidtz, "Nonideal Theory: What it is and What it needs to be," Ethics 121, n. 4 (2011): 772-796, at 
777. 
31 Ibid., 346 
32 For a discussion of racial prejudices embedded in mainstream ideal theorizing, see  Mills ““Ideal Theory” as 
Ideology.”   
33Valentini, "On the apparent paradox of ideal theory,” 346. 
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implications of the principles in actual contexts. Now we can focus on the particular aim of 
Rawlsian ideal theorizing, which is to theorize the principles of a perfectly just society. The 
question then is what kinds of idealizations are legitimate in Rawlsian ideal theorizing for 
good action guidance? We need to determine the kind of empirical information the theorizing   
should take into consideration. 
In terms of the kind of empirical information theorizing  permits, Rawlsian theorizing 
has been considered as a practice-dependent theorizing.34 Existing practices, specifically 
institutions, play an important role in the justification, formulation and implementation of 
ideal principles. Different principles are theorized for each institutional context. Practice-
dependent theorizing has been contrasted with practice-independent theorizing. For the latter, 
existing practices are only relevant in the implementation of principles. In turn, the same 
overarching principles are valid for all contexts.35 For example, a principle of luck 
egalitarianism which prescribes an equal distribution of resources moderated only on the basis 
of  individual responsibility is posed as a practice-independent criterion valid for all contexts. 
Once the luck egalitarian theorist establishes the validity of the principle, she can look for 
ways of best implementing it in different contexts.  
The distinction between practice-dependence and practice-independence is crucial in 
determining the scope of principles of justice. For example, in Rawlsian practice-dependent 
theorizing, the existence of institutions plays a constitutive role. As Andrea Sangiovanni 
argues "institutions put people in a special relationship, and it is the nature of this special 
relationship that gives rise to first principles of justice that would not have existed 
                                                          
34See for example, Andrea Sangiovanni, "Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality," The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 16, no 2 (2008): 137–164, at 138, 147; “How Practices Matter,” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, early view published online, (2015); Laura Valentini, "Global Justice and Practice Dependence: 
Conventionalism, Institutionalism, Functionalism," The Journal of Political Philosophy  19, n. 4 (2011): 375 -
497. In addition to practice-dependent and practice-independent theorizing, in  the literature, there is a further 
distinction between fact-sensitive and fact-insensitive theorizing. I here discuss only the former distinction, since 
fact-insensitive theorizing of justice advocated by Gerald Cohen gives a negative answer to the question 
regarding action guidance posed in the beginning. 
35 Sangiovanni, "Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality," 147.  
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otherwise."36 In the absence of institutions, then principles of justice are not morally relevant. 
Contrarily, for practice dependent theorizing, the principles are relevant for all contexts.37 
A number of authors describe the particular method of theorizing practice-dependent 
principles as a practice of constructive interpretation.38 In Ronald Dworkin's words, 
constructive interpretiaon refers to the process where the theorist imposes a “purpose on an 
object or a practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to 
which it is taken to belong.” Constructive interpretation involves three stages: the identifying 
(pre-interpretive), the interpretive and the critical (post-interpretive). At the pre-interpretive 
stage, theorists identify a shared object of interpretation, which for Rawlsian theorizing is the 
institution. This stage involves only observation of uncontroversial sociological facts. At the 
interpretive stage, theorists determine the point and purpose of the institution, and then, 
reconstruct the reasons of the participants for affirming the basic rules, procedures and 
standards of the institution. Finally, at the post-interpretive stage, theorists speculate on the 
way in which the institutions shape relations among participants. In the form of principles of 
justice, they point to ways through which the point and purpose of institutions can be 
reconciled with the reasons of the participants to uphold such institutions. As Lea Ypi 
explains, "the basic assumption is that since social and political institutions fundamentally 
modify the nature of relations between agents, the nature of such institutions also influences 
the reasons these agents might have for endorsing or rejecting principles designed to regulate 
                                                          
36 Ibid., 140.  
37 The importance of this distinction can be seen most clearly in the global justice debate, which I discuss in 
Chapter Three.  
38 Ronald Dworkin, The Laws Empire, (Cambridge: Harvard Universit Press, 1986), at 52 ‘Constructive 
interpretation’ is described first by Dworkin’s in his account related to interpretating law. Yet, recently, a 
number of authors such as Aaron James have used it in explaining practice dependent theorizing, 'Constructing 
Justice for Existing Practices: Rawls and the Status Quo," Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, n. 3 (2005): 281-316, 
Sangiovanni, "Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality," 148-150; Valentini, "Global Justice and Practice 
Dependence: Conventionalism, Institutionalism, Functionalism," Ypi Global Justice and Avante-Garde Political 
Agency, 52-53.  
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their reciprocal relations."39 Establishing a relationship between institutions and principles 
renders the content of the principles meaningful for the agents. 
 The major criticism to practice dependent theorizing is that so far as it starts from an 
interpretation of existing institutions, the content of principles is significantly constrained.  
First, when a particular unit of analysis is defined as the subject matter of theorizing in the 
pre-interpretive stage, and the principles are constructed to regulate merely that unit, the 
existence of that unit with its complementary structures is  taken for granted. Second, at the 
interpretive stage, taking the point and purpose of the institutions as the starting point may 
lead to reproducing the injustices perpetuated by the institution, such as historical injustices in 
theorizing ideal principles. Valentini  notes that “If principles of justice consist in an 
interpretation of existing practices, then they must fit with them. For instance, any plausible 
interpretation of the point of a hierarchical society will result in a hierarchical conception of 
justice, according to which people’s rights and opportunities vary depending on their social 
status”40 Finally, in terms of scope, so far as focusing on practices “leads us to focus on 
participants, we will be forced to ignore what should be the real possibility that a practice 
treats nonparticipants unjustly.”41 All three criticisms  stress that practice dependence 
undermines the critical capacity of ideal principles, and places theorizing to a status quo bias.  
  Advocates of practice dependent theorizing such as Sangiovanni respond to these 
critiques with an important clarification. He  remarks that “For a conception of justice to get 
off the ground, there must be some sense in which the terms of the institution are at least 
capable of being justified to all participants; if the institution must depend on systematic and 
unmediated coercion to reproduce and sustain itself, then the institution is incapable of such a 
                                                          
39 Lea Ypi. Global Justice and Avante-Garde Political Agency. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 51.   
40 Valentini, "Global Justice and Practice Dependence: Conventionalism, Institutionalism, Functionalism," 407, 
408. 
41 James, 'Constructing Justice for Existing Practices: Rawls and the Status Quo," 285. See also, Ibid., 309-311. 
20 
 
justification and must therefore be rejected.”42 Not all institutions can be included in a 
constructive interpretation. Slavery, for example, is not capable of being justified to all 
participants. In turn, we cannot take slavery for granted, and theorize principles regarding a 
just institution of slavery. This condition also eliminates institutions that exclude non-
participants based on discriminatory practices.   
 
1.2.3 An action guiding ideal theorizing 
The debate on conceptualizing ideal and non-ideal theorizing has resulted in a clearer 
methodology for ideal theorizing. So far as the advocates of  Rawls’ two stage method  can 
respond to the critiques, this method claims to guide action in actual circumstances. Valentini  
observes that ideal principles may not be immediately applicable to actual questions of 
injustice, and the particular kind of guidance may vary from case to case. Yet, she adds that 
this is not a serious charge and expecting otherwise would unreasonable.43 As Adam Swift  
states, “as long as philosophers can tell us why the ideal would be ideal, and not simply that it 
is, much of what they actually do when they do “ideal theory” is likely to help with the 
evaluation of options within the feasible set.”44 For example, Holy Lawford-Smith and 
Valentini argue that ideal theorizing uncovers a profound understanding of justice and thereby 
identifies a society’s priorities.45 Stemplowska maintains that ideal theorizing is helpful “to 
judge what we have already achieved against a final landmark of where we ought to be.”46 
She points out that judging where we are, even though we do not know precisely how to get 
there, is essential for motivation and advocating change. The extent of the deviance from the 
                                                          
42 Sangiovanni, "Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality," 162. 
43 Laura Valentini, “On the apparent paradox of ideal theory,” 340.  
44 Adam Swift, “The Value of Philosophy in Non-Ideal Circumstances,” Social Theory and Practice 34, n. 3 
(2008) 363-387, at 365. 
45 Holly Lawford-Smith, "Debate: Ideal Theory—A Reply to Valentini," The Journal of Political Philosophy 18 
(2010): 357-368; and Laura Valentini, "A Paradigm Shift in Theorizing About Justice? A Critique of Sen," 
Economics and Philosophy 27 (2011): 297-315. 
46 Stemplowska, “What is Ideal about Ideal Theory?”, 332. 
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ideal state of justice and the injustice portrays the severity of the injustice, which will be 
useful in informing the public and constructing an opinion. The extent may convince people 
that taking action is worthwhile  as the problem is urgent. Swift claims that ideal theory may 
“alert us to the presence of previously undiagnosed vices and virtues or expose some apparent 
vices as virtues.”47 For example, in contemporary liberal societies which have  undergone a 
long process of feminist transformation, there is a general belief that the society is gender just. 
In order to assess such claims of perfect justice, we need ideal theorizing at hand.48 Finally 
Robeyns suggests that in some complex cases we need a vision of the ultimate objective to 
find the right course of action. “The reason is that if this is not the case we may choose  an 
injustice-reducing action that may benefit us in the short run, but this nevertheless may lead 
us to a suboptimal situation (from the point of view of justice) in the long run, due to the path-
dependency of our actions.”49   
 
1.3 The problem of disagreement and a social choice approach  
There is one major criticism against the two stage method of Rawlsian theorizing that I 
propose has not been adequately addressed in the debate on ideal and non-ideal theorizing. In 
real world circumstances, there is persistent disagreement pertaining to both levels of the two 
stage method. There are equally valid reasons for upholding different principles of justice and 
equally valid reasons for different ways of implementing them in particular contexts. Andrew 
Masons coherently summarizes the extent of this disagreement: 
 
This disagreement arises in relation to a range of different issues and occurs at 
different levels. It includes disagreement over what counts as a just exercise of 
                                                          
47 Swift, “The Value of Philosophy in Non-Ideal Circumstances,” 2008.  
48 Ingrid Robeyns, "Amartya Sen’s Redundancy and Priority Claims in The Idea of Justice," Crooked Timber, 
(2010) 
49 Ibid. 
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coercive political power, disagreement over basic liberties and how much weight 
each should be accorded, disagreement over what constitutes a just distribution of 
wealth and income, and disagreement over what decision-making procedures are 
likely to produce the most just outcomes. Sometimes these disagreements are over 
fundamental principles, whilst on other occasions they concern the application of 
shared principles to complex circumstances that are interpreted differently. At a 
more abstract level (and mainly in academic writings), there is disagreement over 
whether an adequate theory of justice must be constructivist, realist, or 
contextualist in character—or none of these.50  
 
The action guidance of the two stage method depends on mutual agreement on a set of ideal 
principles. We can achieve the role of ideal theorizing specified by its advocates only by 
virtue of  mutual agreement on a set of ideals. In the context of disagreement,  societal 
priorities will vary and we will have multiple landmarks to judge what we have achieved or 
where we are leading.51 To guide action in this context we “need substantive or evaluative 
judgments about the relative importance or value of the different values at stake.”52 Yet, the 
two stage method does not provide us with any of the tools.53 The critical part of this 
dissertation argues against Rawls' two stage method due to the problems arising from the fact 
of pervasive disagreement. The constructive part develops Amartya Sen's social choice 
approach to justice as a method that can deliver concrete judgments in comparing policies. 
  In Chapter 2, I begin by evaluating Amartya Sen’s call for a radical divorce from the 
Rawlsian social contract approach. Sen challenges the Rawlsian method with two distinct 
claims. First, he claims that identifying the perfectly just social state is redundant in 
                                                          
50 Andrew Mason, "Rawlsian Theory and the Circumstances of Politics," 659. 
51 Lawford-Smith, "Debate: Ideal Theory—A Reply to Valentini," 361.  
52 Swift, “The Value of Philosophy in Non-Ideal Circumstances,” 369.  
53 One role of ideal theorizing still relevant in the context of multiple ideals is what Swift has pointed out in 
identifying undiagnosed vices.   
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advancing justice by arguing that such identification is neither sufficient nor necessary for 
making relational rankings of alternative social states.54 Second, he claims that the method is 
lethally indeterminate by arguing that reaching an agreement on ideal principles is not 
feasible.55 Therefore, he concludes, the Rawlsian approach needs to be abandoned.  
I argue that Sen’s argument is insufficient to ground his call for radical divorce. Yet, I 
also show that there is a more important problem with Rawlsian theorizing. In Section 2.2 I 
unpack Sen’s claim that for the purposes of comparison, theorizing a perfectly just social state 
is neither sufficient nor necessary. I develop the Rawlisan method in detail by introducing two 
kinds of reasoning: non-transitional and transitional, through which we can construct non-
ideal principles based on ideal principles. With a hypothetical case of policy choice regarding 
health care, I demonstrate that the Rawlsian method is unable to identify determinate rankings 
of alternative social states. My analysis in this section supports Sen's claim of redundancy. In 
Section 2.3, I offer an alternative interpretation of the Rawlsian approach by emphasizing that 
determinate rankings are not the primary aim of theorizing. Instead, the method demarcates a 
set of legitimate courses of action. Within the legitimate set, each course of action is as 
morally good as is the other. I argue that the alternative interpretation circumvents both claims 
of redundancy and indeterminacy. In Section 2.4, I develop Sen’s social choice approach. I 
show that for a number of cases his approach can morally distinguish between actions within 
the legitimate set. This outcome implies that the Rawlsian approach is mistaken in asserting 
that the social states within the legitimate set are morally indistinguishable, an assertion that is 
a more serious drawback than is Sen's initial critique. Finally, in Section 2.5, I conclude by 
emphasizing along with Sen that we need to take moral reasoning further in order to advance 
justice whenever we can.  
                                                          
54Sen, The Idea of Justice, 9. 
55Ibid,  9. 
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 In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I respectively analyze two cases of policy choice in 
different domains of justice: the first regards implementing global taxes on natural resources; 
and, the second, reforming the European Union asylum policy. The reason for working on 
these cases is that I share Pogge's belief that the best support for  the claim that philosophers 
can illuminate what really matters "comes not from abstract arguments" but "from showing by 
doing: from working through a problem so as to make evident its importance."56  
In Chapter 3, I compare three competing proposals for implementing global taxes on 
natural resources: Hillel Steiner’s ‘Global Fund’, Thomas Pogge’s ‘Global Resource 
Dividend’ and Paula Casal’s ‘Global Share’. Using the social choice approach that I develop 
in Chapter Two, I show that we can reach a mutual agreement on a morally better policy 
among alternatives without reaching an overall agreement on ideal principles. In Section 3.2, I 
begin with a discussion of how principles are grounded in the global justice debate. After a 
brief overview of the two classic positions in this regard, statist and cosmopolitan, I argue that 
both positions contain problems in the application of the social choice approach to the 
distribution of global resources. For statists, the demand for mutual agreeability on courses of 
action, which the social choice approach requires, is too stringent. Individuals or states in the 
globe are not in a relation that gives rise to stringent duties. For cosmopolitans, there are in 
fact principles of distributive justice that govern the relationship between individuals in the 
globe. Yet, principles that govern the distribution of global natural resources can only be 
posed within the general distributive scheme. The demand for mutual agreeability is relevant 
for identifying the general distributive principles but not for the particular domain of global 
natural resources. Instead, I argue that the method of the third wave theorists who maintain 
that there are multiple grounds for theorizing principles of justice for different domains is 
suitable for the application of the social choice approach. In Section 3.3, I proceed with the 
                                                          
56 Thomas Pogge, Politics as Usual, What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric, 8. 
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social choice approach. I describe the alternative states implied by proposals of Steiner, 
Pogge, and Casal in terms of tax base, rate, and distributive aspects. In Section 3.4, I 
determine how the social states are valued from different ethical perspectives. From the 
exchange between the three authors I single out eight different perspectives: egalitarian, 
prioritarian, sufficientarian, utilitarian, libertarian, conservation of resources, as well as 
considerations regarding transitional aspects and equal respect of persons. From each 
perspective I derive a particular ranking of the three proposals. Egalitarian, prioritarian, and 
conservation of resources prioritize the Global Share, sufficientarian, utilitarian and 
transitional perspective prioritize the Global Resource Dividend and the libertarian 
perspective and perspective of equal respect  prioritizes the Global Fund. Before I go on to 
discussing the relative valuations of the rankings, in Section 3.5, I respond to two main 
objections to the social choice method regarding feasibility and impartial spectators. 
Responding to the feasibility objection, I emphasize that we need to take seriously Sen's 
requirement for public scrutiny of option. Each argument provided by impartial spectators 
needs to be rigorously engaged in order to reach a clearer understanding of each proposal. 
Responding to the impartiality objection, I bring in Thomas Scanlon's requirement that 
principles should be such that others could not reasonably reject for assessing the ethical 
perspectives and Gerald Cohen's interpersonal test in evaluating the arguments for the 
implementation of a policies. In Section 3.6, I pose Steiner, Pogge, and Casal as impartial 
spectators who impart arguments that imply relative valuations of the eight perspectives. 
Then, I point at the overlaps among relative valuations and show the extent of agreement 
regarding the policies. Finally, in Section 3.7, I draw two recommendations for reforming the 
policies towards a less unjust alternative. My first suggestion is to reform the Global Resource 
Dividend to an extent that it can conserve natural resources at least as well as Global Share 
can. My second suggestion is to reform the Global Resource Dividend to an extent that it 
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sustains equal respect for individuals at least as much as the Global Fund does. Reforming the 
Dividend in these ways gives us a morally better alternative that all can mutually agree.    
 In Chapter 4, I compare the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) with two 
alternatives for reforming the in terms of justice. I reconstruct these alternatives by combining 
the already existing practices of the CEAS together with two opposing attitudes to the asylum 
seekers. The first policy proposal, which I call 'Turn Back', is designed to prevent the Syrian 
asylum seekers from entering  EU territory. The second proposal, which I call  'Fair Share', is 
designed to provide shelter for the asylums seekers and share the burden among the Member 
States.  I assess the policies by applying the three step method of social choice that I develop 
in the previous chapters. In Section 4.4, I begin with the first step by describing the alternative 
social states implied by the policies as richly as the assessment requires. In Section 4.5, I 
discuss six ethical perspectives by which we can value the proposals: libertarian, basic rights, 
utilitarian, equal respect, state sovereignty and solidarity. Libertarian, basic rights and 
utilitarian perspectives prioritize the Fair Share. Perspectives of state sovereignty and 
solidarity prioritize the Turn Back and, equal respect, the CEAS. Next in Section 4.6, I first 
identify impartial spectators who give relative valuations of the rankings by different 
perspectives, and then look for overlaps among rankings of impartial spectators with the aim 
of identifying pair wise valuations. Yet, prior to three steps of the social choice approach, in 
Section 4.2, I offer an account of the asylum policies of the neighboring countries of Syria 
and the actual conditions of the asylum seekers. In Section 4.3, I then offer an account of the 
commitments of the EU Member states based on the Refugee Convention. Both accounts are 
important for understanding the social states described in Section 4.4 and their assessment by 
the ethical perspectives in Section 4.5. Finally, in Section 4.7, I conclude by pointing out that 
even though the perspective of state sovereignty does not prioritize Fair Share, this absence is 
not an obstacle for the mutual agreement. In addition, I suggest reforming Fair Share by 
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including the choices of the asylum seekers as criteria for determining the country of 
relocation. Thereby, mutual agreement on Fair Share is possible as the method does take into 
consideration the decisions of the asylum seekers as much as does CEAS claims it does. 
 In Chapter 5, I highlight a number of aspects of the social choice approach to 
theorizing justice. In section 5.2, I emphasize that it is able to incorporate pervasive 
disagreement in society regarding injustices better than its alternatives. I argue that Rawlsian 
constructivism and Cohen's intuitionism take into consideration the point of views of others in 
two different levels of theorizing. The social choice approach, by bringing these two aspects 
together better  responds to pervasive disagreement in real world circumstances. 
In section 5.3, I emphasize that the social choice approach enables us to refrain from 
making authoritarian judgments. I argue that the moral judgments in comparing policy 
proposals as far as they are concerned with social morality, they are authoritative. In turn, I 
show that if we do not go as far as we can with moral reasoning, we are prone to make 
authoritarian judgments. As an example I show how the Rawlsian method I discuss in Chapter 
2 suffers from this problem. Then, I discuss  the cases of implementing global taxes on natural 
resources and reforming EU asylum policy. Finally, in Section 5.4, I emphasize that the 
judgments of social choice approach can  always be improved with new perspectives and 
information. The only way to achieve it in practice is with sustaining an environment for free 
and open-ended discussion.    
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2. Advancing justice: the Rawlsian vs. social choice approach 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Guiding courses of action in advancing justice requires comparing alternative social states in 
terms of justice. Such comparisons can be guided by the application of varying approaches in 
the literature on theorizing justice. This chapter focuses upon a recent discussion of Amartya 
Sen’s criticism of the Rawlsian  approach dominant in political theory since A Theory of 
Justice.57 In “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?”,58 followed by The Idea of 
Justice59 Sen calls for a radical divorce from the Rawlsian tradition, claiming that it is unable 
to guide action in the face of pressing problems of injustice. The problem with the Rawlsian 
approach, Sen argues, lies with its method which draws on the identification of the perfectly 
just social state for guiding action. 
As  I discuss in Section 1.2, John Rawls maintains that ideal theorizing constitutes the 
sole basis for a systematic grasp of actual injustices.60 Ideal theorizing identifies ideal 
principles that govern the perfectly just society. Non-ideal principles that guide courses of 
action in actual circumstances are derived from ideal principles. In order to engage in non-
ideal theorizing, we need an ideal theory already at hand.61 A number of assumptions sustain 
the proposed relationship between ideal and non-ideal principles. As Rawls points out, ideal 
principles project an aim and guide social reform.62 Actual injustices can be identified as well 
as ranked depending on how far they deviate from the perfectly just scheme. Even if the 
                                                          
57 Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.  
58Amartya Sen, “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?” The Journal of Philosophy 103 (2006): 215-238. 
59 Sen, The Idea of Justice. 
60 Rawls, A Theory of Justice,8; Rawls, The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 90.  
61Rawls, The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason, 89-90.   
62Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 215; The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 90. 
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measure of the departures from the ideal is primarily left to intuition, our judgment is 
essentially guided by the ideal of a perfect society.63 Sen challenges the Rawlsian method 
with two distinct claims. First, he claims that identifying the perfectly just social state is 
redundant in advancing justice by arguing that it is neither sufficient nor necessary for 
making relational rankings of alternative social states.64 Second, he claims that the method is 
lethally indeterminate by arguing that reaching an agreement on ideal principles is not 
feasible.65 Therefore, he concludes, the Rawlsian  approach needs to be abandoned. As an 
alternative, he offers his social choice approach. 
Sen’s argument is insufficient to ground his call for radical divorce. His two claims 
need to be reassessed in the face of an alternative interpretation of the Rawlsian  approach. 
Moreover, it remains to be shown that the social choice approach is ultimately preferable. In 
this Chapter, I offer an argument to this end. In section 2.2 I begin by unpacking Sen’s claim 
that for the purposes of comparison, theorizing a perfectly just social state is neither sufficient 
nor necessary. I develop the Rawlisan method in detail by introducing two kinds of reasoning: 
non-transitional and transitional, through which we can construct non-ideal principles based 
on ideal principles. With a hypothetical case of policy choice about health care, I demonstrate 
that the Rawlsian method is unable to identify determinate rankings of alternative social 
states. My analysis in this section supports Sen's claim of redundancy. In Section 2.3, I offer 
an alternative interpretation of the Rawlsian  approach by emphasizing that determinate 
rankings are not the primary aim of theorizing. Instead, the method demarcates a set of 
legitimate courses of action. Within the legitimate set each course of action is as morally good 
as is the other. I argue that the alternative interpretation circumvents both claims of 
redundancy and indeterminacy. In Section 2.4, I develop Sen’s social choice approach. I show 
                                                          
63Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 216. 
64Sen, The Idea of Justice, 9. 
65Ibid.,  9. 
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that for a number of cases it can morally distinguish between actions within the legitimate set. 
This outcome implies that the Rawlsian  approach is mistaken in asserting that the social 
states within the legitimate set are morally indistinguishable, an assertion that is a more 
serious drawback than Sen's initial critique. Finally, Section 2.5, I conclude by emphasizing 
with Sen that we need to take moral reasoning further in order to advance justice whenever 
we can.  
 
2.2 Unpacking Sen’s critique 
Sen’s first claim regarding the Rawlsian method is that ideal theorizing is neither sufficient 
nor necessary for ranking alternative social states. He argues that there is no analytical 
connection between ideal theorizing and actual comparative judgments.66 In other words, the 
former cannot supply the theoretical tools needed for advancing justice. 
Sen’s argument is based on the complexity of the comparison between alternative states 
in virtue of their respective distance from the ideal state. Sen writes, 
 
The difficulty lies in the fact that there are different features involved in identifying 
distance, related, among other distinctions, to different fields of departure, varying 
dimensionalities of transgressions, and diverse ways of weighing separate infractions.67  
 
Sen does not merely point to the unfeasibility of computing distance between an ideal 
state and the actual states in comparison. There is a more fundamental problem at hand. The 
information regarding the distance of alternatives from the ideal does not necessarily imply a 
definite ranking among the alternatives. According to Sen, measuring distance from the ideal 
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involves many variables. Each variable can be assessed in conflicting ways based on different 
valuations of various dimensions of justice. Hence, ranking alternative social states requires a 
valuation of the relative importance of different dimensions of justice, a process which the 
identification of perfectly just social state does not provide.68  
Sen’s criticism severely undermines the ability of the Rawlsian  approach to guide 
action. Yet, it needs to be substantiated. In order to analyze how theories in the vast literature 
of Rawlsian justice guide action, I distinguish between two kinds of reasonings. I call the first 
kind of reasoning ‘non-transitional' with reference to its alternative 'transitional'. Non-
transitional reasoning compares alternative social states based on the values and relations 
identified by ideal principles. Transitional reasoning, on the other hand, compares alternative 
social states by virtue of their ability to bring society to a state of perfect justice. The two 
kinds of reasoning are forms of non-ideal theorizing in the sense that they guide action in 
actual circumstances. In the rest of the section, I discuss them respectively through a 
hypothetical case of health care policy.69 Ultimately, I show that the Rawlsian method is not 
sufficient to identify relational rankings of alternative social states.     
 
2.2.1 Non-transitional reasoning  
The main assumption of non-transitional reasoning is that ideal theorizing uncovers a 
profound understanding of justice and thereby identifies a society’s priorities.70 In theorizing 
                                                          
68Ibid., 99. Sen points out that some theorists have offered ‘conglomera’ theories that provide principles for both 
identifying the perfectly just society and comparing actual social states. Rawlsian theorizing is an example of a 
conglomera theory so far as it provides both ideal principles and priority rules that guide trade off questions in 
actual circumstances. Yet, Sen stresses that the latter does not follow from the former (Sen, The Idea of Justice, 
16-17). I discuss in detail the Rawlsian principles in the following section.    
69Although my illustrative case throughout the paper is about policy choice, my discussion is not confined to 
policy analysis. The idea of action guidance is broader. It aims to include analyses of individual interactions, 
social movements as well as institutions. 
70As I point out in Subsection 1.2.3, number of philosophers have emphasized this role for ideal theorizing. For 
example, see Holly Lawford-Smith, "Debate: Ideal Theory—A Reply to Valentini,"; and Valentini, "A Paradigm 
Shift in Theorizing About Justice? A Critique of Sen."  
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ideal principles we come to know what aspects of a society matter for an assessment of 
justice. Non-transitional reasoning uses this knowledge to achieve improvements of justice by 
constructing non-ideal principles that resemble ideal principles as much as possible. Rather 
than aiming for the ideal state of justice, non-transitional reasoning opts for elimination of 
actual injustices.71 
Principles of ideal theorizing are used in the formulation of non-ideal principles. Hence, 
non-transitional reasoning requires an ideal theory at hand. According to Costanze Binder, the 
description of the perfectly just society points at the salient features for assessments of justice 
by determining values and relations which guide the comparisons of social states.72 It 
provides the necessary information needed for making comparisons, namely, the metric of 
justice (a) and the principles (b). The former specifies the kind of empirical information 
necessary to make any assessment. It tells us where to look. The latter specifies what makes a 
society just. It tells us which particular relation we need to take into account while making the 
comparisons.73  
Let’s look at a case of distributive justice where we need to rank three alternative 
courses of action by non-transitional reasoning. Suppose a society has a health care policy that 
provides free medical care for its citizens without medical insurance for a period of two years 
of unemployment (Po) and is faced with a decision between reforming health care by two 
alternative policies Px and Py or postponing reform. Px provides free medical care without 
any time constraints for the unemployed citizens who do not have medical insurance. Py 
provides no free medical care for its unemployed citizens. Again suppose that there is an 
agreement in society that the Rawlsian ideal principles are the most appropriate principles of 
                                                          
71Costanze Binder, "Action Guidance and Comparative Theories of Justice," unpublished manuscript, 2. My 
account of non-transitional reasoning mainly draws on Binder’s account of comparative theories of justice. 
72Ibid., 7.  
73Ibid., 2, 8.  
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justice. Then, for a comparison using non-transitional reasoning we need to consider (a) and 
(b) in accordance with the Rawlsian ideal principles. For (a), we identify information 
regarding the status of ‘primary goods’ such as basic rights and liberties, income and wealth, 
and the social bases of self-respect as the metric of justice in social states implied by the 
policies.74 And for (b), we compare primary goods with respect to the Rawlsian principles and 
priority rules. The first principle guarantees equal basic liberties for all.75 The second 
principle arranges socio-economic inequalities for the improvement of the position of the 
worst off consistent with the just savings principle and fair equality of opportunity. The first 
priority rule gives an absolute priority to the first principles. The second priority rule gives 
priority to the second principle over the principle of efficiency.76  
Yet, the relation between ideal principles and actual circumstances can be problematic. 
In most cases, the assumptions of ideal background conditions of ideal theorizing prevent 
ideal principles to be directly applied in actual circumstances.77 Non-transitional reasoning 
recognizes such limitations. It does not assume that ideal principles are sufficient for an actual 
comparison, but that they identify the priorities of society. In this sense, the assessment is 
grounded on a moderate interpretation of the priority of ideal theorizing. Ideal theorizing is 
temporarily prior to non-ideal theorizing, since to begin with the model requires specific ideal 
                                                          
74Rawls provides a list of primary goods ‘a. basic rights and liberties, also given by a list; b. freedom of 
movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities; c. powers and 
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structure; d. income and wealth; and finally, e. the social bases of self-respect’ John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2005,) 181.   
75Rawls provides a list of basic liberties, ‘Important among these are political liberty (the right to vote and to 
hold public office) and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom 
of the person, which includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment 
(integrity of the person); the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as 
defined by the concept of the rule of law.’ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 53. 
76Ibid., 266.  
77Michael Phillips calls the view that ideal principles have direct applications in actual circumstances ‘moral 
purism’. It is untenable for it makes space for logical incoherence as absence of proper institutions makes us 
logically impossible to act on them Michael Phillips, "Reflections on theTransition from Ideal to Non-Ideal 
Theory," Noûs 19 (1985): 551-570, at 556. 
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principles. Yet, it is not logically prior to non-ideal theorizing as the outcome of comparison 
is not finalized by ideal principles.78 
In most comparisons, tradeoff questions arise due to differences between ideal and 
actual background conditions. In turn, we need to reinterpret ideal principles for the particular 
question at hand. Non-transitional reasoning suggests that the tradeoff questions should also 
be guided by the priorities of society. In our case with the Rawlsian ideal principles, the 
absolute priority rules are unsustainable in actual circumstances of scarce resources.79 Yet, 
they still guide the comparison in a less strict sense. As Rawls writes, “The lexical ranking of 
the principles specifies which elements of the ideal are relatively more urgent, and the priority 
rules this ordering suggests are to be applied to non-ideal cases as well.”80 For example, 
tradeoff questions such as ‘which basic liberties need to be prioritized?’ or ‘how improved 
should the position of the worst off be?’ are assessed by their contribution for a better 
enhancement of liberties in general. 
 In returning to the comparative assessment of two healthcare policies, we first compare 
the status of basic liberties implied by three courses of action. Assuming that basic health care 
is not among an individual’s basic rights, the comparative question does not relate to the first 
principle of justice. Yet, it does relate to the second principle. On the one hand, Px improves 
the position of the worst off by providing free access to medical care for unemployed citizens 
without health insurance. On the other hand, Py exacerbates the position of the worst off by 
refraining medical care from unemployed citizens. The comparison can be made not only in 
terms of material resources but also in sustaining the social base of self-respect. Since the two 
policies do not directly relate to the just savings principle or the principle of equality of 
                                                          
78Here I draw on Burke Hendrix’s distinction between logical and temporal priority of ideal theorizing. Hendrix, 
"Where should we expect change in non-ideal theory?"  
79The point that a commitment to Rawlsian priority rules leads to counter-intuitive results is well demonstrated 
by Collin Farrely. Farrely, "Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation." 
80Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 216.  
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opportunity, we can establish a ranking between three courses of action, Px>Po>Py, and argue 
that Px needs to be preferred to Po and Py.81 
Yet, the analysis is not confined to non-transitional reasoning. The policy choice 
transforms the background conditions which have direct implications for tradeoff questions. 
Hence, we need to take into account the implications of any policy on the background 
conditions. How the analysis should proceed in the face of such considerations is reflected in 
the following discussion of transitional reasoning.  
 
2.2.2 Transitional reasoning 
Transitional reasoning is grounded on a stricter interpretation of Rawls' distinction between 
ideal and non-ideal theorizing. According to this interpretation, the former is both logically 
and temporarily primary to the latter.82 In other words, ideal theorizing is both a good starting 
and ending point. Rawls maintains that the transition to an ideal state of justice is a long term 
project that should be theorized accordingly.83 As he points out: 
 
Non-ideal theory asks how this long-term goal might be achieved, or worked toward, usually in 
gradual steps. It looks for policies and courses of action that are morally permissible and 
politically possible as well as likely to be effective.84 
  
                                                          
81The rankings of policies that I present throughout the paper are based on empirical assumptions. Alternative 
empirical assumptions would point to alternative rankings. Yet, this contingency does not undermine my 
illustrative point about how the two reasonings function in guiding action. 
82My account of transitional reasoning draws on John Simmons’ argument for transitional theorizing. Simmons, 
"Ideal and Nonideal Theory." 
83For example, in Rawls’ view of international justice the questions of non-ideal theory ‘are questions of 
transition, of how to work from a world containing outlaw states and societies suffering from unfavorable 
conditions to a world in which all societies come to accept and follow the Law of Peoples.’ Rawls, Law of 
Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,  90. 
84Ibid., 89. 
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John Simmons follows Rawls’ formulation and argues for a transitional understanding 
of non-ideal theorizing. The main assumption is that all societies aim for a state of perfect 
justice. In turn, the aim of non-ideal theorizing should be to identify transitional non-ideal 
principles that carry society to a state of perfect justice. Non-ideal principles are constructed 
for overcoming obstacles that result from deviances from the main idealizations of ideal 
theorizing. They are justified by the fact that they aim to pursue the perfect society that ideal 
theorizing has identified. Moreover, in order to achieve perfect justice, partial principles that 
address only one domain of justice are rejected in virtue of an integrated approach.85 As 
Simmons points out, theorizing that targets injustices here and now, or only one domain of 
justice, may turn out to be staggering or even blocking the improvements on other domains or 
the society’s chances of reaching overall justice.86  
Let’s consider what transitional reasoning implies for the comparative case at hand. One 
of the main idealizations of Rawls’ ideal theorizing is ‘favorable conditions’. It implies that 
society has enough natural resources and an adequate level of economic and technological 
development to establish institutions governed by ideal principles. Suppose that like most 
contemporary societies our society does not have ideal favorable conditions. Then, 
transitional reasoning identifies courses of action that contribute to sustaining favorable 
resources. Py, which implies significantly lower public spending than do Po and Px, 
accumulates resources that can be used in improving the background conditions of society. Px 
and Po, which imply higher public spending in virtue of expanding free medical care, prevent 
the accumulation. In turn, Po and Px may block prospective improvements for the worst off in 
society. When the background conditions are improved, there is the chance to implement 
more effective policies to better improve the position of the worst off. Po and Px may also 
                                                          
85For a discussion of partial and comprehensive (integrated) ideal theorizing, see Ingrid Robeyns, "Ideal Theory 
in Theory and Practice," 341-353. 
86Simmons, "Ideal and Nonideal Theory," 22-24.  
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undermine society’s abilities to address socio-economic improvements in other domains. And, 
more importantly, they may distance society from establishing basic liberties for all, which is 
prioritized by the first principle.  Hence, transitional reasoning identifies an alternative 
ranking between the three courses of action, Py>Po>Px. 
Yet, transitional reasoning has a large scope that can justify a number of counter-
intuitive courses of action. Many desirable courses of action identified by non-transitional 
reasoning can be rejected or undesirable ones can be justified in the name of contributing to a 
long term project. Hence, it is important to determine if the transitional reasoning indeed 
corresponds with the aims of enhancing justice. To this end, we can consider the three 
restricting conditions for transitional policies and courses of action that Rawls recognizes. 
They must be ‘morally permissible’, ‘politically possible’ and ‘likely to be effective’ in 
moving society toward the ideal of perfect justice.87 In addition, we can add a fourth condition 
that Simmons emphasizes: we should foremost address the most grievous injustices.88 Let me 
briefly discuss how these restricting conditions may influence our case for policy choice. 
The political possibility of a course of action relates to a number of aspects regarding 
the makeup of the society. The political possibility of choosing transitional reasoning over 
non-transitional reasoning is related to the willingness of society for giving up what is 
considered to be the course of action that leads to less justice here and now (Px>Po>Py) for a 
long term and integrated project of perfect justice (Py>Po>Px).  The public deliberation on 
the latter involves competing claims based on the two kinds of reasoning with constraints 
specified by the particular problem at hand. For our case, we can demonstrate possible lines of 
reasoning by adding the relative information.  First, the citizens may find it morally 
impermissible to implement Py instead of Px. Abstaining free medical care from the 
                                                          
87Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 89.  
88Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” 18.  
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unemployed may have dire consequences especially for the vulnerable parts of population, 
such as the homeless or illicit drug users. It can be argued that substantial increases in 
mortality rates related to infectious diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis are morally 
impermissible. Second, citizens may judge that the condition of those who do not receive 
medical care because they are unable to pay for insurance is the most grievous injustice. 
Hence, the resource accumulation of Py for an integrated approach that addresses all domains 
of justice at the same time is unjustified and should be rejected. Third, the citizens may judge 
Py to be an ineffective step to build the background conditions of ideal justice. It can be 
argued that resource accumulation implied by Py undermines the abilities of the vulnerable 
population to enjoy basic liberties and equality of opportunity, which has bad consequences 
for economic growth and long term resource accumulation of society.   
An analysis of the two kinds of reasoning lays out possible tradeoff questions that arise 
due to the method of Rawlsian  approach. We may now ask if we can reach a definite ranking 
of policies Px and Py for the comparative question at hand. The first step is to make the 
relevant calculations of the implications of a particular policy precise enough. In virtue of the 
Rawlsian ideal principles, we need to determine all the implications of the policy on different 
political liberties, the worst off part of society, and the background conditions. Although the 
task is complicated and involves multiple disciplines, it can be resolved. The second step, 
where we compare the precise implications of alternative policies, is more controversial. The 
problem is that ideal principles do not tell us how to assess competing valuations reached by 
the two kinds of reasoning.89 For example, citizens may judge that not receiving health care is 
not the most grievous injustice in society. At the same time, they may hold the opinion that 
the rising mortality rates among the vulnerable are not morally permissible and emphasize 
                                                          
89The priority rules identified by Rawls can be adopted to apply to actual circumstances as well. Sen points out 
that Rawlsian theory is a conglomera theory that is able to work to some extent at both levels. However, even the 
priority rules do not enable us to reach definite rankings. 
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that the position of the worst off needs to be improved in the domain of health. Both claims 
are based on the same ideal principles of justice. We cannot rank them without establishing 
relative valuations. Identifying the perfectly just social state is not sufficient for comparing 
alternative social states. This conclusion supports Sen's claim of redundancy.90  
 
2.3 Demarcating the set of legitimate courses of action  
However, there is an alternative interpretation of the Rawlsian method that circumvents Sen’s 
criticism. Sen writes that:   
 
The absence of such comparative implications is not, of course, an embarrassment for a 
transcendental theory itself, seen as a freestanding achievement. The relational silence is not, in 
any sense, an ‘internal’ difficulty’; indeed, some pure transcendentalists would be utterly 
opposed even to flirting with gradings and comparative assessments, and may quite plausibly 
shun relational conclusions altogether. They may point in particular to their understanding that a 
‘right’ social arrangement must not, in any way, be understood as a ‘best’ social arrangement.91 
 
As Sen recognizes, the exact formulation of relational rankings may not be interpreted 
as an aim of Rawlsian theorizing, a result which renders his criticism ‘external’. Rawls has a 
different understanding of how theorizing justice can guide action. He explicitly recognizes 
the importance of addressing urgent problems of everyday life and offers ideal theorizing as 
the guide for judgments in actual circumstances.92 However, he maintains that in the context 
of reasonable disagreement, the convictions of individuals do not converge on exact rankings. 
                                                          
90The second part of Sen’s claim of redundancy, namely that identifying the perfectly just social state is not 
necessary for comparing alternative social states can be supported by demonstrating that there is a feasible 
alternative to the Rawlsian approach that does not draw on ideal theorizing. I take up this task in the last section 
where I develop Sen’s social choice approach. 
91Sen, The Idea of Justice, p. 99. 
92Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 8, 215-216; Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 90.   
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Instead, individuals can specify a framework of deliberation that is able to sustain fair and 
effective social cooperation.93 Identifying the basis of the deliberative framework is the 
primary aim of theorizing justice. Afterwards, we can determine whether a course of action is 
legitimate in virtue of the deliberative framework.  
2.3.1 Sequences from the first principles 
It is important to track the process followed by the Rawlsian  approach to understand the 
specific idea of action guidance implied above. The prior step is ideal theorizing, which 
specifies the general first principles that govern the basic structure of an ideal society. Then, a 
sequence is determined through which more particular subjects in actual circumstances are 
respectively theorized. The theoretical unity is sustained by the connection between each 
particular principle and the previous more general principles.94 The deliberation that is 
involved both in identifying ideal principles and the sequences constitute the framework, 
where the former guides the whole process.  
The sequences can be modeled as the two kinds of reasoning I have introduced in the 
previous section. Non-transitional and transitional reasoning(s) show how particular cases can 
be linked with ideal principles. Courses of action that relate to the ideal principles in virtue of 
the two models are considered legitimate; the rest are not. In this way, the deliberative 
framework enables individuals to demarcate a set of legitimate actions. Let's turn back to our 
case regarding the choice of health care policy. A particular ranking between the three courses 
of action Px>Po>Py that we assert based on the belief that Px improves the position of the 
worst off is legitimate because it is an outcome of a sequence guided by ideal principles. An 
alternative ranking Py>Po>Px that we assert based on the belief that Py improves the 
background conditions of society towards achieving a full state of justice is also legitimate for 
                                                          
93Rawls, Political Liberalism, 3, 368.  
94Ibid., 262.  
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the same reasons, provided that the policy does not violate the restricting conditions. 
Moreover, a middle ground such as Po>Px>Py or Po>Py>Px is also legitimate so long as it is 
based on a reasoning that specifies a balance between the two sequences.  
As Rawls points out, the measure of departures from the ideal, which grounds relational 
rankings of legitimate courses of action, is left mainly to intuition.95 The exact distance of the 
alternative state from the ideal is valued differently by each individual. Among legitimate 
courses of action, a particular course of action is ‘just’ for an individual based on her 
valuations. For others who have alternative valuations, the course of action is legitimate but 
not just. Hence, Sen’s first claim of redundancy needs to be qualified: the method of Rawlsian  
approach is able to guide action by demarcating legitimate actions from illegitimate ones. Yet, 
it is not sufficient to rank courses of action within the set of legitimate courses of action. 
 
2.3.2 Reasonable first principles 
At the previous step of theorizing ideal principles Sen raises his claim of indeterminacy. 
Rawls maintains that in order to initiate any sequence that determines the set of legitimate 
courses of action, we need to agree on a unique set of ideal principles. He emphasizes that the 
justification of principles ‘is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of 
everything fitting together into one coherent view’.96 The required agreement is modeled by a 
hypothetical initial situation called the 'original position'. Rational and equal people cleansed 
of vested interests deliberate in order to identify a conception of justice that specifies 
appropriate principles.97 Sen points out that ‘what we do not know is whether the plurality of 
                                                          
95Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 216.  
96Ibid., 19.  
97Rawls, Political Liberalism, 22. The deliberation involves ranking alternative traditional conceptions of justice 
based on how the conceptions reflect preferences in terms of primary goods and feasibility consideration. Ibid., 
271-278.  Although Rawls recognizes that there are competing reasons for alternative conceptions of justice, he 
believes that there ‘may still be an overall balance of reasons plainly favoring one conception over the rest.’ 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 26. ‘Citizens of the well-ordered-society’ are expected to converge on a set of 
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reasons for justice would allow one unique set of principles of justice to emerge’.98 Even with 
the restricting assumptions of the original position that exclude vested interests, it is possible 
for parties to offer a variety of competing non-arbitrary reasons for alternative principles of 
justice. Since all have a valid claim to impartiality, there will be a plurality of outcomes.99 
Rawls recognizes this condition as ‘reasonable disagreement’. For points out that “many 
of our judgments are made under conditions where it is not to be expected that conscientious 
persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will arrive at the same 
conclusion”.100 Particularly, in the deliberation for choosing the first principles of justice, he 
recognizes that there are various equally reasonable candidates. He describes such a condition 
as follows: 
 
Thus, the content of public reason is given by a family of political conceptions of justice, and 
not by a single one. There are many liberalisms and related views, and therefore many forms of 
public reason specified by a family of reasonable political conceptions. Of these, justice as 
fairness, whatever its merits, is but one.101 
 
Sen argues that Rawls cannot consistently recognize reasonable disagreement and at the 
same time demand a unique choice at the original position without providing a method to 
select one principle among competing reasonable alternatives. The problem is that if there is 
no mutual agreement on a set of principles, or there are two sets both agreeable by society, 
then, the Rawlsian method runs into lethal indeterminacy.102  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
principles whose fairness is demonstrated by the original position. In turn the basic structure of the well-ordered 
society is organized according to the content specified by the chosen principles. Ibid., 259.   
98Sen, The Idea of Justice, 11.  
99Sen, “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?” 224. 
100Rawls, Political Liberalism, 58.  
101Ibid., 450.  
102Sen, The Idea of Justice, 12, 58.  
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However, Sen’s claim of indeterminacy also needs to be qualified. Recall that the exact 
determination of relational rankings is not the primary aim of Rawlsian theorizing. Rather, the 
aim is to identify the basis of a deliberative framework. To this end, it is sufficient to identify 
a set of reasonable ideal principles that ground a fair and effective system of social 
cooperation.  
It is important to recognize that the 'step by step' process of identifying principles and 
choosing courses of action only models how each step depends on the prior one. Such a 
process does not imply an actual sequence of events. Rather, it is a reflective tool for the 
individual. The assessment does not start from an exact identification of ideal first principles. 
It starts from evaluating the ranking. If the ranking is an outcome of one of the sequences that 
are guided by one of the ideal principles of justice, then, it is legitimate.103 
Our case regarding choice of health care policy stands out as a problem of distributive 
justice. Besides the Rawlsian ideal principles, we may formulate a number of reasonable 
distributive principles. In very simple terms, utilitarians focus on aggregate welfare, 
libertarians on securing personal entitlements, egalitarians on reducing inequalities, 
prioritarians on benefiting the worst off or sufficienterians on securing enough. Each family 
of distributive principles takes into account a specific value and relation as relevant for 
                                                          
103Considering the point of view of the actual citizens is helpful to make the claim more explicit. In Rawls’ 
theorizing, one place where the theory connects with actual circumstances is the point ‘-of you and me who are 
elaborating justice and fairness and examining it as a political conception of justice.’ Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, 28. Agents assess the political conception in relation to their convictions by a test which Rawls calls 
‘reflective equilibrium’.  If the political conception passes the test with the convictions of every other agent, 
then, 'overlapping consensus' is sustained and the conception is publicly justified.  If such justification is 
achieved, then, the agent can advance claims on others about courses of action based on the political conception, 
and expect that others recognize her claims. As Rawls writes, ‘the political conception provides a publicly 
recognized point of view from which all citizens can examine before one another whether their political and 
social institutions are just.’ Ibid., 9.  
In the account I propose, in an actual moment of choice the agent reflects on the comparative assessment through 
the two kinds of reasonings and makes a claim justified by the political conception. Yet, her claim is one of 
numerous legitimate claims. The set of legitimate claims contains rankings diversified by different first 
principles and the alternative valuations in various trade-off situations. The assessment takes place within the full 
political justification of the conception of justice. Hence, all the agents know that each claim for an alternative 
ranking is legitimate due to the sequence from the political conception. The final relational ranking of the agent 
is 'just' for her, and 'legitimate' for others.   
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making relational rankings. Ultimately, they have strong arguments that are in line with 
common intuitions about justice. In the deliberative framework, then, the choice regarding 
health care policy may be guided by any of the legitimate ideal principles of justice.  
In the discussion so far, we have reached two conclusions regarding the Rawlsian 
method. Due to reasonable disagreement in both identifying ideal principles and competing 
valuations in tradeoff situations, the ordering of alternative rankings does not provide a 
determinate choice among particular courses of action within the set of legitimate actions. 
Yet, by demarcating the set of legitimate actions, the method is able to establish the basis of 
fair and effective social cooperation. This interpretation of Rawlsian method circumvents both 
Sen’s claims of redundancy and indeterminacy. Yet, it also implies that any course of action 
within the legitimate set is morally as good as is the other. There is no need for further 
reasoning in terms of justice. Hence, the ultimate choice between the courses of action within 
the set of legitimate actions is based on factors that do not relate to justice.104 Any one of the 
three options of health care policy (Px, Py, Po) may be implemented in accordance with the 
political affiliations or economic priorities of powerful groups.105  
Yet, is there really no moral difference between any competing courses of action within 
the group of legitimate actions? Is it always morally justified to take any course of action on 
the basis that it is an implementation of a legitimate ideal principle by a legitimate sequence? 
In the following section, I develop Sen’s social choice approach as a method that is able to 
provide the tools for distinguishing between social states within the legitimate set. If social 
                                                          
104As Sen writes, “assertive incompleteness, like assertive completeness, has the effect of closing a substantive 
issue, declaring further research to be pointless.” Amartya Sen, “Well Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey 
Lectures 1984,” The Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985): 169-221, at 180. For a discussion of assertive vs. tentative 
incompleteness, see Amartya Sen, “Incompleteness and Reasoned Choice,” Synthese 140 (2004): 43–59, at 55; 
“Well Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984,” 179-180; “Maximization and the Act of 
Choice,” Econometrica 65(1997): 745-779, at 763-764. 
105Decisions that are not based on considerations of justice need not always be an imposition of the powerful 
group. Decisions can be taken with some pre-established decision making process that reflects considerations of 
efficiency, productivity or pre-established norms. However, which decision making process will be followed 
needs also to be decided based on a decision making process.  In the contemporary context of politics, the 
process is usually determined by historical contingencies that involve power relations.      
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choice approach is feasible for a number of cases, then, the Rawlsian  approach has a larger 
problem than indeterminacy. Namely, that it incorrectly asserts courses of action as morally 
indistinguishable. 
  
2.4 Social choice approach and determinate rankings 
In “What do we want from theory of justice?” Sen begins by setting out the foundations for a 
social choice approach for theorizing justice. The new approach draws on “Rawls’ lead on the 
basic connection between objectivity, public reasoning and the theory of justice.”106 It shares 
the idea of fairness based on mutual acceptability. Yet, it poses a different question than the 
Rawlsian  approach. Rather than the nature of the perfectly just social state, social choice 
approach asks what would be the less unjust alternative in a comparison. Thereby, the content 
of public reasoning is substantially different. Moral reasoning is aimed at determining the 
morally better option that can be endorsed by.  
In the constructive part of The Idea of Justice, Sen exposes the details of the novel 
approach. Moreover, he claims that it is able to identify injustices in the current world order 
such as persistent famines, exclusion of medical access, subjugation of women and torture.107 
However, nowhere does he demonstrate how an actual assessment can be made by the social 
choice approach. In this section, I aim to develop Sen's social choice approach based on my 
analysis of action guidance with the two kinds of reasoning. I first demonstrate in three steps 
how social choice approach can reach more determinate rankings of alternative social states. 
Then, I consider two objections regarding its legitimacy as an exercise of normative reasoning 
and feasibility.  
                                                          
106Sen, The Idea of Justice, 216. The social choice approach that Sen proposes differs from other theories of 
social choice in virtue of the fact that the collective choice is not grounded by aggregates of inputs such as 
preferences or votes. Rather, in line with Rawlsian idea of justice as fairness, the choice is grounded by mutual 
agreeability. 
107Ibid., 24-25, 103-104, 243.  
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The first step of social choice approach is to have a description of the alternative states 
as richly as the valuation requires.108 For actual cases, this entails a detailed inspection of the 
problem at hand. For our hypothetical case, we can specify a number of general 
characteristics of the society. Recall that as with most contemporary societies, ours does not 
have enough resources to simultaneously address all the issues of justice. Institutions are not 
fully effective in implementing distributive schemes; there is need for institutional 
improvement; and there are problems in other domains of justice such as political, gender and 
environmental justice that need to be addressed. Moreover, Px and Py are alternative policies 
that are feasible as well as accessible from the original state Po. 
 In addition, we need to specify the particular kind of information to which the 
principles we are going to use in the comparison are sensitive; the information regarding the 
values and relations which guide the comparison.109 An important feature that Sen’s social 
choice approach shares with the Rawlsian  approach is the emphasis on the mutual 
justification of principles of justice.110 Hence, only those principles that withstand critical 
scrutiny by an informed public are allowed in the deliberation. The comparative claims need 
to refer to perspectives that are acceptable by others.111 For our case at hand, let’s specify five 
distributive principles discussed in the previous section as reasonable principles; libertarian, 
egalitarian, prioritarian, sufficientarian, and utilitarian.112 
                                                          
108Amartya Sen, “Environmental Evaluation and Social Choice: Contingent Valuation and Market Analogy.” The 
Japanese Economic Review 82 (1995): 23-37, at 24.   
109For a discussion of principles of justice and their respective informational basis, see Amartya Sen, 
Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 2000), at 55-56. 
110For a discussion of commonalities between Sen and Rawls on justice as impartiality see Gerald Gaus, “Social 
Contract and Social Choice,” Rutgers Law Journal Vol 43(2012): 167-405, at 245;and on mutual justification 
see Fabienne Peter “Sen's Idea of Justice and the Locus of Normative Reasoning,” Journal of Economic 
Methodology 19 (2012): 165-167, at 166.  
111For a discussion of impartiality and objectivity see Sen, The Idea of Justice, 122. 
112The kind of principles referred here are not ideal principles designed to govern a perfectly just social state. 
Rather, they are principles that reflect the values emphasized by a particular ethos, such as an egalitarian ethos. 
In this way, social choice approach does not depend on principles of ideal theorizing. For a discussion of the 
relationship between values, principles and ethos, see Jonathan Wolff, “Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian 
Ethos,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1998): 97-122. 
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 A relevant information for the assessment is about how the resources for sustaining Px 
are to be secured, since Px requires more than Po. We also need to take into account how the 
resources that emerge from Py are to be deployed, since Py requires less than Po. 
Accordingly, we can specify that in our society Px is to be funded by the general tax scheme 
already in place. And the funding that is to emerge from Py is to be used both in addressing 
the problems with the institutions as well as other domains of justice. Other relevant 
information relates to the consequences of the policies on the well-being of individuals. We 
need to know the proportion of unemployed citizens without medical insurance to the 
employed, the level of well-being of each group of individuals and an account of how they 
will be affected by the policy decision in terms of well-being. Accordingly, we can specify 
that it is a particular moment of economic hardship. Unemployment rates are as high as 15%. 
The unemployed have insufficient income to receive medical treatment that involves costly 
controls and medication. The absence of medical treatment implies a significant decrease in 
their well-being, which can be remedied by Px. Moreover, bad health has also dire 
consequences for other aspects of their life. The unemployed individuals are no longer able to 
make efficient use of public life; furthermore, the prospects of finding employment and 
getting back health care are seriously undermined. On the other hand, the remainder of the 
population is also experiencing economic hardship. The public expenditure sustaining Px can 
instead be used for a general economic scheme that implies economic growth and consequent 
increase in the well-being of society in general.   
Having specified the relevant information, the second step is to identify alternative 
rankings of social states by the principles and the two kinds of reasoning. The above 
description of the social states is just rich enough to identify rankings of policies with non-
transitional reasoning based on the five distributive principles. Egalitarian principles (e) are 
likely to rank Px over Po and Py because the former decreases inequalities by taxing the well 
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off and improving the position of the worst off. Prioritarian principles (p) are likely to rank Px 
over Po and Py because the former helps the worst off. Sufficientarian principles (s) are likely 
to rank Px over Po and Py because without access to health care, individuals are destined to 
stay under a particular level of well-being. Utilitarian principles (u) are likely to rank Py over 
Po and Px because the decrease in the level of well-being of 15% of the population in Py is 
compensated by the increase in the well-being of the rest. Libertarian principles (l) are likely 
to rank Py over Po and Px because the latter two use the tax revenue from the well-off for the 
improvements of others, depriving the former of their personal entitlements. In addition to 
rankings based on non-transitional reasoning with five distributive principles, we need to 
consider the rankings based on transitional reasoning. Let’s assume that similar institutions 
would need to be in place in order to implement better distributive schemes implied by the 
five principles. Let’s further assume that the importance of improvements in other domains of 
justice with regards to the distributive domain is relatively similar regardless of the particular 
distributive principle that is chosen. Hence, transitional reasoning (t) based on all the five 
distributive principles is likely to rank Py over Po and Px because the former implies securing 
resources to be used in the improvement institutions and addressing problems in other 
domains of justice. 
 
Table 1  
Egalitarian 
Principles 
(e) 
Prioritarian 
Principles 
(p) 
Sufficientarian 
Principles 
(s) 
Utilitarian 
Principles 
(u) 
Libertarian 
Principles 
(l) 
Transitional 
Reasoning 
(t) 
Px Px Px Py Py Py 
Po Po Po Po Po Po 
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Py Py Py Px Px Px 
 
  
 So far, in terms of deriving rankings from principles for actual circumstances, the 
analysis is similar to the  approach. We have at hand a number of courses of action based on 
the two kinds of reasonings and five distributive principles, all of which are undistinguishable 
in terms of justice. The third step of social choice approach articulates a way to eliminate a 
number of alternatives by making use of incomplete orderings.113 We can make use of 
incomplete ordering in virtue of the particular aim of social choice approach. As I have 
emphasized, rather than identifying the perfectly just social state, the social choice approach 
aims to guide action by identifying the morally better alternative for the question at hand. 
Hence, disagreements do not need to be fully resolved for the entire society. In other words, 
the outcome of deliberation need not specify a complete ordering for all cases. 
 The reasoning has two steps. First, we identify impartial spectators who give relative 
valuations of the rankings specified at the previous step. Impartial spectators are idealized 
agents cleansed of vested interests as well as the bias of tradition and custom.114 They 
represent possible impartial rankings of different reasonings that can be proposed in relation 
to the particular policy question. Impartiality of the rankings is again sustained by reasoned 
scrutiny from different perspectives. We demand impartial reasons for each of the rankings 
proposed by the impartial spectators. For our case, let’s specify three impartial spectators who 
have alternative rankings: A (e>p>s>u>l>t)115, B (p>s>l>e>u>t) and C (s>p>l>e>t>u).116 It is 
                                                          
113For a discussion of eliminating alternatives based on incomplete orderings, see Amartya Sen, “Well Being, 
Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984,” 181. 
114'Impartial Spectator' is the idealized agent Sen adopts from Adam Smith. It not only eliminates ‘the influence 
of vested interest, but also the impact of entrenched tradition and custom’ Sen, The Idea of Justice, 44-45. 
115e>p is read as e is preferred to p. 
116It might be objected that referring to more than one impartial spectator undermines the impartiality of the 
spectators. I discuss this objection in detail in the following subsection. 
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important to note that the reasons each impartial spectator gives for ranking one ethical 
perspective over another refer to the alternative policies. In other words, rankings of the 
principles are relative to the comparative question. The same impartial spectator who assesses 
a similar question in another domain, or compare different proposals is likely to offer a 
different ranking of principles. 
 
Table 2117 
A B C 
e p s 
p s p 
s l l 
u e e 
l u t 
t t u 
 
 The second step is to look for overlaps among rankings of impartial spectators with the 
aim of identifying pair wise valuations. As Sen points out, when different parts of the plural 
evaluation point to the same valuation between two rankings, we can assert that particular 
valuation as an overall ranking.118 In the above evaluation of the impartial spectators A, B and 
C there are nine overlaps: e>u, e>t, p>u, p>l, p>t, s>u, s>t, s>l and l>t. These are nine 
valuations that all impartial spectators agree on. 
                                                          
117Gaus provides a similar illustration of how impartial spectators may rank alternatives. Gaus, “Social Contract 
and Social Choice,” 247-248. 
118For a discussion of dominance reasoning, see Amarta Sen, On Ethics & Economics, (New York: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988) at 66; and The Idea of Justice, 105.  
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 The pair-wise valuations that all impartial spectators agree on identify alternatives that 
are not judged to be worse than any other.119 Even though they do not point to the best 
alternative, the information is central for guiding action. As Sen writes, “intelligent moral 
choice demands that we not choose –explicitly or by default- an alternative that we can see is 
morally inferior to another feasible alternative.”120 According to the above nine overlaps, 
there is an agreement that u, t, and l are all inferior to at least one of the other alternatives. 
This means that it is morally wrong to choose any one of them, when there is the chance to 
choose any one of the others: e, p and s. In turn, for making a morally justified choice among 
alternative distributive principles, the option set is significantly decreased. For our case of 
health policy, the option set has also decreased to an extent that we can make a morally 
justified choice of Px, over Po and Py since all of the principles in the available set; e, p and s 
entail a ranking that prefers Px over Po and Py.  
 Contrary to the Rawlsian  approach, Sen’s social choice approach as I have developed 
offers the possibility of distinguishing a morally better choice among the three policies. This 
entails that the  approach is mistaken in asserting those courses of action as morally 
indistinguishable. There are in fact morally distinguishable courses of action within the 
legitimate set.  
 
2.5 Two Objections   
In our hypothetical case, the determinate choice was possible by virtue of the particular 
evaluations of impartial spectators A, B and C. At this point, it is useful to consider at least 
two fundamental concerns regarding the account of Sen’s social choice approach developed 
                                                          
119For a discussion of maximization and optimization, see Sen, “Maximization and the Act of Choice,” 763-769. 
120Sen, “Well Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984,” 181. Sen also points out that “The 
classical framework of optimization used in standard choice theory can be expressed as choosing, among the 
feasible options, a "best" alternative… The general discipline of maximization differs from the special case of 
optimization in taking an alternative as choosable when it is not known to be worse than any other (whether or 
not it is also seen to be as good as any other).” Sen, Maximization and the Act of Choice, 763. 
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here. First we can ask: is it justified to assert relative valuations of first principles for the 
actual question as impartial orderings? As we have seen, one of the main assumptions of  
approach is that there is reasonable disagreement on ideal principles. Taking reasonable 
disagreement seriously might bind us to affirm any relative valuation of first principles as 
subjective, rather than objective. Second, we can ask: even if the relative valuations of the 
first principles are objective, is it realistic to assume that they can take such a form as to allow 
partial orderings to significantly affect the choice set? 
 The first question concerns the legitimacy of social choice approach as an exercise of 
normative reasoning. If the relative valuations of first principles are subjective, then 
spectators cannot be impartial. A, B and C would merely represent three of a great number of 
relative valuations of the reasonings that correspond to contingent preferences of groups. In 
this sense, social choice approach would remain only as a mechanism for aligning 
preferences. It would have practical value but no normative impact.  
For Sen, the differences between the impartial spectators are a result of the way the 
question is assessed from different social positions. Yet, the relative valuations are 
positionally objective. They reflect what can be seen from a given position as a person-
invariant but position-relative observation. In other words, the orderings can be made by any 
person who occupies that social position.121 Sen maintains that objectivity "‘is not so much a 
'view from nowhere', but one from a 'delineated somewhere'".122 For our case, the ordering of 
impartial spectator A (e>p>s>u>l>t) implies that there is a social position from where the 
contextual assessment of the comparative question leads to that particular ranking. This is 
recognized also for the competing orderings of impartial spectators B (p>s>l>e>u>t) and C 
(s>p>l>e>t>u). The economic hardship in our hypothetical society; the unemployment rates, 
                                                          
121Sen, The Idea of Justice, 157-158.  
122Amartya Sen, “Positional Objectivity,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 (1993): 126-145, at 129. 
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the extent of bad health and poverty, the conditions of the institutions and other domains of 
justice can be unique experiences among varying social positions. The perception(s) of 
women, immigrants or ethnic minorities with histories of domination produces distinct 
reasonings that translate into different impartial rankings. It is important to note that 
assessment of the question is from a particular position. Assessing other questions from the 
same position may lead to alternative valuations.  
These claims, nevertheless, need to be trans-positionally consistent and put to critical 
scrutiny by an informed public. Sen suggests that the kind of scrutiny may take the form of 
Thomas Scanlon's approach in identifying reasonable principles.123 For example, the reasons 
for the emphasis on the egalitarian claims in the ordering of the impartial spectator A need to 
be such that no one could reasonably reject. 124 The reasons may be grounded on the particular 
information derived from the trans-positional experiences of a historically dominated group, 
but not on their preferences. Otherwise, the orderings would reflect their positional bias or 
illusions.125 
The second question concerns the feasibility of social choice approach. The hypothetical 
society that I have considered so far has been particularly accessible to partial orderings that 
significantly affect our choice set. Yet, is it realistic to assume similar orderings with an actual 
case?  
In order to test the feasibility of the social choice approach, let’s add three more 
impartial spectators to our evaluation of health care policy: D (l>e>t>u>s>p), E 
(t>p>s>l>e>u) and F (u>l>t>e>p>s). Each prioritizes a reasoning that has a lower ranking in 
the evaluations of the impartial spectators A, B and C. The upshot is that in the new 
                                                          
123Sen, The Idea of Justice, 197. 
124Scanlon holds that "thinking about right and wrong is, at the most basic level, thinking about what could be 
justified to others on grounds that they, if appropriately motivated, could not reasonably reject." Scanlon, What 
We Owe to Each Other, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998) at 5. 
125For a detailed discussion of positional objectivity see Sen, The Idea of Justice, 130. 
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evaluation there are no pair-wise valuations upon which all impartial spectators agree. We are 
not able to eliminate any of the principles as morally inferior to any other. The set of 
legitimate courses of action remains morally indistinguishable.  
 
Table 3 
A B C D E F 
e p s l t u 
p s p e p l 
s l l t s t 
u e e u l e 
l u t s e p 
t t u p u s 
 
The evaluation with only the impartial spectators A, B, and C and the evaluation with A, 
B, C, D, E, and F represent two distinctive kinds of orderings that we can encounter in 
assessing comparative questions. The former is particularly receptive to partial orderings; the 
latter, on the other hand, is equally unreceptive. In assessing actual comparative questions, we 
are definitely going to encounter cases of both kinds. However, more commonly, we should 
expect rankings that are in between. In such cases, even if the similarity between the orderings 
is not enough to identify a determinate course of action, the information is still relevant for 
reforming the alternatives.  
Let’s consider another case where in addition to A, B and C, we have the impartial 
Spectator J who has the ordering l>t>u>e>p>s. The only pair-wise evaluation that all 
impartial spectators agree on is l>t. It implies that in cases where we are able to choose l, we 
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should not choose t. The partial agreement does not enable us to distinguish any course of 
action as the morally right one.    
 
Table 4 
A B C J 
e p s L 
p s p t 
s l l u 
u e e e 
l u t p 
t t u s 
     
Recall that the different ordering of J is the outcome of J’s different valuation of the 
actual comparative question. From the social position of J, one explanation of the different 
ordering that prioritizes (l), (t) and (u) over the (e), (p) and (s) may be the extent of Px. Also 
recall that Px provides free medical care for unemployed citizens who do not have medical 
insurance without any time constraints. Px contrasts severely with libertarian considerations, 
since it implies using the tax revenue from the well-off for improvements for others, depriving 
the former of their personal entitlements. Moreover, Px significantly diminishes the resources 
that could be spent on the improvement of institutions and other domains of justice. In turn, it 
also implies a decrease in the well-being of the employed that is not compensated by the 
increase in the well- being of the unemployed. 
For exploring ways to reach an agreement on advancing justice, we can reformulate the 
policy options. We can aim to align the rankings of impartial spectators just enough to be able 
to morally distinguish morally better courses of action. One option is to moderate Px to Px* 
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which provides free medical care for six years to all unemployed citizens without medical 
insurance. Px* implies less deprivation of personal entitlements of the well off, and more 
resources for the improvement of institutions and other domains of justice than Px. Hence, the 
comparison between Px*, Py and Po points to different orderings of the reasonings since Px* 
implies different weights for libertarian, transitional and utilitarian considerations than does 
Px. In turn, the policy adjustment has the prospects of changing the ordering of J to the extent 
that it is compatible with pair-wise valuations identified through the orderings of A, B and C.  
In this way, the social choice approach can be informative in reformulating courses of action 
towards a mutually agreeable choice.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this article, I try to accomplish two things. First, I qualify Sen’s two claims of redundancy 
and indeterminacy by offering an alternative interpretation of the Rawlsian  approach in 
guiding action. I show that the Rawlsian method demarcates a set of legitimate courses of 
action that citizens can take as morally justified. Second, by demonstrating that for a number 
of cases Sen’s social choice approach is able to morally distinguish between actions within 
the legitimate set, I argue that the Rawlsian method is misguiding in advancing justice. 
For Rawls, identifying ‘the fair terms of social cooperation’ is the primary aim of 
theorizing justice. The Rawlsian  approach serves well to this end. Yet, as I argue in this 
article, within a fair system of social cooperation we can still make mutually agreeable 
advances in justice. Admittedly, the hypothetical case regarding choice of health care policy is 
highly simplified. Actual questions regarding courses of action for alleviating injustice are 
much more complex. Nevertheless, the complexity of the problems should not stop us from 
taking moral reasoning further. Sen’s social choice approach gives us just the right tools.  
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3 Implementing global taxes on natural resources 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Paula Casal describes the contemporary world order as characterized by massive deprivations, 
inequalities and environmental problems. She reminds us that  
 
One-fifth of humanity lives in abject poverty on less than $1 per day, and almost half on less 
than $2 per day. The consequences of deprivation for the children of developing countries are 
particularly horrific: two in five are stunted, one-third are underweight, and one quarter of all 5 
to 14-year-olds work for wages, often under harsh conditions in agriculture, mining, textile 
and carpet production, or prostitution. Climate change is worsening matters further still, 
already adding 300,000 deaths annually.126  
 
According to Casal, most individuals agree that the contemporary world order is 
shocking and depressing. Nevertheless, there is no consensus “on how to eradicate global 
poverty and distribute the costs of doing so.”127 Acknowledging the injustice embedded in the 
current does not to an agreement on the appropriate remedies. With the aim of exploring an 
effective way to improve the current situation, she engages in a fruitful debate with Hillel 
Steiner and Thomas Pogge regarding implementation of global taxes on natural resources, a 
domain which has prospects of significantly impacting the contemporary world order. The 
debate proceeds with Casal critically examining each author’s original tax scheme and 
advocating her own proposal. In light of Casal’s criticisms, Steiner and Pogge then defend 
and clarify their proposals. The exchange is concluded by Casal’s final reply.  
                                                          
126 Paula Casal, "Global Taxes on Natural Resources.".Journal of Moral Philosophy 8, (2011): 307-327, at 308. 
127 Ibid., 308.  
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The approach that Pogge and Casal share differs from Steiner’s. While Steiner 
theorizes from a left-libertarian view what would be the ideally just arrangement regarding the 
distribution of natural resources, Pogge and Casal conceptualize an initial step for overcoming 
global problems. In this article, I compare the three policy proposals using the social choice 
approach proposed by Amartya Sen, in 'In What do we want from a theory of justice?'128and 
The Idea of Justice.129 I show that we can progress in overcoming a number of problems 
without reaching an overall agreement on ideal arrangements. The questions of what is the 
perfectly just way to eradicate global poverty and who should bear these costs do not need 
determinate answers in order to improve the status quo. By means of the social choice 
method, we can come to an agreement among actual alternatives on a less unjust social state.  
I compare the global tax schemes by developing the social choice approach in three 
steps, which I respectively discuss in the following sections. The first step involves describing 
the alternative social states as richly as the assessment requires. For our case at hand, this 
activity entails a detailed inspection of what the alternative proposals imply. In Section 3.3, I 
discuss Steiner’s ‘Global Fund’, Pogge’s ‘Global Resource Dividend’, and Casal ‘Global 
Share’ in terms of tax base, rate, and distributive aspects. In Section 3.4,  as the second step of 
social choice approach, I discuss how the social states are valued from different ethical 
perspectives. I first identify from the exchange between the three authors eight perspectives 
from which the competing proposals can be valued: egalitarian, prioritarian, sufficientarian, 
utilitarian, libertarian, conservation of resources, as well as considerations regarding 
transitional aspects and equal respect of persons. From each perspective I derive a particular 
ranking of the three proposals. Egalitarian, prioritarian, and conservation of resources 
prioritize the Global Share, sufficientarian, utilitarian and transitional perspective prioritize 
                                                          
128 Sen, "What do we want from a theory of justice", 2006.  
129 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 2009. 
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the Global Resource Dividend and the libertarian perspective and perspective of equal respect  
prioritizes the Global Fund. Before I go on to discussing the relative valuations of the 
rankings, in Section 3.5,  I respond to two main objections to the social choice method 
regarding feasibility and impartial spectators. Responding to the feasibility objection, I 
emphasize that we need to take seriously Sen's requirement for public scrutiny of option. Each 
argument provided by impartial spectators needs to be rigorously engaged in order to reach a 
clearer understanding of each proposal. Responding to the impartiality objection, I bring in 
Thomas Scanlon's requirement that principles should be such that others could not reasonably 
reject for assessing the ethical perspectives and Gerald Cohen's interpersonal test in 
evaluating the arguments for the implementation of a policies. After that, in Section 3.6 as the 
third step of social choice approach, I pose Steiner, Pogge, and Casal as impartial spectators 
who impart arguments that imply relative valuations of the eight perspectives. Then, I point at 
the overlaps among relative valuations and show the extent of agreement regarding the 
policies. Finally, in Section 3.7, I draw two recommendations for reforming the policies 
towards a less unjust alternative.   
Yet, prior to embarking on the social choice method, we need to determine whether it 
is relevant for the distribution of global natural resources. Only if the distribution of global 
natural resources is a valid domain for considerations of justice can we then press the demand 
for mutual agreement in choosing courses of action. To this end, I begin in Section 3.2 with a 
discussion of how principles are grounded in the global justice debate. After a brief overview 
of the two classic positions in this regard, statist and cosmopolitan, I focus on the method of 
the third wave theorists who maintain that there are multiple grounds for theorizing principles 
of justice for different domains. 
 
3.2 Is fairness relevant in the distribution of global natural resources?  
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Social choice approach demands that the choice between courses of action need to be 
mutually justifiable. Hence, prior to using social choice approach for guiding action, we need 
to determine whether considerations of fairness are relevant to assess the distribution of global 
natural resources. We need to establish the grounds for theorizing stringent principles for this 
domain. 
 Mathias Risse defines grounds of justice as "those considerations or conditions based 
on which individuals are in scope of principles."130 Particular features of a population ground 
principles of justice. Our concern here is global natural resources. The population we need to 
consider is the world population as a whole. Therefore, we need ask if there is a feature of 
world population that puts individuals within the scope of distributive principles. If we fail to 
provide the required grounds, we can still pose humanitarian principles. However, a social 
choice approach in this domain cannot be justified.  
 In the debate in theorizing global justice, there are two main positions: statist and 
cosmopolitan. They provide competing accounts of how principles of justice are grounded, 
and whether those features exist for the world population. There is an extensive literature 
arguing for each position. Here my concern is not to engage with the debate, but rather to  
determine if an assessment of the distribution of global resources by the social choice 
approach is compatible with any of the two positions. 
The statists believe that there is only one particular relationship among individuals, 
namely the membership to a state that is grounded by the principles of justice.131 The 
significance of membership to a state is characterized by alternative statist accounts. For some 
theorists, such a membership implies a commitment to a system of social cooperation or 
reciprocity while other theorists focus on the coercive relationship between an individual and 
                                                          
130 Mathias Risse. On Global Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 5. 
131 Ibid., 8. 
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the state.132 Regardless of how the particular relationship is characterized, all statist theorists 
pose principles of distributive justice to govern the interactions of individuals within the state. 
Beyond the boundaries of the state, since the global population as a whole lacks a similar 
binding relation, stringent principles of justice are not relevant between individuals. In 
considering global problems, such as those related to the distribution of natural resources, 
emphasis on membership to a state renders the state as the relevant unit of moral concern. 
Moreover, since the membership of the states to the global order is not a relation similar to the 
membership of individuals within the state, statists do not pose distributive principles that 
govern the interactions between the states as well. Instead, they pose less stringent moral 
principles such as principles that are limited to sustaining mutual aid and respect. Similarly, in 
regarding the relationship among individuals, only less stringent moral obligations such as 
humanitarian aid can be posed. 133  Hence, for the statists, global natural resources cannot be 
assessed by considerations of fairness either between individuals or between states.   
 The second main position in the global justice debate is cosmopolitanism. 
Cosmopolitans provide two different accounts of how principles of justice are grounded. 134 
Globalists, or weak cosmopolitans, agree with the statist that one particular relationship exists 
among individuals that grounds the principles of justice. However, globalists disagree with 
the statists on the assumption that the membership to a state, whether based on coercion or 
cooperation, solely constitutes that relationship.135 They point to the cooperative or coercive 
                                                          
132 Samuel Scheffler, “The Idea of Global Justice: A Progress Report” Harvard Review of Philosophy, 
forthcoming. 
133 See for example, Rawls, “The Law of Peoples: with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," at 119, 120;  
Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, n.2 (2005):113-147; Samuel 
Freeman, “Distributive Justice and the Law of Peoples,” in Justice and the Social Contract (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 297-321; David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007)   
134 Risse. On Global Justice, 8. Gillian Brock, “Contemporary Cosmopolitanism: Some Current Issues” 
Philosophy Compass 8, n. 8 (2013): 689–698, at 691; Simon Caney, “Review Article: International Distributive 
Justice,” Political Studies 49, (2001): 974-997, at 975, 976.   
135 See for example, Darrel Moellendorf, “The World Trade Organization and Egalitarian Justice,” 
Metaphilosophy 36, n. ½ (2005): 145-162.  
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features of the global order and argue that an individual's membership to the global order is 
sufficiently binding to pose stringent principles of justice. Strong cosmopolitans, on the other 
hand, reject the assertion that a relationship among individuals grounds principles of justice. 
Instead, the common features shared by the world’s population, regardless of the kind of 
relationship they hold, are sufficiently grounding.136 In assessing global problems, both 
accounts of cosmopolitanism, regardless of the particular reasons they offer, assert that the 
relevant unit of moral concern is the individual. Hence, they pose stringent principles that 
govern the interaction of individuals. The states are relevant as a means to implement the 
global distribution identified by cosmopolitan principles. In addition to the stringent duties of 
distributive justice, humanitarian duties and principles that sustain mutual aid and respect 
between states are still relevant.137   
 Both positions contain problems in the application of the social choice approach to the 
distribution of global resources. For statists, the demand for mutual agreeability on courses of 
action, which the social choice approach requires, is too stringent. Individuals or states in the 
globe are not in a relation that gives rise to stringent duties. For cosmopolitans, there are in 
fact principles of distributive justice that govern the relationship between individuals in the 
globe. Yet, principles that govern the distribution of global natural resources can only be 
posed within the general distributive scheme. The demand for mutual agreeability is relevant 
for identifying the general distributive principles but not for the particular domain of global 
natural resources. The principles for the latter can be derived from the former either in the 
form of transitional principles that aim to achieve the global distributive scheme or as 
                                                          
136 See for example, Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalizing Opportunities,” Metaphilosophy 32, n. 
½ (2011): 113-134; “Survey Article: Cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples,” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 10, n. 1 (2002): 95-123;  
137 See for example, Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
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approximations of the general principles. A comparison between alternative policy proposals 
is thus problematic. 
 A recent approach in theorizing global justice, which Gabriel Wollner calls the third 
wave, offers an alternative method of grounding principles.138 Contrary to both statist and 
cosmopolitan positions, the third wave theorists assume that the principles of justice are 
grounded in multiple ways and that differing grounds of justice lead to diverse principles. In 
the domestic context, we are assured that principles of distributive justice apply because the 
domain is over-determined by a plurality of grounds.139 In the global context, different 
grounds that correspond to various domains. Theorizing is therefore partial, in contradiction 
to integrated and transitional theorizing. For example, Risse recognizes five grounds: 
"individuals as human beings, members of states, co-owners of the earth, as subject to the 
global order, and as subject to a global trading system."140 Each ground corresponds to the 
distribution of a certain set of  objects. For Risse the distribution of global natural resources is 
grounded by Common Ownership of the Earth. Based on this ground, he constructs a set of 
natural ownership rights. They are rights "to use (in the narrow sense) resources and spaces to 
satisfy one’s basic needs or else to live in a society that does not deny one the opportunity to 
satisfy one’s basic needs in ways in which it otherwise could have been done through original 
resources and spaces."141 Risse limits the content of his natural ownership rights to a 
guarantee of basic need of satisfaction because he is looking for rights that can be acceptable 
to every reasonable person. Constructing more comprehensive rights from the grounds of 
common ownership may be objected by reasonable people. 
                                                          
138 Gabriel Wollner, "The Third Wave of Theorizing Global Justice: A Review Essay" Global Justice: Theory 
Practice Rhetoric. 6 (2013): 21-39, at 27. Exemplary of the third wave, Wollner discusses theorizing of Laura 
Valentini Justice in a Globalized World: A Normative Framework, 2011; Aaron James Fairness in Practice: A 
Social Contract for a Global Economy, 2012; and Mathias Risse On Global Justice. 
139 Wollner, "The Third Wave of Theorizing Global Justice: A Review Essay", 27-30. 
140 Risse, On Global Justice, 11. 
141 Ibid., 112. 
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The aim of the social choice approach is not to construct ideal principles based on 
particular grounds. Rather, this approach guides action by identifying the morally better 
alternative. Hence, once we agree that there are reasonable grounds for theorizing justice for 
the domain of distribution of natural resources, we can then proceed with the social choice 
procedure. Paula Casal points out that there are at least three rationales that can ground the 
distribution of natural resources. There are geoist reasons, similar to Risse’s Common 
Ownership of the world, that “affirms the equal claim of humanity to land and other planetary 
resources.’142 These reasons demand compensation for unilateral appropriation of resources 
for those who are excluded. There are also consequentialist and contractualist reasons for 
alleviating poverty and reducing natural resource consumption that have environmentally 
beneficial effects.143 All grounds and the consequent principles based on those grounds need 
to be mutually agreeable. Casal lists a number of ways  in which natural resources can claim 
fair distribution. They are limited in supply; hence acquisition of one resource by one person  
tends to keep others away.  Natural resources are not created; hence no one have a priori 
entitlement claim. They are essential to human survival and easy to distribute. Moreover, 
consuming natural resources leads to negative externalities such as pollution and waste.144 We 
can claim, then, that it is mutually agreeable that there are grounds for demanding an impartial 
assessment of the distribution of natural resources 
 
3.3 Competing proposals for global taxes on natural resources 
Having specified the position of the social choice approach in the global justice debate and the 
grounds for the particular assessment of the distribution of global natural resources, I now 
                                                          
142 Casal, "Global Taxes on Natural Resources," 308,309.   
143Ibid., 309. Yet, some grounds inevitably carry more weight than do  others from different ethical perspectives. 
Rather than serving as an obstacle, the difference of valuation lies at the core of the social choice approach.   
144 Paula Casal. "Progressive Environmental Taxation: A Defence." Political Studies 60, (2012): 419-433, at 
421. 
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turn to the content of the assessment. The first step of my three step exposition consists in 
describing the alternative states as richly as the comparison requires. To this end, in line with 
Casal's analysis, I discuss the three proposals of Steiner, Pogge, and Casal in terms of tax 
base, rate, and distributive aspects.145  
 
3.3.1 The Global Fund 
I begin with Steiner, who proposes a distributive scheme regarding global natural resources 
termed as the Global Fund (Pf). It is based on a left libertarian view of justice which “requires 
that persons be compensated for all, and only, those elements or proportions of their poverty 
that are not self-inflicted.”146 When theorizing global natural resources, Steiner argues that 
everyone is at full liberty to occupy and use any of the world’s resources. For the only 
commodity that is a priori justly owned by people is their body. If anyone reserves a portion 
of the world’s natural resources for his or her exclusive use, then she is required to 
compensate others.147 The Fund is designed to engender compensation in today’s world where 
the distribution of natural resources has been arbitrary.  
The Fund imposes a global flat 100% tax on natural resource ownership. Natural 
resources are defined in a very broad way including "all global surface areas and the supra- 
and sub-terranean spaces contiguous to them, as well as the natural objects they contain."148 
The tax is levied on states. As owners of locations, they are taxed the full competitive rental 
value of all its territories determined by the highest bid for each location’s right to exclusive 
                                                          
145At this step, I do not engage with the debate or take any position regarding the proposals. When describing the 
social states implied by the policies, I include only what each author accepts from another’s criticism. The 
arguments of the authors for their proposals and against subsequent criticisms involve empirical assumptions. I 
accept each author's assumptions as valid regarding their own views, except in a few places where an obvious 
criticism is not addressed by an author. 
146 Hillel Steiner. "The Global Fund: A Reply to Casal." Journal of Moral Philosophy 8, (2011): 335-352, at 329. 
147 Ibid., 332.  
148 Ibid., 330. 
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use.149 The tax is supplemented by 'pollution vouchers' that states need to pay in case of 
negative environmental spillovers.150 The revenue collected at the Fund is distributed equally. 
As Steiner maintains, "each person on the globe is entitled to an equal portion of each such 
location's value."151 The Fund distributes each nation "a per capita equal share of that 
aggregate revenue."152 The form which the distribution takes is the provision of regular 
payments, such as an unconditional basic income or an initial capital stake.153 It is anti-
paternalistic in "allowing individuals to decide whether to consume their share or to choose to 
invest with others in producing public goods."154 Although the main aim of the Fund is to 
apply the Lockean proviso of rightful appropriation, the Fund nevertheless has considerable 
impact for alleviating inequality, poverty, and addressing environmental problems. The net 
effect of the Fund transfers resources from the rich to the poor. Moreover, as Steiner points 
out, the equal distribution of the revenue eliminates 'poverty traps'.155 
 
3.3.2 The Global Resource Dividend 
Pogge's proposal in redistributing global natural resources is called the Global 
Resource Dividend (Pd). It is a tax scheme that aims to alleviate global poverty and 
inequality. At the same time, Pd contributes to conserving non-renewable natural resources 
for protecting the environment and the interests of the future generations.156 The Dividend 
imposes a modest flat tax on both use and ownership of natural resources. Levied on states, 
the tax targets a limited number of natural resources identified by a number of factors: the use 
                                                          
149 Ibid., 331,332. 
150 Ibid., 332,333. 
151 Ibid., 331. 
152 Ibid., 332. 
153 Ibid., 330.  
154 Casal, "Global Taxes on Natural Resources," 322, 323. 
155 Steiner, "The Global Fund: A Reply to Casal," 334. 
156 Thomas Pogge, "Allowing the Poor to Share the Earth." Journal of Moral Philosophy 8, (2011): 335-352, at 
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or ownership of the taxed resource must be easy to monitor or estimate for keeping overall 
collection costs of the tax scheme low. The taxation needs to have a small impact on the price 
of goods consumed to satisfy basic needs, and at the same time it should encourage 
conservation of resources and environmental protection.157 Pogge argues that taxing the 
ownership of natural resources such as oil leads to over extraction of the resource so as to 
compensate for the tax. Therefore, countries owning non-renewable natural resources such as 
crude oils, metals, or minerals are taxed only for the extraction of the resources with the aim 
of encouraging conservation of non-renewable resources.158 For similar reasons, when 
imposing taxes on land, "rainforests and other wilderness areas as well as lands used for 
planting basic food stuffs for human consumption should be exempted.”159 Moreover, 
contrary to Steiner’s Fund, the rate of the land tax needs to be “based on the unimproved 
quality of the land rather than its market value” in order to enable the alleviation of poverty. 
Pogge points out that in nations such as Bangladesh, land prices are high because of the 
tremendous population, and the position of those should not be further worsened.160 The tax 
rates are to be arranged periodically based on their conservational effects as well as target 
revenue. Pogge tentatively aims “at about $300 billion or (in 2010) about half a percent of the 
sum of all gross national incomes — that would suffice to design and implement the structural 
reforms and policies that would end severe human poverty once and for all."161 Although the 
flat tax rate may be regressive, it is compensated by the distributive scheme.162 
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The revenue collected by the Dividend is distributed in accordance with prioritarian 
values, with special emphasis on the worst off.163 The form of revenue distribution is 
diversified. A portion of the revenue is distributed in cash by need-based basic income or 
stock of starting capital. However, the major portion is distributed in the form of global public 
goods and institutional design.164 Pogge asserts that "using the GRD to fund such public 
goods as well as clean water, adequate sanitation, basic health care, basic education, careful 
redesign of national and supranational institutions/legislation, land reform, and measures 
against corruption, human trafficking, smoking and alcoholism, ensures that its introduction 
brings net benefits to nearly all poor people."165 Compliance is sustained by rendering 
redistribution conditional upon government cooperation.166 Moreover, by employing different 
distributive schemes, various incentives can be provided to diverse agents. Thereby Pogge 
aims to make sure that "all agents and agencies involved understand that they will lose 
funding if they do not work effectively in the interest of the poor."167  
  
3.3.3 The Global Share  
Casal proposes the Global Share (Ps) as an improvement on the Global Resource Dividend. 
The aims of both policies are similar in alleviating problems of global poverty and inequality 
as well as encouraging conservation of non-renewable natural resources for environmental 
protection and interests of future generations. Levied on the states, the Share imposes taxes on 
both use and ownership of different kinds of natural resources such as oil, land, and sea 
access. Tax base and tax rate are determined and modified periodically in relation to a target 
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revenue, the consequences for poverty and conservation.168 The emphasis is on the 
environmental objective.169 Different from the Dividend, the states are taxed progressively. In 
determining the exact rates and bases for each resource, multiple poverty lines are 
employed.170 In addition, taxes for the affluent states are modified in relation to their position 
from the global average per capita.  
The revenue is distributed in a prioritized fashion. As Casal presents, the standard 
formulation of prioritarianism considers "(i) how many people can be benefited, (ii) the size 
of the benefit, and (iii) the level of advantage of the recipient."171 Similar to the Dividend, the 
form of distribution is the provision of public goods rather than regular payments such as 
basic income, i.e., in providing "clean, efficient technologies to enable developing countries 
to skip the unhindered carbon intensive industrialization that others have enjoyed."172 In order 
to sustain compliance to the scheme, Casal suggests that we can employ progressive import 
duties or withhold the distributive benefits from noncompliant states.173  
 
3.4 Ranking the proposals by ethical perspectives 
The second step of the social choice approach is to determine how the social states are valued 
from different ethical perspectives. Each perspective provides reasons for alternative 
rankings. From the exchange between the three authors I single out eight different 
perspectives. From each perspective I derive a particular ranking of the three proposals. I 
characterize these perspectives as egalitarian, prioritarian, sufficientarian, utilitarian, 
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libertarian, conservation of resources, as well as considerations regarding transitional aspects 
and equal respect of persons.  
 
3.4.1 Redistributive Perspectives 
The first three perspectives--egalitarian, sufficientarian, and prioritarian--are related to 
redistributive aspects of the proposals. Policies are valued in relation to the net outcome of the 
revenue collection and redistribution. In basic terms, the egalitarian perspective values 
reducing inequality (E); the sufficientarian perspective values minimizing the aggregate 
shortfall below a poverty line (S); and lastly, the prioritarian perspective values maximizing 
the aggregate benefit for the worst off with diminishing moral value to the benefitting (P). 
The Fund imposes a flat tax on natural resource ownership and distributives revenue equally. 
Assuming that the affluent states own more natural resources than do the less affluent states, 
the affluent states owe more to the Fund, which in turn is distributed equally. The net effect 
reduces inequality. It is an improvement compared to the status quo from prioritarian 
perspective since the less affluent the state, the less tax contributed to the fund.174 This 
valuation is also an improvement from the sufficientarian perspective, since the least affluent 
contributes least and the position of individuals  below the poverty line is improved. The 
Dividend imposes a modest flat tax on use and ownership of natural resources and distributes 
the revenue in a prioritarian way with special emphasis for the worst off. Similar to the Fund, 
the revenue collection of the Dividend reduces inequality; it is simultaneously an 
improvement from prioritarian and sufficientarian perspectives. Although the Dividend's 
modest tax has a smaller impact for redistribution compared to the full tax of the Fund 
because of the former's low rate at the revenue collection stage, the redistributive stage of the 
Dividend significantly changes net outcome. First, for the Dividend, the worst off have a 
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greater claim on the distribution than do the remainder of the population. Second, the tax base 
and rate are periodically modified in order to achieve the redistributive aims. For example, for 
cases where the flat tax rate of the Dividend is regressive, such as when lower income groups 
need to contribute a higher percentage of their income than do higher income groups, the tax 
base and rate are moderated to eliminate the regressive outcome.175 So far as the Fund does 
not have distributive aims besides compensation for unjust appropriation, the Fund equally 
distributes the revenue. Moreover, the tax is not moderated in cases where the flat tax rate is 
regressive. Hence, the Dividend is ultimately ranked higher than the Fund in all three 
distributive perspectives E, S, and P. The Share, on the other hand, imposes a progressive tax 
on use and ownership of natural resources and distributes it in a prioritarian way. Due to 
progressive taxation at the stage of revenue collection, the Share fares better than does the 
Dividend from all three distributive perspectives. However, taking into account Pogge's 
emphasis on helping first and foremost the worst off and Casal’s arguments against 
employing any poverty line in distribution, the net outcome of the Dividend is ranked higher 
by the sufficientarian perspective.176 Hence, the ultimate valuation from the three perspectives 
can be formulated as E (Ps>Pd>Pf), S (Pd>Ps>Pf), and P (Ps>Pd>Pf).  
 
3.4.2 Utilitarian Perspective  
Utilitarian perspective (U) values the aggregate benefit a policy achieves in terms of poverty 
reduction.  It relates to the revenue raising potential of the policies as well as how that 
revenue is used. As the Fund imposes a 100% tax on natural resource ownership, it has the 
highest revenue raising potential. However, the distribution is not directly aimed at poverty 
alleviation. As mentioned, the possible regressive consequences of the Fund’s tax that are not 
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balanced at the redistributive stage undermine its ability to alleviate poverty. The Share and 
the Dividend, on the other hand, are similar in raising revenue since both tax use and 
ownership. Moreover, for both the Share and the Dividend alleviating poverty is a direct 
policy objective; this objective determines the choice of resources to be taxed as well as the 
tax rate and base. However, for Casal, the environmental objective  matters more than does 
the poverty objective. She suggests that  "we should revise the tax base depending on its 
environmental impact, even in the event that we managed to achieve our initial environmental 
policy objective without reaching our poverty objective."177 And for Pogge, the 
conservational impact of the Dividend is to be arranged in relation to a pre-fixed poverty 
objective. As he emphasizes, it should "suffice to design and implement the structural reforms 
and policies that would end severe human poverty once and for all."178 Hence, the Dividend 
ranks higher than does the Share by the utilitarian perspective; and the final valuation can be 
formulated as U(Pd>Ps>Pf). 
 
3.4.3 Perspective of Conservation of Resources  
The next perspective, conservation of non-renewable natural resources (C), values the impact 
of the policies on other domains such as environmental and intergeneration justice. Pogge and 
Casal point out that the high tax rate of the Fund encourages the states to extract more natural 
resources. As a response, Steiner proposes 'pollution vouchers' to be included in the Fund to 
compensate for any activity that damages the property of another. However, the interests of 
future generations remain outside policy objectives. Steiner maintains that "concerns for 
environmental degradation that damages no living persons, or that is licensed by them, may 
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well be grounded in other moral values but are not demands of justice."179 Casal recognizes 
that since conservation is not a demand of justice, "there is no guarantee that the balance of 
contrary tendencies (respectively caused by oil ownership taxes and pollution vouchers) will 
always resolve in favor of appropriate conservation."180 For Pogge and Casal, on the other 
hand, concerns for environment and future generations are direct policy objectives. Casal 
emphasizes that no a priori rules exist that we can impose to  ensure resource conversion.181 
The tax bases, rate, and choice of resources to be taxed by the Share and the Dividend are 
determined and moderated periodically according to the conservational impact. Nevertheless, 
as I have pointed out, Casal prioritizes the environmental objective over the poverty objective. 
Hence the Share ranks higher than does the Dividend, and the final valuation from the 
perspective of conservation of non-renewable natural resources is C(Ps>Pd>Pf). 
 
3.4.4 Libertarian Perspective  
Libertarian perspective (L) values the compensation achieved by the policies for the arbitrary 
acquisition of the world resources as well as the sensitivity of the policies to personal 
entitlements. The Fund is meant to be a direct application of the Lockean proviso to global 
natural resources. The determination of the full rent of natural resources and equal 
distributions is aimed to implement the proviso. Hence, the Fund ranks higher than do both 
the Dividend and the Share. However, Pogge and Casal also endorse the libertarian 
perspective by "taxing only non-produced resources" and appealing only to "negative duties 
to refrain from imposing harmful institutions."182 Comparing the Share and the Dividend, 
Casal argues that the progressive tax rate of the Share fares better with the libertarian 
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perspective. She asserts that "Lockean principles do not determine a particular rate structure 
but since they justify financial charges by the harm pollution or over-acquisition causes to 
fellow humans, it is not strange to expect repeat offenders to be charged at higher rates."183 
Moreover, the prioritarian redistributive scheme of the Share is valued better by the libertarian 
perspective compared with the Dividend because "sets no thresholds but compensates more 
those who are harmed more by the exclusion."184 Hence, the final valuation can be formulated 
as L(Pf>Ps>Pd).  
 
3.4.5 Transitional Perspective 
The transitional perspective (T) assesses the proposals in terms of the institutions required for 
effectively implementing them. The valuation is based on the feasibility and accessibility of 
the proposals. The former refers to the material and political conditions of the world in order 
to implement the policies; the latter, to the relationship between the current world order and 
the proposed tax scheme. I consider the transitional perspective as ethical because evaluating 
a course of action that leads to less justice here and now with respect to a long term and 
integrated project of perfect justice requires an ethical valuation of the two options. Pogge 
emphasizes that the Fund is "an ideal of fully just institutional arrangement governing the use 
of natural wealth."185 Even if the Fund's tax scheme may be feasible, it requires a major 
change in the current world order.  On the other hand, the Dividend and the Share require 
minor institutional reforms designed for achieving piecemeal improvements. Hence, from the 
transitional perspective, the latter two rank higher than does the Fund. Comparing the Share 
and the Dividend, the institutions required to implement the former are more complex than are 
the latter. The progressive tax rate implied by the Share involves adjusting the price of any 
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commodity within the tax scheme according to the per-capita income of the country. As 
Pogge observes, in the face of the complex international division of labor, it is difficult and 
costly to make the adjustments.186 Instead of complicated tax schemes such as progressive 
taxation, we need to aim at reducing inequality "through a small number of institutional 
mechanisms and policy instruments that are best suited to this task."187 Hence, from the 
transitional perspective, the policies are ranked as T(Pd>Ps>Pf). 
 
3.4.6 Perspective of Equal Respect 
The last perspective I consider evaluates the three tax schemes based on the value of equal 
respect (R). Jonathan Wolff points out that the implementation of policies that aim to bring 
about a fairer outcome may, on the contrary, undermine the self-respect of the individuals 
whose position the policy aims to improve.188 For example, in order to make a distribution 
based on responsibility, we need to know whether an individual's advantaged or 
disadvantaged  position results from his or her choices or circumstances beyond one’s 
control.189 However, acquiring the required information may conflict with the value of equal 
respect for everyone. For example, there may be cases in which individuals are required to 
reveal personal information that will potentially undermine their self-respect."190 Although 
the authors do not explicitly discuss equal respect, it is an important value within the debate. 
The informational requirement of the Fund which imposes a flat tax and equal distribution is 
much lower than both what the Dividend and the Share require. For the latter two, the benefits 
are means tested. The distribution is conditional on the states' cooperation with the objectives 
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of the tax schemes.191  The authors aim to sustain compliance by means of progressive import 
duties or withholding the distributive benefits from noncompliant states.192 Moreover, in order 
to make further claims on the redistribution, the less affluent states need to make the case that 
they are not responsible for their low income situations. The informational requirements  
exacerbate the position of the worse-off.  As Wolff points out, “In the real world the burden of 
revealing data about one's circumstances falls only on one sector of society, and that sector is 
already among the most disadvantaged."193 Hence the Fund is ranked higher from the 
perspective of self-respect. Comparing the Dividend and the Share, the former's flat tax 
scheme requires less information from the states than does the latter's progressive tax scheme. 
In addition to the informational requirement, there is another aspect from which the flat tax 
scheme promotes better the value of self respect than does the progressive tax scheme. As 
Pogge reminds us, "it is morally undesirable to exempt the poor — as if they did not care 
about, and could not share, our generation’s responsibility for the environment and toward 
future generations and other species."194 Preventing the less affluent from sharing 
responsibility in environmental problems undermines their agency and self-respect.Hence, 
from the perspective of self-respect we can rank the policies as R(Pf>Pd>Ps).  
 
E S P U L  C T R 
Ps Pd Ps Pd Pf Ps Pd Pf 
Pd Ps Pd Ps Pd Pd Ps Pd 
Pf Pf Pf Pf Ps Pf Pf Ps 
Table 1. 
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3.5 Two objections to impartial spectators 
At the conclusion of the second step, we have at hand rankings of the three proposals by eight 
different perspectives. The next step of the social choice approach aims to single out a number 
of rankings as relevant for determining the morally better policy. The reasoning consists of 
two further steps. The first step consists in identifying impartial spectators who give relative 
valuations of the rankings. Impartial spectators are idealized agents cleansed of vested 
interests as well as the bias of tradition and custom.195 They represent possible impartial 
rankings of the different perspectives that are proposed in assessing policy options. Each 
relative valuation of the impartial spectators is based on reasons for valuing one ethical 
perspective over another. For assessing the discussion regarding the distribution of global 
natural resources, in the next section, I reconstruct the views of Steiner, Pogge, and Casal as 
impartial spectators who proffer competing arguments for relative valuations of the eight 
perspectives. However, in this section, I first aim to respond to a number of objections that 
Gerald Gaus raises that relate to this stage of the social choice method.196  
 
3.5.1 Objection on feasibility 
The first objection concerns the choice set that the impartial spectators evaluate. Gerald Gaus 
points out that we may have disagreements regarding the feasible options to be ranked by 
impartial spectators. If any one of the alternatives is not included in the rankings of an 
impartial spectaor, we will have an incomplete ordering regarding that alternative.197 The 
disagreement regarding feasibility may arise due to different empirical assumptions involved 
in determining what kind of social states are implied by the proposals. The objection Gaus 
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raises regards the first stage of the social choice approach that I have discussed in the second 
section. Moreover, alternative empirical assumptions may also create problems at the second 
stage. For, if we have different accounts of the social states implied by each policy due to 
alternative empirical assumptions, we will also have different rankings of the proposals by 
ethical perspectives. Then, the relative valuations proposed by the impartial spectators will be 
incommensurable. We will not be able to identify the pair-wise valuations upon which all 
agree. For example, Casal and Pogge criticize Steiner’s Fund by pointing out that the high tax 
scheme encourages natural resource consumption and causes pollution. In response, Steiner 
proposes 'pollution vouchers' as a mechanism that renders liable countries which have 
destroyed another nation’s environment. Yet, Casal is not convinced that pollution vouchers 
are adequate to sustain environmental protection. Whether the pollution vouchers are fit for 
the task or not depends on the empirical assumptions of the authors. The disagreement has 
direct consequences for the ranking of proposals by the ethical perspective of conservation of 
resources. One way to overcome such disagreements is to have an open discussion regarding 
the proposals. Moreover, we need to take seriously Sen's condition that the public be properly 
informed. Each argument provided by impartial spectators needs to be rigorously engaged in 
order to reach a clearer understanding of each proposal.198 
 
3.5.2 Objection on impartiality 
The second objection concerns the impartiality of the rankings provided by impartial 
spectators. Gaus cautions that "we also may well disagree on what constitutes such an 
objective, bona fide, perspective on justice."199 The objection may be raised both for the 
impartiality of the spectators and the objectivity of the principles that they are ranking. First, it 
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may be argued that the spectators that we are considering are not impartial. Hence, their views 
should not be included in the assessment. Second, disagreement may arise as to the 
components to be considered of the list of ethical perspectives. It may be argued that an 
ethical perspective in the list is subjective.  
The idea of ethical objectivity and reasonableness that Sen maintains is central to 
respond to both objections. Sen maintains that there are multiple ethical perspectives that have 
a claim to objectivity. A unique, impartial resolution of a question of justice is not always 
possible. He emphasizes "the possible sustainability of plural and competing reasons for 
justice, all of which have claims to impartiality and which nevertheless differ from – and rival 
– each other."200 Hence the social choice approach involves multiple spectators that have a 
claim to impartiality. The competing reasons of justice come from different viewpoints of 
social groups who have varied experiences.  
In the face of such plurality of values, the impartiality of the spectators and objectivity 
of the ethical perspectives are sustained by informed public scrutiny. The type of reasons that 
impartial spectators give in support of their relative rankings and the set of ethical 
perspectives are assessed by the general public.201 As Sen indicates, "we can take the relevant 
standard of objectivity of ethical principles to be linked to their defensibility in an open and 
free framework of public reasoning."202 Sen suggests that this kind of scrutiny may follow 
Thomas Scanlon's approach in conceptualizing moral principles as principles others could not 
reasonably reject.203 For Scanlan the point of moral judgments is practical, “they make claims 
about what we have reason to do.”204 He writes that,  
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“When I ask myself what reason the fact that an action would be wrong provides 
me with not to do it, my answer is that such an action would be one that I could not 
justify to others on grounds I could expect them to accept. This leads me to 
describe the subject matter of judgments of right and wrong by saying that they are 
judgments about what would be permitted by principles that could not reasonably 
be rejected, by people who were moved to find principles for the general regulation 
of behavior that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject.”205 
 
Scanlon’s formulation focuses on the reasons that are given to others and others give us. The 
authority of moral judgments is sustained by including the others’ perception of the reasons 
given for the moral judgment. The spectators are impartial to the extent that the reasons given 
for each ranking cannot be reasonable rejected. 
Moreover, as I discuss in 2.5, the differences between the impartial spectators are a 
result of the way the question is assessed from different social positions. The relative 
valuations are positionally objective, they reflect what can be seen from a given position as a 
person-invariant but position-relative observation. The positional objectivity of the 
impartiality of spectators can be sustained by following Gerald Cohen’s ‘interpersonal 
test.’206 Cohen argues that in order to determine the validity of the kinds of reasons given for 
a policy, we need to take into account who utters the reasons and who listens to them. The 
justification needs to be achieved through a dialogical confrontation of each segment of 
society. His ‘interpersonal test’ is designed to sustain this condition. He writes that, 
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“to carry out the test, we hypothesize an utterance of the argument by a specified 
individual, or, more commonly, by a member of a specified group, to another 
individual, or to a member of another, or, indeed, the same group. If, because of 
who is presenting it, and/or to whom it is presented, the argument cannot serve as a 
justification of the policy, then whether or not it passes as such under other 
dialogical conditions, it fails (tout court) to provide a comprehensive justification 
of the policy.”207  
 
Cohen’s interpersonal test further adds a component of human agency to Scanlon’s 
formulation consistent with the positional rankings of impartial spectators. It places the 
criterion of impartiality to be tested within particular contexts. He points out that “When the 
justification of policies that mention groups of people is presented in the usual way, with 
exclusively third-person reference to groups and their members, the pertinence of the question 
why various people are disposed to act as they do is not always apparent.”208 This aspect of 
Cohens formulation best captures the positional perspective of impartial spectators. And it is 
able to assess their claims of impartiality. The reasons for what we should do then need to be 
such that others could not reasonably reject when uttered by any group in society.  
With regards to the present discussion, the exchange between Steiner, Pogge, and 
Casal is a good example of public scrutiny. Each author gives reasons for their proposals as 
well as criticisms regarding the others’ proposals. The analysis of the previous section shows 
that each author takes each perspective at least as reasonable.  Similarly, each line of 
reasoning by an impartial spectator is open to public scrutiny. Hence, the rankings of Steiner, 
Pogge, and Casal as impartial spectators and the ethical perspectives to which they refer are 
included in the evaluation. 
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 Even when the impartiality of spectators and ethical views are established, one final 
objection remains that regards the inclusiveness of the assessment. Gaus argues that we may 
"disagree on who counts as an impartial spectator."209 It may be argued that the impartial 
spectators that we are considering are not appropriate for the assessment because they are 
outsiders. The view, which Sen calls 'closed impartiality', asserts that the valuations that we 
need to consider should only be those of a defined focal group. One way to define the focal 
group is as those individuals for whom the principles of justice apply: the group of people that 
are required to bear consequent duties. Another way to define the focal group is as those 
individuals whose lives will be affected by the principles of justice. The distribution of global 
natural resources which we aim to assess through the social choice approach has 
consequences for all throughout the globe in terms of distribution and environmental 
problems. It has consequences for everyone both as duty bearers and those affected by the 
principles. Hence, regardless of which of the two ways that we define the focal group, all 
possible impartial spectators are relevant for the assessment. The present inquiry, which 
includes only three impartial spectators, is constrained only by concerns of simplicity. The 
resulting judgment is partial and relative to the current impartial spectators. Yet, the inquiry is 
always open for including novel impartial spectators that enrich the discussion and improve 
our judgment.  
 
3.6 Relative valuations and guiding action 
With these considerations in mind we return to the inquiry at hand. The first step is to identify 
the relative valuations of impartial spectators. Steiner, Pogge, and Casal all have prior 
intuitions regarding the distribution of global natural resources before they assess the 
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comparative question at hand. One way to trace these intuitions is by looking at how each 
proposal fares with an ethical perspective. According to the analysis in Section Two, we can 
assert that Casal prioritizes prioritarian and egalitarian values as well as conservation of 
resources, Pogge prioritizes sufficientarian, utilitarian, and transitional values, and Steiner 
prioritizes libertarian values and the value of equal respect. However, the question at hand is a 
comparative one. We aim to determine which proposal leads to a less unjust social state. The 
reasons each impartial spectator provides for ranking one ethical perspective over another 
should also refer to alternative policies. In other words, the rankings of the ethical 
perspectives are relative to the comparative questions. If the same impartial spectator assesses 
a question in another domain or compares different proposals, she is likely to offer a different 
ranking of ethical perspectives.  
 In order to sustain the comparative aspect of the assessment, we may identify a general 
rule that guides the relative evaluations of the impartial spectators. When an ethical 
perspective is valued more or less equally by all impartial spectators, it is ranked relatively 
lower in the general ranking by all impartial spectators. What is important for impartial 
spectators is to bring their different valuations into realization. Hence, they want to emphasize 
how differently they assess the comparative question. In a similar way, if there is a stark 
difference between the valuations of the impartial spectators regarding a particular ethical 
perspective, then it ranks higher in general in the ranking of an individual impartial spectator 
who values it.  
 With this rule we can grasp the comparative character of the relative valuations and 
pose possible rankings of the impartial spectators. In addition we can rule out, unreasonable 
rankings. An impartial spectator should not rank a perspective higher irrespective of how 
other perspectives rank it. It would be an unjustified insistence of prioritizing one perspective 
over others regardless of the actual conditions of the policy question. 
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 For Steiner, the transitional value (T) is not a priority, since he does not take into 
account that the Fund requires complex institutions for its implementation. On the contrary, 
for Pogge and Casal, the transitional value is of high importance as the Dividend and the 
Share presuppose only minor institutional reforms in the current global order. Moreover, there 
is a great difference between the transitional requirements of the Fund and both the Dividend 
and the Share. Similarly, there is a major difference between their relative valuations. Hence, 
the transitional value ranks high in the rankings of Pogge and Casal, and low in that of 
Steiner. Considering the libertarian value (L), the Fund is a direct implementation of the 
Lockean proviso, whereas the Dividend and the Share are only constrained by it. We can 
assert that there is a major difference in the valuations of impartial spectators. Hence, the 
libertarian value is ranked high in the ranking of Steiner and low in the rankings of Pogge and 
Casal. Similarly, the value of equal respect (R) is much more important for Steiner than for 
Pogge and Casal as the informational requirement of the Fund is much lower than both the 
Dividend and the Share. Hence, the value of equal respect ranks high in the rankings of 
Steiner, and low in the ranking(s) of Pogge and Casal. Still, Pogge prioritizes the value of 
equal respect slightly more than does Casal as he points to concerns of agency. Utilitarian 
value (U), is considered important by all impartial spectators. The extent of the difference 
between the valuations of impartial spectators is low; hence (U) is ranked relatively lower. All 
proposals decrease inequality; hence, egalitarian value (E) is ranked relatively lower by all 
impartial spectators. Prioritarian (P) and sufficientarian (S) values are prioritized by both 
Pogge and Casal, and not by Steiner. Hence, they will be ranked relatively higher than the 
egalitarian and utilitarian value by Pogge and Casal and lower by Steiner. Moreover, Pogge 
prioritizes sufficientarian value over prioritarian value, and Casal prioritizes prioritarian value 
over sufficientarian. All proposals help in conservation of natural resources (C). However, for 
Casal, natural resource conservation is more important than it is for Pogge. Based on these 
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considerations, we can pose 
rankings by impartial spectators as 
follows: Casal 
(T>P>C>S>U>E>R>L), 
Pogge (T>S>P>U>C>R>E>L) and 
Steiner (R>L>U>C>E>T>P>S). 
Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 After establishing the relative valuations, the next step is to identify the overlaps in 
terms of pair-wise valuations. Over lapping pair-wise valuations are the choices that the 
impartial spectators mutually agree on without an agreement on the overall rankings or the 
best choice. In the above evaluation of the three impartial spectators there are five pair-wise 
valuation that they all agree on T>P, T>S, C>E, U>E, R>L. They guide action based on 
shared beliefs. Sen points out a way to use pair-wise agreements in assessing any plural 
evaluation. He argues that ‘intelligent moral choice demands that we not choose –explicitly or 
by default--an alternative that we can see is morally inferior to another feasible alternative.’210 
                                                          
210 Amartya Sen. "Well Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984." The Journal of Philosophy 82, 
n. 4 (1985): 169-221, at 181.   
Casal Pogge Steiner 
T T R 
P S L 
C P U 
S U C 
U C E 
E R T 
R E P 
L L S 
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(Sen, 1985, p.181). According to the above five pair-wise valuations, there is an agreement 
that P, S, E, and L are all inferior to at least one of the other alternatives: U, T, C, and R. 
Then, we can claim that it is morally wrong to choose any one of P, S, E, and L when there is 
the chance to choose any one of the others: U, T, C, and R. 
 For the case at hand, the application of the social choice approach has decreased the 
mutually agreeable choice set at hand. Yet, what does it imply for the actual policy choice? 
As Sen contends, depending on the extent of similarity among the rankings, we can have 
different levels of guidance.211 In some cases, the similarity may be to an extent that it can 
determine a morally better option or options. In other cases, such as the one at hand, pair-wise 
valuations do not point to a determinate choice. Nevertheless, they can still provide guidance 
for reforming policy options. The four ethical perspectives that the impartial spectators agree 
to be superior to at least one of the other alternative are U, T, C, and R. As I have discussed in 
Section Three, utilitarian and transitional perspectives rank Pd over Ps and Pf. However, from 
the perspective of conservation of resources, Ps ranks over Pd and Pf; similarly, from the 
perspective of equal respect, Pf ranks over Pd and Ps.  
 There may be multiple ways of articulating this similarity as valuable information for 
reforming policy alternatives. Nevertheless, the easiest way to arrive at a mutually agreed 
choice seems to lay with reforming Pd. My first suggestion is to reform Pd to an extent that it 
can conserve natural resources at least as good as Ps. However, in the analysis of Section 
Three, I have suggested that there is a tradeoff between the environmental and poverty 
reducing aspects of the proposals. Moreover, just as Pogge prioritizes the latter by employing 
a prefixed objective, Casal prioritizes the former. Hence, Pd needs to be reformed in a way 
that emphasizes the environmental objective more without dropping below Ps in poverty 
reduction. Perhaps, one way to go is reforming both policies by dropping any fixed objective 
                                                          
211 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 104, 105. 
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on both environmental protection and poverty reduction and, instead, attaching importance to 
their equal improvement. Then, the tax base, rate, and choice of resources to be taxed are to 
be determined for each case depending on the effects on equal improvement of environmental 
protection and poverty reduction. This suggestion makes more sense when we consider that 
the worst off groups in society are subject to the worst effects of environmental problems, 
and, as Casal points out, that poverty diminishes the capacity of people to address 
environmental problems.212 Hence, both Pd and Ps may be ranked equally by both utilitarian 
and conservation perspectives.  
 My second suggestion is to reform Pd to an extent that it sustains equal respect for 
individuals at least as much as Pf does. As I have discussed in Section Three, both Pd and Pf 
imply flat taxation. Hence, the difference between the proposals in promoting to self-respect 
is related to the differences in the distributive mechanisms. Equal distribution of Pf requires 
less information than the conditional distribution of Pd regarding people who are the worst-off 
and states who are cooperating with the tax scheme. The condition of proving that a state 
cooperates with the tax scheme is a general condition that applies to all states and ensures 
only that the worst off are receiving the benefits. Determining which individuals or groups are 
the worst off, on the other hand, requires information that burdens an already disadvantaged 
sector. These people need to make the case that they do not bear responsibility for their worst-
off position. The distributive mechanism of Pd is central for the scheme and relates closely 
with its other aspects; hence, the mechanism cannot be dropped. Perhaps one way to reform 
Pd is to supplement it with a mechanism that sustains a ‘‘vulnerability presumption 
principle’’. According to this principle, which has been proposed by Christian Barry for 
evaluating information relevant for determining responsibilities, we are to use standards of 
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proof that “express a willingness to err in favor of the acutely deprived subjects.”213 For our 
case at hand, the benefits of the tax scheme can be withheld from those individuals if and only 
if it is clear that their worst-off position results from the outcome of their choices. In cases 
where the evidence is disputable, the benefits of the tax scheme cannot be withheld from the 
vulnerable. Hence, the burden of an informational requirement is minimized to an extent 
compatible with Pf. Reforming the Dividend in accordance with the two suggestions has the 
prospects of transforming the guidance derived from the pair-wise valuations to determining 
the Dividend as the morally better option. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Steiner, Pogge and Casal offer competing global tax schemes on natural resources. In line 
with Sen, I assume that each have an equal claim to justice so far as they survive informed 
public scrutiny. Nevertheless, for making a morally better choice, the conflicts between the 
views do not need to be fully resolved. As I demonstrate in this article, we can still derive 
important moral guidance with the analysis of social choice approach. Admittedly, my 
analysis is a small part of an open ended discussion. The aim is not to reach a conclusion in 
the debate regarding the implementation of a global tax scheme. New information and 
perspectives always offer original ways of moderating the outcome. Yet, the two policy 
recommendations are valuable as they point towards a less unjust social state among the 
actual alternatives. Following Sen, "we go as far as we reasonably can."214 
 
 
 
                                                          
213 Christian Barry, "Applying the Contribution Principle."Metaphilosophy 36, n. 1/2 (2005): 210-227, at 221. 
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Chapter 4.  Reforming the EU Asylum Policy  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Since 2011, millions of have been forced  to leave their houses in search of safer living 
conditions due to the conflict in Syria. In addition to more than seven million internally 
displaced people, as of September 2015, there are more than 4 million people of concern 
registered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in   neighboring 
countries.215  The conflict did not, however, immediately initiate a refugee influx into the 
European Union (EU). Between April 2011 and August 2015, only less than ten percent of the 
Syrian refugees applied for asylum in the EU Member States.216 Instead, Syrians have sought 
refuge in neighboring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. However, 
the situation is dramatically changing. There seems to be no prospect of a peaceful solution of 
the Syrian conflict in the near future.  Furthermore, massive numbers of asylum seekers are 
continuously taking the long and dangerous road to Europe in search of safety. Thousands 
daily cross the Mediterranean Sea from Turkey, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia to Italy and Greece. 
                                                          
215 "These generally include refugees and asylum-seekers, returnees, stateless persons and, under certain 
conditions, internally displaced persons (IDPs)." UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook Revised edition, Geneva: 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, (2011) at 18.   
216 UNHCR data, available at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php 
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The sea journey is extremely hazardous. According to UNHCR data, as of September, there 
were 477,906 arrivals by sea in which 2,962 people were reported dead or missing in 2015. 
Reaching Greece or Italy is not the desired final destination for these asylum seekers. From 
Greece, where 357,065 people have made landfall since the beginning of the conflict, the 
refugees travel through Macedonia and Serbia in order to reach Hungary, making their way 
towards northern European countries such as Germany or Sweden.217 In this long journey, the 
refugees are usually without adequate shelter, sanitation or supplies. Moreover, they are left 
vulnerable to human-smuggling organizations.218    
 The escalating crises, however, have not received public attention in Europe until three 
alarming events hit the news in   2015. In April 25th, a boat carrying refugees from Libya to 
Italy was capsized, drowning 400 people including minors and children.219 In August 27th, a 
sealed truck was discovered parked in eastern Austria containing the bodies of at least 40 
refugees who had suffocated.220 In September 2nd, the body of Aylan, a Syrian boy from the 
town of Kobane, was found lying face-down on a beach in the holiday resort of Bodrum in 
Turkey. He was one of the twelve refugees drowned in an attempt to cross the Aegean Sea to 
reach the island of Kos in Greece.221 In the first week of September, the concerns raised by 
the inhuman images have materialized around another crisis. Thousands of asylum seekers, 
most of them fleeing the conflict in Syria, were gathered at Budapest's main train station. The 
                                                          
217 UNHCR data, available at: http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php. Actual numbers are likely to be 
much greater. It is estimated that the risk of dying while crossing the Mediterranean is 2%. Philippe Fargues and 
Sara Bonfanti, “When the best option is a leaky boat: why migrants risk their lives crossing the Mediterranean 
and what Europe is doing about it.” Migration Policy Centre: Policy Brief, October 2014, at 5. 
218 As Fargues  indicates "The ratio of Syrians smuggled by sea to Greece or Italy, compared to those regularly 
seeking asylum in the EU28, has jumped from 14.7 percent in 2011 to 40.9 percent in 2012 and 44.7 percent in 
2013." Philippe Fargues, “Europe Must Take on its Share of the Syrian Refugee Burden, But How?” Migration 
Policy Centre: Policy Brief, February 2014, at 3.  
219 Damien Gale, “Hundreds of migrants believed to have drowned off Libya after boat capsizes” Guardian, 
April 15, 2015.  
220 Luke Harding, “Police fear as many as 50 migrants dead inside lorry left by Austrian motorway.” Guardian, 
August 28, 2015 
221 Helena Smith, “Shocking images of drowned Syrian boy show tragic plight of refugees,” Guardian, 
September 2, 2015.  
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asylum seekers demanded the opportunity to travel across Hungary to Austria and finally to 
Germany and Sweden, where they believed their claims of asylum would be better received. 
The Hungarian government officials, claiming that they are following EU regulations, 
demanded that the asylum seekers remain in the established refugee camps.222  
 The events revealed two major problems with the asylum policies of the EU states 
brought together under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).  First, the asylum 
seekers did not have effective access to the official asylum procedures; second, the bordering 
countries such as Hungary did not have adequate means to receive asylum seekers. Hence, 
beyond responding to the immediate humanitarian situation, the need for reforming CEAS 
was made evident. My main aim in this chapter is to compare, in terms of justice, the current 
practice with two alternatives for reforming CEAS. I reconstruct these alternatives by 
combining the already existing practices of the CEAS together with two contrasting attitudes 
regarding the asylum seekers and their plight. The first policy proposal, which I call 'Turn 
Back', is designed to prevent the Syrian asylum seekers from entering the EU territory. The 
second proposal, which I call 'Fair Share', is designed to provide shelter for the asylums 
seekers  as well as share the burden among the Member States.   
 I assess the policies by applying the three step method of social choice that I 
developed in the previous chapters. In Section 4.4, I begin with the first step by describing the 
alternative social states implied by the policies as richly as the assessment requires. In Section 
4.5, I discuss six ethical perspectives by which we can value the proposals: libertarian, basic 
rights, utilitarian, equal respect, state sovereignty and solidarity. Furthermore, in Section 4.6, I 
first identify impartial spectators who give relative valuations of the rankings by different 
perspectives and then look for overlaps among rankings of impartial spectators with the aim 
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of identifying pair wise valuations. Yet, prior to three steps of the social choice approach, in 
Section 4.2 I offer an account of the asylum policies of the neighboring countries of Syria and 
the actual conditions of the asylum seekers.    Section 4.3 offers an account of the 
commitments of the EU Member states based on the Refugee Convention. Both accounts are 
important for understanding the social states described in Section 4.4 and their assessment 
under the ethical perspectives are discussed in Section 4.5. Finally, in Section 4.7 I conclude 
with some policy recommendations.       
 
4.2 Syrian Asylum Seeker in Neighboring Countries    
The current condition of the Syrian asylum seekers in the neighboring countries is important 
for understanding the reasons behind the refugee's flight to Europe. The prima facie fact is 
that the asylum policies of neighboring countries were not designed for the long term duration 
of the Syrian conflict and the  great number of asylum seekers it has produced. They do not 
offer long lasting solutions to diverse problems refugees face in their territory. I discuss the 
case of Turkey in more detail as it is the only neighbor who is party to the Refugee 
Convention with a relatively more welcoming legal framework towards Syrian refugees and 
hosts the highest number in absolute terms. At the end of the section, I also offer some 
comparative remarks in relation to other neighboring host countries such as Jordan and 
Lebanon.    
The major issue concerns the legal status of the refugees in host countries. The most 
important legal document regarding the refugees is the Refugee Convention of 1951 and its 
Additional Protocol of 1967. These documents provide a baseline in determining who is   
considered a refugee, what are the rights of refugees and the relevant duties of the states. 
Although Turkey has signed both the Convention and its Additional Protocol of 1967,  the 
nation maintains a geographical limitation that allows asylum rights only to refugees coming 
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from European countries.223 The Syrians asylum seekers, being non-European, are thus not 
eligible for  attaining Convention refugee status. Hence, although Turkey has implemented an 
open borders policy for asylum seekers arriving from Syria, they cannot apply for Convention 
refugee status. Instead, they are recognized as 'guests' who have been given 'temporary 
protection' status.224  
Under this ‘temporary protection’ status, the Syrian asylum seekers enjoy mainly three 
kinds of rights.225 First, these rights commit the state of Turkey to the principle of non-
refoulment, and thereby guarantee the Syrian asylum seekers residence within the territory of 
Turkey unless they can be resettled into a safe third country.226 The principle of non-
refoulment laid out by Article 33 of the Convention states that  
  
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.227  
 
However, the duty of non-refoulement  differs from a right to asylum. As James Hathaway 
points out "it [non-refoulment] only prohibits measures that cause refugees to ‘‘be pushed 
                                                          
223 Ahmet Icduygu, “Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Long Road Ahead.” Washington  
DC: Migration Policy Institute, (2015) at 4.    
224 "Temporary protection is generally used to describe a short-term emergency response to a significant influx 
of asylum-seekers  and was initially developed by several European States as a response to the large-scale 
movement of people fleeing the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s” UNHCR, Resettlement 
Handbook Revised edition, 20.   
225 The actual policy document regarding the Syrian refugee influx in Turkey remains secret and non-accessible  
to the public. Kemal Kirisci, “Syrian Refugee and Turkey’s Challenge: Going Beyond Hospitality.” Brooking 
Institution Reports (2014) at 14.  Our understanding of the policy is only from the declarations of  government 
officials and thus  creates an ambiguity and insecurity regarding the status of refugees.   
226 I discuss the limited capacity of the resettlement mechanism at the end of this subsection.  
227 UNHCR,“Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees,” (2011) at 30.  
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back into the arms of their persecutors’’; it does not affirmatively establish a duty on the part 
of states to receive refugees."228  
 The second right the temporary protection status gives to the asylum seekers is 
protection from  punishment for bypassing the legal entrée conditions when entering the host 
state. Although Turkey has been following an open border policy since the beginning of the 
conflict, there have been times when the borders were closed for security reasons, a state of 
affairs which makes the second protection important. The first part of Article 31 of the 
Convention states that  
 
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry 
or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or 
freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their 
territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to 
the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.229 
 
In line with UNHCR Guidelines on Temporary Protection and Stay Arrangements,230 the third 
kind of right commits the host government to provide basic rights without discrimination such 
as rights to physical protection and shelter, access to services such as health care and basic 
education for children, freedom of movement and respect for family unity. 
The first two kinds of rights imply negative duties for the state.  Such rights are 
concerned with protecting the asylum seekers from  punishment due to their circumstances. 
The third kind of right, however, implies a number of positive duties. In practice, the Syrian 
asylum seekers in Turkey face major problems in the actual enjoyment of the rights of the last 
                                                          
228 James C Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press,  2005) , 300-301. 
229 UNHCR,“Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees,” 29. 
230 UNHCR, “Guidelines on Temporary Protection or Stay Arrangements,” (2014).  
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kind.  Moreover, without the actual enjoyment of basic rights, the first two kinds of negative 
rights lose their significance.  
A major problem is that asylum seekers outside the camps, which constitute the 
majority of the refugee population, lack formal access to rights of the third kind.231 Due to the 
number of asylum seekers and the duration of the conflict, the camps   have far exceeded their 
capacity for adequately hosting the asylum seekers.232  Four fifths of the total number of 
asylum seekers are now living in towns and cities, where they  lack access to adequate 
housing and services. There is no infrastructure for schooling half a million Syrian children, 
and no clear policy in addressing their educational needs that arise from differences in 
curriculum and language.233 They experience problems in actual access to health care system 
because the health care system in refugee concentrated regions is overburdened, health care 
workers lack awareness regarding the entitled rights of the Syrian asylum seekers, and 
language barriers exist.234  
Another important problem relates to the issue of employment of Syrian asylum 
seekers.  Gaining access to the formal economy is very difficult for them   since the temporary 
protection status does not provide   a work permit. As Kirisci points out, Syrian asylum 
seekers "would need to have a valid passport as well as a residence permit and the employer 
would need to show that a Turkish national could not be found for the position.”235 Without 
work authorization, the refugees are led to jobs in the informal economy with extremely low 
wages and no legal protection. This situation creates “an underground labor force for adult 
                                                          
231 Kirisci, “Syrian Refugee and Turkey’s Challenge: Going Beyond Hospitality,” 15. 
 232 UNHCR data , available at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. Of the countries hosting the 
highest number of refugees, Turkey has more than one million nine hundred thousand, Lebanon more than one 
million one hundred thousand, and Jordan more than six hundred thousand. Moreover, as Fargues points out " It 
has to be remembered that the Syrian refugee crisis comes just after the Iraqi refugee crisis of 2006-2009, which 
had displaced around two million Iraqi citizens towards the very same countries: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey 
and Egypt." Fargues, “Europe Must Take on its Share of the Syrian Refugee Burden, But How?”, 3.  
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and children workers in industries such as construction, textile manufacturing and heavy 
industry as well as in the agricultural sector.”236  
 Last, but not least, a growing social problem has ensued. First, although a portion of 
the refugees has close ties with the local population, there remain major cultural, ethnic and 
religious differences.237 Such differences are felt more intensely as  the reality that the refugee 
population is there to stay becomes  increasingly obvious for the local communities. Second, 
the region of Turkey bordering Syria has traditionally been composed of diverse religious and 
ethnic communities. An increase in numbers of one particular community due to the refugee 
influx has created political problems. Third, increases in housing rents and competition in the 
labor market, as well as illegal activities are usually associated with the presence of the 
refugee population. All  these factors have transformed the previous welcoming attitude of the 
local communities into hostility towards refugee communities.  
 UNHCR lists three policy options: integration to the local community, repatriation to 
the country of origin or resettlement to a third state as durable solutions for the problems of 
asylum seekers.238 Yet, none of these outcomes seem viable in the near future for Syrian 
asylum seekers. First, since they are ineligible for refugee status in Turkey, the government is 
under no legal obligation to implement a policy of integration.  Furthermore, no time limit has 
been introduced to the temporary protection.239 Hence, the Syrian asylum seekers lack access 
to any asylum procedure. Second, repatriation, the voluntary return of the refugees to their 
country of origin, is not an option as the Syrian conflict has entered its fifth year with no 
                                                          
236 Ibid., 21.  
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prospect of peaceful solution in the future.240 Moreover, it is  unclear if the post-conflict Syria  
will  be hospitable for those who have fled the country during the conflict. Third, although the 
Syrians refugees are recognized by the UNHCR as people of concern and entitled to  
resettlement, the resettlement mechanism does not have the capacity to respond to the current 
scale of the crises. UNHCR recognizes refugees, as  
 
 those who are outside their country of origin or habitual residence and  
unable to return there owing  to serious and indiscriminate threats to  
life, physical integrity or freedom resulting  from generalized violence 
 or events seriously disturbing public order.241   
 
This definition of the UNHCR extends protection to nearly all of the Syrian asylum seekers. 
Nevertheless, the number of asylum seekers that third countries are willing to admit through 
the resettlement mechanism is very low.  Furthermore, the UNHCR’s capacity to process the 
number of applications is  inadequate.242 Actual resettlement world-wide has been only a 
fraction of the numbers in need.243 Syrian refugees who have applied to the UNHCR in 2015 
have been given interview dates  as late as  2020.  
 The same conditions, if not worsening ones, hold for the Syrian asylum seekers in 
Jordan. The majority  do not live in camps; the cities lack the infrastructure to meet the needs 
of the Syrian population and the public system is overburdened, causing problems with 
                                                          
240 "When looking at this possible durable solution, it is important to identify the indicators which may determine 
that voluntary repatriation could be an option in the near or foreseeable future. For example, are peace talks 
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ensured?” (UNHCR 2011a, 31) 
241 UNHCR, “Resettlement Handbook Revised edition,” 80, 81. 
242 UNHCR, “UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2016,” 2015, at 12.  
243 As of September 2015 total places available worldwide are 107,239.    Detailed data is available at: 
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housing, food, sanitation, energy and water. There is no policy to integrate the asylum seekers 
into the labor market. As the burden is increasingly felt by the local population, welcoming 
attitudes have gradually turned hostile.244 In Lebanon, where the Syrian population makes up 
one fourth of the total population,   no officially established camps exist. Most asylum seekers 
live in urban areas; the remainder, in informal camps established by the community under 
extremely harsh conditions. The presence of the Syrian population, the highest number in the 
region in relative terms, has greatly strained an already insufficient infrastructure.245  
 The neighboring countries are the first option for the Syrian asylum seekers fleeing the 
conflict to take refugee. The open border policy of the neighbors provides the first escape 
from danger. Moreover, the proximity of the neighboring countries to Syria provides easier 
opportunities for repatriation.  Lastly, cultural similarities tend to provide an initially 
welcoming environment. Yet, with the conflict entering in its fifth year, the negative factors   
discussed above have gained the upper hand. The complex issue of Syrian asylum seekers 
requires a search for extensive and long term solutions. 
  
4.3 Commitments of the EU Member States 
The asylum systems of the EU Member States offer a better alternative to Syrian asylum 
seekers than do their neighboring countries. The major reason is that, being party to the 
Refugee Convention and the Additional Protocol, every state of EU is required to give a fair 
hearing to people in their territory who have a claim to Convention Refugee status. 
Nevertheless, as Timothy Hatton cautions, this hearing is required by Article 33 of the 
Convention for avoiding refoulement of the potentional refugees and does not apply to 
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refugees outside their territory.246 In addition, in line with Article 31, illegal entry of the 
asylum seekers to the host country does not prevent their claiming asylum or prejudice their 
admission procedure.247 These two principles of the Convention create incentives for the 
Syrian asylum seekers to leave the neighboring countries and reach  the EU territory  so as to 
claim asylum. 
 According to the Convention, asylum seekers entitled to apply for Convention refugee 
status have a number of rights before, during and after the asylum determination procedure. I 
discuss these rights in this subsection to portray what is at stake for the Syrian refugees  that 
take the hazardous journey to Europe.  
 As Hathaway underlines, "it is one’s de facto circumstances, not the official validation 
of those circumstances that gives rise to Convention refugee status."248 Hence, in order to 
prevent genuine refugees being disadvantaged, asylum seekers who are simply present on a 
host country enjoy a number of rights immediately and while their claim to Convention 
refugee status is being determined. These rights are similar to  those given to asylum seekers 
by the 'temporary protection status' discussed in the previous section. In addition to the right 
to non-refoulment and protection from punishment due to illegal entry, Hathaway discusses 
four additional rights. First, the Convention binds the host country to provide for the security 
and basic economic needs of the asylum seekers, as well as creating adequate mechanisms for 
assessing the claim to Convention refugee status. Second, the basic human dignity of   asylum 
seekers should be protected. This protection involves   the right to the preservation of family 
unity, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and right to primary education 
of children. Third, the host state should provide adequate identification documentation that 
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portrays their status.   Lastly,   legal means should be open for asylum seekers in cases where 
any of the listed rights are breached.249 
 Ultimately, the claim of the asylum seeker depends on whether his or her situation fits 
with the Conventions' refugee status. Article 1 of Convention provides that required 
definition, characterizing it as follows:    
 
 the term refugee shall apply to who owing to a well-founded fear of being 
 persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
 particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
 nationality and is unable or, owing to such  fear, is unwilling to avail 
 himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
 and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result 
 of  such events, is unable or unwilling to return to it.”250  
 
 Based on the definition of the Convention, if the claimant qualifies as a Convention 
refugee, then s/he gains a number of more substantive rights. As Hathaway lists, "These 
include the right to engage in wage earning employment and to practice a profession, freedom 
of association, access to housing and welfare, to benefit from labor and social security 
legislation, intellectual property rights, and the entitlement to receive travel 
documentation."251  
 In cases where, after the assessment of the application by the host country, the 
claimant is not recognized as a Convention refugee, s/he may still be protected by the 
principle of non-refoulment. For Carens, “Even on the most expansive interpretation of the 
Convention, however, people fleeing civil wars and famine are generally not thought to 
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qualify, because they are not targets of violence or deprivation, despite the fact that their lives 
are in danger.”252 The Syrian refugees who cannot make the case that they are particularly 
prosecuted for their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or 
political opinion are not qualified as Convention refugees. However, the conditions laid out 
by the principle of non-refoulment are broader than conditions required to be considered as a 
Convention refugee. If it is not safe for asylum seekers who do not qualify for refugee status 
to be returned to their country of origin, then they are allowed to stay with a quasi-refugee 
status fewer rights.253  
 In both cases, there is a time limit to their stay with the status of the Convention 
refugee or quasi refugee. They need to be eventually 'naturalized' and given "an opportunity to 
make a new life on the same terms as the members of the society they have joined." (Carens 
2013, 203-204) This is established by the Article 34 of the Convention, which reads: 
 
 The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation  and 
naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort  to 
 expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the  
 charges and costs of such proceedings.254   
 
 The Refugee Convention lays out the general conditions for the rights of asylum 
seekers before, during and after the assessment of their claim. The rights eventually offer long 
term solutions to the Syrians fleeing the conflict compared to the temporary protection status 
offered by the neighboring countries. Hence, entering into the territory of an EU state is the 
best chance for the Syrian refugees to achieve a safe and stable life.  
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 However, actual implementation of these rights does not always work to this 
satisfactory ending. Although every state of the EU who has signed the Convention is 
required to pass legislation in order to implement the Convention, they still differ in    
interpretation of the Convention.  As Carens emphasizes, in the refugee definition of the 
Convention, there are a number of phrases such as “well-founded”, “persecution” and 
“membership of a social group” that need to be interpreted in order to make precise 
determinations.255 Moreover, the conditions of 'threat to life and freedom' in the formulation 
of the principle of non-refoulment are also open to different interpretations. While countries 
such as Germany and Sweden are more positive in receiving and interpreting the asylum 
applications of the Syrian refugees, others, for example, Greece and Hungary are more 
negative. Such differences lead to competing policies, where asylum seekers of similar origin 
and situations might end up with results as different as deportation or naturalization.  
 
4.4 The CEAS and the two proposals for reform 
 
4.4.1 The Common European Asylum System CEAS  
The harmonization of asylum polices across Europe around the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS) was established as a goal at the European Council meeting at Tampere in 
1999. 256The revised Dublin Regulation in 2013 (Dublin III) is the latest step in the 
development of the CEAS.  The regulation builds on the experiences of two previous legal 
frameworks that have been established by the Dublin Convention in 1990 and the Dublin 
Regulation in 2003 (Dublin II). The Dublin Regulations establish the ground rules for 
determining the member state that is responsible for an asylum application. There are two 
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main objectives. The first is preventing the abuse of the asylum system in the form of multiple 
applications by the same person in several Member States.257 The second objective is to 
ensure that asylum seekers have effective access to procedures for determining refugee 
status.258 The policy does not imply free entry to asylum seekers who wish to enter the EU 
territory. Nevertheless, in line with the Convention commitments of the EU Member States, 
they are protected by Article 31 and 33. In this subsection, I first offer a general account of 
the CEAS based on the ground rules established by Dublin III.  Then, I describe the current 
status with respect to the Syrian asylum seekers.  
 In determining the Member States responsible for assessing an asylum application, 
Dublin III establishes a clear hierarchy of criteria.259   The most important criterion is family 
unity. The responsibility for the application of asylum lies with a Member State if a family 
member of the applicant resides in that Member State as a refugee or as an asylum-seeker 
whose status is under determination.  The second most important criteria is the legal presence 
of the asylum seeker. If any of the Member States has issued the asylum seeker a visa or 
residence permit, then it is responsible for her application. If the first two criteria do not 
apply, then the first Member State in which the asylum seeker has irregularly entered is 
responsible for the application. Finally, if none of these criteria apply, then the Member State 
where the first asylum application was submitted is responsible.260 When a Member State 
establishes, based on these criteria, that another Member State is responsible for the asylum 
seeker's application, then the former may request the latter state to take charge of the 
                                                          
257 The underlying assumption for the first objective is "that "shopping" for one's favorite country is inconsistent 
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application. In a similar way, when a Member State determines that the asylum seeker has 
already submitted an application in another state, then the former may request the latter 
rescind the application. 261 Lastly, a member state may also take the responsibility of an 
application for asylum or  reunite family members based on humanitarian grounds even when 
it is established by these criteria that the application is not its responsibility.262  
 A major problem with the Dublin regulations is the misplaced assumption that asylum 
systems of each Member State are similarly sufficient with regards to the protection of the 
Convention rights of refugees. As Tsourdi and Bruycker point out, "the differentiated levels 
of economic development between Member States, the discrepancies in their social assistance 
systems and the varying levels of investment in their asylum processing and reception 
systems, have led to widely diverging recognition rates and reception conditions."263 
Particularly, practices in Greece, Bulgaria, Italy and Hungary have been repeatedly 
challenged by the UNHCR and other asylum advocates.264 There are problems that regard 
poor reception conditions and dysfunctional asylum procedures, subjection of the illegal 
entrees to prolonged detention periods and inhumane treatments, and inadequate respect for 
the criterion of family unity.265  
 Solving these problems constituted one aim of the Dublin III regulations, as a revision 
of Dublin II safeguards.   Two pre-emptive measures were taken regarding the asylum system 
of a receiving country that has begun to show signs of deficiency to an extent  in which the 
rights of the refugees are in danger. A separate provision was included that placed “a new 
responsibility on the transferring Member State to ensure that the applicant's rights and ability 
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to access protection will be respected in the receiving state."266 In addition, an 'early and 
warning and preparedness mechanism,' that aims to assess and monitor the data, and 
determine the extent of the deficiency was put in place.267 The mechanism enables the 
transferring state to fulfill its responsibility for stopping transfers to the asylum system with 
deficiencies.  
 Another major problem with (both II and III) Dublin regulations is that they place 
unfair burdens on the bordering states of the EU where the asylum seekers have made the first 
entry. These countries are the border countries of the EU where the Syrian asylum seekers 
usually have made first entry. According to the last two criteria just described, they are 
responsible for the asylum applications of those who have irregularly entered EU territory and 
who do not have family members residing in any of the member states.  Moreover, due to 
'take back' and 'take charge' mechanisms, the asylum seekers who submit asylum applications 
in other member states need to be transferred to the border countries.268 It is also true that the 
border countries  such as Greece, Bulgaria and Hungary are relatively less affluent than are 
the rest of EU member states, an economic difference which amplifies the claim of unfair 
burden.269   
 These two problems have materialized clearly around the Syrian refugee crisis. On the 
one hand, more than half a million people who have made landfall in Greece and Italy are 
aware of the poor reception conditions of the first entree states. These asylum seekers try to 
bypass these countries by avoiding registration, hoping to submit their asylum application to   
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Member States with more positive reception conditions such as Germany and Sweden. 
However, non-registration prevents them from obtaining assistance and increases their  
vulnerability to human smugglers. Moreover, non-registration increases the difficulty for host 
states to organize assistance mechanisms and distinguish between economic migrant and 
refugee populations.  On the other hand, the effective implementation of the Dublin III would 
mean that the applications of hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers entering EU annually 
need to be assessed by the asylum systems of EU border countries, a process which places 
excessive burdens on the latter.   
  
4.4.2 The Turn Back Policy 
A number of proposals have been offered for reforming the CEAS in the face of the problems 
related to the high number of Syrian asylum seekers. I discuss these proposals mainly as two 
competing policies. The first policy, which I call Turn Back, I discuss in this subsection. I 
reconstruct the Turn Back by combining the already existing anti-immigration practices of the 
CEAS and a number of further measures that the border Member States such as Hungary, 
Greece and Bulgaria have taken in response to the arrival of Syrian refugees.270 The main aim 
of the policy is to reduce the heavy burden that the formal rules of the CEAS put on the 
border states. By deterring the asylum seekers from entering  EU territory, and in turn, 
practically preventing them from submitting claims of asylum, the policy aims to substantially 
decrease the Syrian refugee population in their territory. In this way, the policy drops the 
second objective of the CEAS, which is to ensure that asylum seekers have effective access to 
procedures for determining refugee status. 
                                                          
270 The negative attitude of Hungary was  pronounced clearly by the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, 
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 This strategy has been already implemented in different ways in relation to the routes 
the asylum seekers take to reach the EU. The arrival of the refugees by the flight route are 
constrained by stringent visa requirements and controls at the borders, heavy fines for airlines 
companies who transport people without adequate documentation,  and reorganization of the 
arrival areas as ‘international zones’ where no asylum claim can be raised.271 The arrivals by 
sea route are constrained by coastguard operations. Refugees crossing the Mediterranean by 
carriers are intercepted on the sea and directed back to their original destination.272 Refugees 
in the intercepted carriers are treated as illegal immigrants without any consideration to 
determine the potential asylum-seekers.273  (Leonard 2010, 240)  
 The arrivals by the land route are constrained by a number of policies the border 
countries of the EU have implemented as a response to the arrival of the Syrian asylum 
seekers. Greece, Bulgaria and Hungary have one after the other taken preventive measures to 
block the Syrian asylum seekers from entering the country by the land route. First, in June 
2012, "Greece dispatched an additional 1,800 border guards to the Greek-Turkey Evros 
border and placed 26 floating barriers along the river that divides the countries in an attempt 
to keep out a potential wave of Syrians fleeing the country." 274 The border protection was 
complemented with the construction of 12,5 km fence.275 The measures taken by the Greek 
government turned the migration route to Bulgaria, where the infrastructure was far from 
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sufficient to receive the asylum seekers or provide them with adequate accommodation, 
medical aid and subsistence.276 The Bulgarian government took similar measures. The border 
protection policy included deterring the asylum seekers from reaching the Bulgarian territory 
by "the building of a razor-edge fencing facility and the deployment of 1400 (plus 100) strong 
police unit in order to ensure the '100% control' of sensitive areas along the border."277 
Asylum seekers who were able to cross the border were detained. The policy was successful 
in significantly decreasing the crossings.278  
 With both land routes to Greece and Bulgaria closed, the asylum seekers aimed for 
Greece through the sea route. Those who could make the landfall traveled through Macedonia 
and Serbia to reach Hungary as the first EU Member State.  The reaction of the Hungarian 
government was no different than that of the Greek or Bulgarian government. In September 
2015, Hungary finished constructing a barbed wire fence along to its Serbian border. Along 
the barbed fenced border, transit zones were created for housing of the asylum seekers and 
assessing their asylum applications. The capacity of the transit zones, which can register only 
100 asylum claims per day were insufficient in the face of thousands arriving to the border 
daily.279 In July 2015, a number of legislations were amended that provide the legal grounds 
of the border protection policies. The asylum procedures were extremely accelerated, making 
the one-instance judicial review of asylum cases ineffective. Serbia was recognized as a safe 
third country for asylum-seekers. Hence, refugees arriving from Serbia were immediately 
rejected at the border.280  
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 The turn back policy consisting of blocking all sea, air and land routes to the EU is 
effectively implemented without breaching the rights of the refugees protected by the Refugee 
Conventions in virtue of a particular interpretation of the safe third country rule. Accordingly, 
the member states have the authority to send back the asylum seekers to a safe third country 
which they passed through before entering a Member State. As Hathaway points out "To 
qualify as a ‘‘safe third country’’ there must simply be a determination that the destination 
country is prepared to consider the applicant’s refugee claim, and will not expose the claimant 
to persecution, (generalized) risk of torture or related ill-treatment, or refoulement."281 The 
first country of arrival and safe third country rules start a chain of deportation that ends with 
the refugee's return to neighboring countries of Syria  such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. 
Although in these countries the refugees are not exposed to torture, prosecution and 
refoulment, as I have discussed in Section Two, the refugee population has no long term 
prospects.   
  
4.4.3 The Fair Share Policy  
I reconstruct the second policy proposal, which I call Fair Share, by combining the relocation 
scheme proposed by the European Commission with a number positive attitudes towards the 
Syrian refugees. Similar with Turn Back, Fair Share aims to reduce the burden on the border 
states of the EU and prevents asylum shopping. Yet, at the same time, it aims to make sure 
that the asylum seekers have effective access to procedures for determining refugee status. It 
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consists of three aspects: non-rejection at the border, breaking the link between claim and 
place, and relocation of the refugee population among the Member States.282    
 Non-rejection at the border  ensures that the asylum seekers effectively enjoy the right 
to seek asylum. It diminishes the distinction between those who have already entered the 
territory of a Member State and those at the border who wish to enter.283 The border 
protection measures that have been implemented to block air, sea and land routes are 
removed. The asylum seekers are exempt from visa procedures that may still be implemented 
for other kinds of migrants.    
 The second component is to remove the link between the Member State where the 
asylum seeker makes the claim and where she receives refugee status. There are two 
advantages of this move. First, it removes the incentives for the asylum seeker for asylum 
shopping. As Carens correctly questions, "Why travel thousands of miles to file a refugee 
claim if that does not enhance one’s chances of being able to live in the state where the claim 
is filed?”284 Second, if the link is removed, then the rich states have less incentive for 
preventing asylum seekers to enter their territory, rendering the first component more feasible. 
Third, the resources for implementing preventive measures can be allocated for better 
protection of refugee rights.285 
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 The third component, relocation, distributes the responsibility to protect the rights of 
refugees fairly across the Member States according to their absorption capacity.286 Kritzman-
Amir defines absorption capacity as "a State's ability to endure additional responsibility in a 
way that, from a functionalist point of view, will not dramatically affect the State or will not 
radically influence its economy."287 It depends on a number of criteria whose relative strength 
needs to be determined in relation to particular cases. I here take as reference the relocation 
scheme proposed by the European Commission within the emergency response system for the 
arrival of Syrian refugees. The distribution of responsibility rests on four criteria: GDP, size 
of population, unemployment rate and the number of asylum seekers in the previous years.288 
The last two criteria are inversely applied: the higher unemployment rate and the number of 
asylum seekers in the previous years, the lesser number of asylum seekers for which the host 
country is responsible. For example, while France and Germany respectively receive 14,17% 
and 18,42%,  Greece and Hungary receive respectively 1,9% and 1,79% of the total number 
of asylum seekers.289 Moreover, the country of relocation is identified according to a number 
of qualifications of the asylum seekers such as “language and professional skills, and other 
criteria based on demonstrated family, cultural or social ties which could facilitate their 
integration.290 The European Commission proposes to relocate in total 160000 refugees from 
Italy, Greece and Hungary, while still keeping the first country of entry rule as the baseline. 
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The Fair Share policy considered here differs from the relocation scheme as Fair Share does 
not presuppose a limit to the number of refugees consistent with the first component.   
   
4.5 Assessing the proposals by ethical perspective  
The descriptions of the social states implied by the three proposals are just rich enough to go 
on to the second step of the social choice approach. My aim is to determine how the social 
states implied by the three policies are valued from different ethical perspectives. I consider 
six ethical perspectives: libertarian, basic rights, utilitarian, equal respect, state sovereignty 
and solidarity. They all provide distinct reasons for alternative rankings. As I have discussed 
in Chapter Two, each ethical perspective has a claim to objectivity to the extent that it 
survives public scrutiny. In each subsection, I show in what ways each perspective is 
reasonable as well as how the policies are valued by them. The valuations grounded on 
personal interests or prejudices regarding race, religion or ethnicity are excluded.291  
 
4.5.1 Libertarian Perspective 
The libertarian perspective is concerned with the negative duty not to harm others, and 
compensate them for harm already done.  In the context of asylum policies, we have “duties 
to refrain from the harmful actions which serve to create refugees and to compensate those 
whom one has harmed in this fashion.”292 If the EU Member States have acted in ways that 
contributed to the flight of refugees from Syria, then they have a duty to compensate. The 
compensation may be in a number of different forms that might help the Syrian asylum 
seekers. Nevertheless, with the Syrian conflict  entering its fifth year, asylum seekers need 
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long term solutions. And, as I have discussed in Section Two, classical long term solutions 
such as repatriation, resettlement or integration to the neighboring countries are unavailable to 
them. The only way of effective compensation is then to allow them to have access to the EU 
asylum system.  
 Do the EU Member States have any responsibility in the flight of Syrian refugees? 
Matthew Gibney discusses two different ways that the Westerns States may contribute to the 
flight of refugees: military intervention or sale and supply of military weapons, and 
participation in the global economy.293 In addition, Carens remarks that the rich states may be 
contributing to the condition of asylum seekers by playing a role in major environmental 
changes  such as global warming.294 To a certain extent, a causal connection between the EU 
countries and the conflict in Syria can be established in all these three ways.  First, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been conducting military operations in the region 
for decades. The 2003 campaign in Iraq is especially considered as a key element in the 
destabilization of the region. In addition, NATO has been supplying military equipment to the 
diverse groups who are now part of the conflict in Syria. Second, the region has suffered from 
authoritarian regimes funded by oil based economies, a phenomenon which has been 
identified in the literature as the Resource Curse.295 Moreover, the EU, as an important actor 
in the world economy, is responsible for the existence of regimes that are part of the conflict. 
Third, the extreme draught that Syria has suffered between 2006 and 2009 is considered as 
one of the phenomena that has paved the way for the Syrian conflict.296 The unusual duration 
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and intensity of the draught is related to rising temperatures due the global warming, to which 
the affluent industrial states are the major contributors.   
 Establishing such connection requires extensive empirical analysis that is beyond the 
aims of this research.   Furthermore even if the connections are established, it is very hard to 
quantify the precise harm done to the Syrian asylum seekers that needs to be compensated by 
the EU states. Nevertheless, the demand for compensation to the Syrian asylum seekers is 
genuine. As I describe in Section Two, they have no long term solutions in the neighboring 
countries, and they have no access to basic rights. Preventing asylum seekers from claiming 
Convention Refugee status implies a major harm for the already disadvantaged population. In 
such cases where the responsibilities to vulnerable people depend on the assessment of the 
relevant empirical information, Christian Barry argues that we should apply a ‘‘vulnerability 
presumption principle’’. According to this principle, we are to use standards of proof that 
“express a willingness to err in favor of the acutely deprived subjects”297 In assessing the 
empirical information regarding the contribution of the EU to the flight of Syrians, we should 
be more favorable to the possibility of harm. If any of the Syrian asylum seekers are harmed 
by the policies of the EU Member States, they need to be compensated.  Turn Back (Pt) 
allows the least number of asylum applications and does not offer any compensation for the 
possible harms done by the EU Member States.   Fair Share (Pf) on the other hand allows the 
most number and the CEAS (Pc) allows an intermediate number. Hence, we can establish a 
ranking by the libertarian perspective (L) as Pf>Pc>Pt.            
 
4.5.2 Perspective of Basic Rights 
 In addition to the duties that are grounded on the principle of harm, Gibney argues that there 
are "duties to prevent, at least when the costs are low, serious harm coming to those who have 
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already been made refugees by the actions of others.”298 Asylum seekers are one of the most 
vulnerable parts of the world population. As I discuss in Section Two, the Syrian asylum 
seekers have no legal standing in Jordan and Lebanon, and temporary protection status in 
Turkey, which significantly constrains their means to have safety and subsistence in the long 
term. Moreover, in the dangerous journey to the EU, thousands of asylum seekers put their 
lives in danger. If they do not have effective access to the EU asylum system, they will be 
seriously harmed. As Carens explains, “We have a duty to admit refugees simply because 
they have an urgent need for a safe place to live and we are in a position to provide it.”299  
 Nevertheless, this duty is conditional on the costs it imposes on the citizens of the EU 
states. Hence we need to consider whether allowing in the Syrian asylum seekers imposes 
heavy costs or not. In order to have an idea of the extent of the costs, let’s look at how many 
asylum seekers the Member States are required to take responsibility of in the context of the 
Fair Share, the policy that allows the highest number of asylum seekers. According to the 
UNHCR, there are more than four million people of concern in the neighboring countries of 
Syria. In the case of the implementation of the Fair Share, not all of this population will claim 
asylum in the EU. A part of the Syrian asylum seekers settled in the neighboring countries  
has adapted to the living in the local communities. Considering that the process of moving 
from one of the neighboring countries to an EU Member State  will be burdensome, if better 
living conditions can be provided, the asylum seekers would rather stay in the neighboring 
countries. The capacity of the neighboring countries to host the asylum seekers depends on 
the number of asylum seekers in their territory. Hence, if a significant number of asylum 
seekers are transferred to the EU Member States, a significant number of asylum seekers will 
prefer to stay. In line with these considerations, let’s assume roughly half of the Syrian 
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asylum seekers prefer to apply for refugee status in the EU under the Fair Share. According to 
the criteria established by the Fair Share, out of two million asylum seekers, Hungary is 
required to take responsibility of roughly 35000 asylum seekers and Germany 360000 asylum 
seekers. These numbers do not imply major costs to the citizens of the Member States. 
Germany is already hosting more than it is required by the Fair Share, without major costs on 
its own population.  Additionally,  Hungary’s limited quota is manageable without major 
costs to its population.  
As I discuss in Section Three, providing an effective opportunity for Syrian asylum 
seekers to apply for asylum guarantees a series of basic rights before, during and after the 
assessment procedures established by the Refugee Convention. Hence there is a big difference 
in terms of realizing basic rights between Pt, which prevents access to asylum procedures, and 
Pc and Pf which do not. Pf allows more asylum seekers in the asylum system than does Pc 
due to the differences in border policies. In addition, Pc fails to provide protection to the part 
of the asylum seekers who try to cross the border Member States without registration. Hence, 
Pf is valued higher than Pc by the basic rights perspective (B).  Lastly, we can establish a 
ranking by the basic rights perspective (B) as Pf>Pc>Pt. 
 
4.5.3 Utilitarian Perspective 
The utilitarian perspective is concerned with neither the causal connection between the host 
countries and the plight of the asylum seekers, nor their relative position. Instead, it is 
concerned with the aggregate benefit the policies imply. There are two important aspects of 
the calculation. First, the interests of all within the scope of the policies are equally valued.  
Second, the aggregate benefit is determined by a cost benefit analysis.300 The benefits to the 
                                                          
300 Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum, 62, 63. 
117 
 
citizens of the host states, the asylum seekers and those who are affected indirectly by the 
policy are included in the assessment.  
First, the more pressing problems of the asylum seekers, such as enjoyment of basic 
rights are valued more than are the less urgent interests of the citizens of the host states. 
Hence, in line with the analysis in the previous subsection, the benefits of Turn Back are 
lower than are those of CEAS, and CEAS benefits are lower than those of Fair Share. The 
benefits gained by the realization of the basic rights needs to be further moderated in terms of 
the economic benefits and losses each policy implies. 
 Second, from the perspective of the asylum seekers, their economic situation will be 
improved once they enter a host country where their application is assessed. This change in 
status/improvement is due to the series of rights they are entitled to before, during and after 
their asylum claim is processed. As I discuss in Section 4.3, as asylum seekers proceed in the 
process, they gradually receive better economic rights from self-employment to work permit 
and welfare benefits. The amount of benefits the asylum seekers receives depends on the 
affluence of the host country as well as the number of asylum seekers the host country 
receives. The Fair Share takes into consideration these two factors by applying the four 
criteria for distribution of responsibility among states. The fair distribution of the asylum 
seekers creates more economic benefits for the asylum seekers than does the CEAS which 
transfers the most asylum seekers to the less affluent the EU border states.  
Third, from the perspective of the host countries, “there is reason to expect an income 
increase for the natives of the State to which these immigrants arrive.”301 First, the arrival of 
asylum seekers may be beneficial for the EU Member States in that the Syrian asylum 
seekers, predominantly composed of young people, can join their labor force. Second, 
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contrary to the economic migrants, not all of the Syrian asylum seekers are economically 
disadvantaged. Nevertheless, the economic benefits to be derived from the arrival of the 
Syrian asylum seekers are conditional on the economies of the Member States. Border states 
such as Hungary and Greece are less affluent and currently deal with economic problems such 
as unemployment. Hence, the presence of the asylum seekers might be a burden on the 
economy rather than helping it improve. While CEAS requires them to receive the biggest 
portion of asylum seekers, Fair Share distributes the asylum seeker population according to 
the relevant criteria: for example,   GDP and unemployment rates. Hence, with Fair Share, the 
host states benefit from the arrival of asylum seekers; while with CEAS, they suffer.  
 Last but not least, the Fair Share and the CEAS benefit the neighboring countries of 
Syria in proportion to the number of asylum seekers admitted in the EU. First, both polices 
ease the burden on the local population and economies. Second, as these policies ease the 
burden on the neighboring states, stability is brought to the region. Bringing together all four 
considerations, we can establish a ranking by the utilitarian perspective (U) as Pf>Pc>Pt. 
 
4.5.4 Perspective of Equal Respect  
The perspective of equal respect (R) is related with how the policies respect the agency of the 
asylum seekers.302 Carens emphasizes that the asylum seekers “are not just passive victims to 
be assisted in whatever way the receiving states deem best. They are human beings whose 
agency deserves respect.”303 In this sense, the distribution of the asylum seekers among the 
Member States needs to take into account their decision as well as their diverse needs and 
qualifications. Respecting the agency of the asylum seekers has also instrumental value. 
Asylum seekers do not always aim for the countries with better reception condition and 
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affluent economies. Instead, they look for countries where they have ties with the already 
existing communities. Their considerations point at countries where they can find comfort and 
assistance and have better integration opportunities.304  
 In Turn Back policy, the asylum seekers have to return to a safe country where they 
have already passed. The element of agency does not play a role at all.   Fair Share policy 
applies quotas in the relocation of asylum seekers. The country of relocation is identified by a 
number of qualifications of the asylum seekers such as “language and professional skills, and 
other criteria based on demonstrated family, cultural or social ties which could facilitate their 
integration.”305 These considerations take into account the diverse needs and qualities of 
individual asylum seekers. Nevertheless, their decision is not included in the assessment. 
Considering the CEAS, out of the four criteria that are applied in determining the 
responsibilities of the Member States, three  are related with the agency of asylum seekers. 
The first two criteria regarding family unity and the existence of visa or residence permits are 
related to the particular qualifications of the asylum seeker.  The last criteria regarding the 
place of the first asylum application is related with the decision of the asylum seekers. Hence 
among the three policies, we can establish a ranking by the perspective of equal respect (R) as 
Pc>Pf>Pt. 
 
4.5.5 Perspective of State Sovereignty  
The next perspective provides a valuation of the three policies with respect to their effect on 
state sovereignty (S). State sovereignty is important for at least two reasons related with the 
arrival of asylum seekers. The first refers to the importance of authority of the states in their 
own territory. Carens stresses that “the principle of state sovereignty entails that states are 
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normally responsible for what goes on in their own territory and not responsible, or at least 
not nearly as responsible, for what goes on in the territory of other states.”306  According to 
David Miller, such demarcation of authority has important instrumental value. It makes 
“possible for people at any given location to know which legal regime they are subject to, and 
which other policies apply to them.”307 Many human activities, such as economic activities 
that require cooperation and collective problem solving, depend on the fact that the state has 
the final word.308  
In addition to instrumental value, sovereignty within the borders of the states 
guarantees the citizens a territorial right to self-determination. Miller argues that nations that 
have occupied and transformed a certain territory for a substantial period of time have the 
right to determine the future shape of that territory.309 The relationship between a nation and 
its territory involves not only the material transformations such as those that that relate to 
economic growth or environmental values,310 but also the production of the culture.311 The 
territorial right to self-determination gives the citizens of a nation the right to continue this 
activity without the interference of outsiders.  
Miller recognizes that asylum seekers have strong claims for  acceptance in a territory 
of a nation based on the threat to their basic rights. Nevertheless, in practice, the extent of the 
protection that the asylum seekers are entitled to and the distribution of responsibility among 
the states need to be considered contextually. “Realistically, therefore, states have to be given 
                                                          
306 Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, 207. 
307 David Miller,  National Responsibility of Global Justice.( New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), at 214. 
308 Ibid., 214.  
309 Territorial rights  are not absolute. For example, the territory of the state needs to be rightfully acquired in the 
first place. Moreover, the strength of the right may vary according the period of time a nation has occupied and 
transformed it. (Ibid., 218-222) Here I cannot engage with Miller’s argument in detail. Yet, it suffices to assume 
that the EU Member States have legitimate claims to the territories that they occupy  and that they have 
transformed them to an extent that they have a right to self-determination.      
310 Ibid., 223.  
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considerable autonomy to decide on how to respond to particular asylum applications.”312 For 
the case of Syrian asylum seekers, recognition of Turkey and Serbia as safe third countries 
might diminish the responsibilities of the EU Member States in providing asylum. Both for 
sustaining the authority of the states and the right to self-determination imply conditional 
entry of the asylum seekers.   
On the one hand, Turn Back reinforces state sovereignty by refusing responsibility for 
the asylum seekers who are outside the borders of the EU states. The asylum seekers are not 
allowed to enter without proper documentation.  Those who enter face detention and 
deportation. Nevertheless, it is still the decision of the Member States to provide the 
documentation of entry. On the other hand, Fair Share follows a non-rejection policy. It 
diminishes the distinction between those who have already entered the territory of a Member 
State and those at the border who wish to enter. For Miller, erosion of the distinction 
undermines the value of state sovereignty “since a system of territorial authority cannot 
function without some control over who falls within its scope."313 (Miller 2007, 215-216) 
Lastly, CEAS is a midpoint between Turn Back and Fair Share. Similar to Turn Back, CEAS 
does not allow asylum seekers to enter without proper documentation. Yet, those who enter 
are protected by the Article(s) 31 and 33 of the Convention. Therefore, we can establish a 
ranking by the perspective of state sovereignty as Pf>Pc>Pt. 
 
4.5.6 Perspective of Solidarity 
Gibney argues that citizens of large and democratic states, such as the EU states, share "a 
commitment to a political culture – that is, to a framework of institutions and rights that 
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enables individuals to pursue different and diverse ways of life."314 The commitment to such a 
political culture constitutes the basis of solidarity among citizens. The three policies are 
valued with respect to how they sustain solidarity based on political culture (P).  
 This solidarity is essential to maintain a system of welfare and democracy. First, "If 
national welfare programmes, disaster assistance, regional subsidies and the like are to find 
support at the national level, members must believe that they have obligations not only to 
those in their region, class or ethnic group but to their fellow citizens qua citizens."315 And 
second, “Majority decisions are acceptable only under conditions of trust, meaning that 
citizens are sufficiently benign and reasonable as not to exploit minorities."316 Integrating the 
asylum seekers into the local communities, and nourishing the political culture where it is 
lacking is an important aim of asylum policies. Nevertheless, the arrival of asylum seekers 
who do not share such solidarity might disrupt both democratic mechanisms and the welfare 
system.   
 The evaluation of the three policies from the perspective of solidarity then depends on 
the number of asylum seekers and their political culture.  In discussing the basic rights 
perspective (Section 4.5.2), I consider a case where roughly half of the Syrian asylum seekers 
prefer to apply for refugee status in the EU under Fair Share. Accordingly out of the two 
millions asylum seekers, Hungary is required to take responsibility of roughly 35000 asylum 
seekers; Germany, 360000. I argue that in terms of sustaining basic needs, these numbers of 
asylum seekers do not constitute heavy costs for the rest of the population. Nevertheless, if 
such a number of asylum seekers do not share a political culture with the Member State, then 
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the discrepancy is sufficient enough to disrupt both the democratic mechanisms and the 
welfare system.  
 We need to consider if the Syrian asylum seekers share a political commitment to a 
liberal and democratic framework of institutions and rights. A definitive answer to this 
question is beyond the aims and abilities of this research. Nevertheless a number of remarks 
are relevant. First, our judgment in considering the questions needs to be clear of the narrative 
that portrays the asylum seeker as the culturally, ethnically and religiously different other. The 
stigmatization included in such narratives needs to be excluded from ethical perspectives. 
Second, we need to consider that the Syrian asylum seekers are fleeing the authoritarian 
governments of the region. In this regard, we should not expect them to face democratic 
processes with hostility. Third, we should not envision either the citizenry of the EU Member 
States or the Syrian asylum seekers as a homogenous community that shares complete 
solidarity. There are and will always be some who refuse to become part of the political 
culture if both of the groups that need to be respected without disrupting the democratic 
procedures and the welfare systems. In relation to the number of asylum seekers each policy 
allows, we can establish a ranking by the perspective of shared political culture as Pt>Pc>Pf. 
Yet, the difference between the policies is not extensive. 
 
 
L B U R S  P 
Pf Pf Pf Pc Pt Pt 
Pc Pc Pc Pf Pc Pc 
Pt Pt Pt Pt Pf Pf 
Table 1 
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4.6 Rankings by Impartial Spectators  
At the end of the second step of social choice approach, we have at hand valuations by the six 
ethical perspectives. The next step is to single out the rankings relevant for determining the 
policy that leads to a less unjust social state. The reasoning consists of two further steps. First, 
we identify impartial spectators who give relative valuations of the rankings. Then, we look 
for overlaps in terms of pair-wise valuations. Over lapping valuations are the choices that the 
impartial spectators mutually agree on without an agreement on the overall rankings. They 
guide our choice in determining the less unjust alternative.  
 In the previous chapter I reconstructed the views of Paula Casal, Thomas Pogge and 
Hillel Steiner as the views of impartial spectators from the proposals they put forth. In a 
similar way, here I reconstruct three impartial spectators from the proposals in comparison.317 
I call them T, C, F with respect to Turn Back, CEAS and Fair Share. Yet, before going on to 
identify the rankings by impartial spectators, in the following subsection I discuss a relevant 
point regarding which views should be included as impartial spectators.  
 
4.6.1 Open vs. Closed Impartiality 
In the previous chapter, I discuss an objection of Gerald Gaus regarding the social choice 
approach. Gaus reasons that we may "disagree on who counts as an impartial spectator."318 
(2.4.2). As a response, I argue that since the distribution of global natural resources has 
consequences for all throughout the globe, the evaluations of the focal group that we need to 
consider are those of the globe. Therefore, we should include all reasonable rankings of the 
ethical perspective that are proposed. This assessment is compatible with the view Sen calls 
'closed impartiality'.  For   comparison of the EU asylum policies, this is not the case, 
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however. The focal group consists of the citizens of the EU Member States, the asylum 
seekers and the citizens of the neighboring countries who are affected by the flight of the 
asylum seekers. Then, according to 'closed impartiality' we should only include reasonable 
rankings that  derive from the limited focal group.  
 However, including only the viewpoints of those affected has important limitations. 
Sen points out that "If we live in a local world of fixed beliefs and specific practices, 
parochialism may be an unrecognized and unquestioned result."319 The rankings of the 
impartial spectators of a particular focal group may be prone to containing local prejudices, 
which cannot be revealed by scrutiny of the same focal group. In overcoming this problem, 
Sen suggests that we include the views and experiences of those who are distant because they 
may help identifying the limitations of closed impartiality by bringing in new experiences.320 
This approach is called 'open impartiality'. For our case at hand, we need to go beyond the 
experiences of the citizens of the EU Member States, the asylum seekers and the citizens of 
the neighboring countries. Any reasonable ordering of the rankings should be welcome as an 
impartial spectator.  
 
4.6.2 Impartial Spectators 
Having specified grounds of the grounds, I turn to their specific orderings in assessing the 
three proposals. Recall that in previous chapter (3.5), I provide a general rule to capture the 
comparative aspect of the assessment. I suggested that when an ethical perspective is valued 
more or less equally by all impartial spectators, it is ranked relatively lower in the general 
ranking by all impartial spectators. When there is a stark difference between the valuations, 
then it ranks higher in the ranking of the impartial spectator who values it more, lower in the 
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ranking of the one who values it less. This outcome is because what is important for impartial 
spectators is to bring forth their different valuations.     
 When we consider the impartial spectators in isolation, in line with my discussion in 
4.5, we can state a number of relations. The impartial spectator F values b, u and l; C values r, 
and T values s and p more than the rest of ethical perspectives. Moreover, in relation to the 
extent of difference between the three policies, F ranks u, b and l as u>b>l, and T ranks s and 
p as s>p. When we consider the impartial spectators in the comparative analysis, we can state 
a number of further relations. There is a stark difference between the three policies in terms of 
state sovereignty.  Hence, T ranks it generally higher, and F and C ranks it generally lower. In 
addition, my discussion regarding the political culture of the Syrian asylum seekers in 4.5.6 
significantly limits the difference between the three policies. Hence, p is ranked generally 
lower by all the impartial spectators.   
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
 
 
 
  
 Consistent with these relations we can establish rankings of the impartial spectators as 
F(U>B>L>R>P>S), C(R>L>B>U>S>P) and T(S>L>B>U>R>P). In the above rankings there 
are five pair-wise valuations:  U>P, B>P, L>P, R>P and S>P. These are the valuations  upon 
F C T 
U R S 
B L L 
L B B 
R S U 
S U R 
P P P 
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which each of the impartial spectators agrees. Thus, we can claim that it is morally wrong to 
choose any one of P when there is the chance to choose any one of the others: U, B, L, R and 
S.  
As I discuss in Section 3.5, depending on the extent of similarity among the rankings, 
we can have different levels of guidance.321 In some cases, the similarity may be to an extent 
that it determines a morally better option or options. In other cases, such as the one at hand, 
pair-wise valuations do not point to a determinate choice. Nevertheless, they still provide 
guidance for reforming policy options. The five ethical perspectives that the impartial 
spectators agree to are superior to P. As I have discussed in Section 4.5, utilitarian, basic 
rights and libertarian perspectives rank Pf over Pc and Pt, while perspective of equal respect 
ranks Pc over Pf and Pt and perspective of state sovereignty ranks Pt over Pc and Pf.  
There may be multiple ways of articulating this similarity as valuable information for 
reforming policy alternatives. The easiest way to arrive at a mutually agreed choice seems to 
me to reform Pf to the extent that it is ranked at least as good as the others from the 
perspective of equal respect and state sovereignty. For the perspective of equal respect, we 
need to reform Fair Share to an extent that it takes into consideration the decisions of the 
asylum seekers as much as CEAS. This may be possible by including in the criteria for 
determining the country of relocation, the choices of the asylum seekers.  
For the perspective of state sovereignty, we need to reform Fair Share to an extent that 
it respects the right to self-determination and state sovereignty. However, non-rejection at the 
border is an essential component of the Fair Share. We cannot moderate without significantly 
influencing valuations of other perspectives. Even so we need to emphasize that whether the 
right to self-determination is breached by Fair Share depends on the context. The citizens of 
Member States may choose to allow all Syrian asylum seekers into their territory. Then, Fair 
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Share is valued as much as are Turn Back and CEAS from the perspective of state 
sovereignty. Considering that many of the valuations favor Fair Share over CEAS and Turn 
Back, this outcome may be expected. State sovereignty does not value Fair Share as it implies 
the citizens of the Member States to share sovereignty, but at the same time it is not an 
obstacle for the mutual agreement on Fair Share.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The need to reform European asylum policies is urgent. Millions of Syrian asylum seekers are 
not within reach of long term solutions to their deteriorating circumstances. The EU Member 
states should face up to their Refugee Convention responsibilities. The contextual comparison 
I offer in this Chapter aims to offer a clearer understanding of the many proposals aired in this 
regard. By laying out impartial perspectives, we can overcome biased claims of interest 
groups. By focusing on mutually agreed points of view, we can make progress in reaching a 
less unjust solution.    
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5. Conclusion 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
In this concluding chapter, I highlight a number of aspects of the social choice approach to 
theorizing justice that I have developed throughout the thesis. In Section 5.2, I emphasize that 
the method  can incorporate pervasive disagreement within society regarding injustices better 
than its alternatives do. I point out that Rawlsian constructivism and Cohen's intuitionism take 
into consideration the point of view of others on two different levels of theorizing. While the 
former looks for mutual agreeability in identifying principles of justice, the latter does so in 
arguments for implementing policies. The social choice approach, by bringing together these 
two aspects, is better able to respond to pervasive disagreement. In Section 5.3, I emphasize 
the importance of following a social choice approach in refraining from making authoritarian 
judgments. The method appeals to citizens rather than policy makers in comparing social 
130 
 
states. The judgments delivered by the social choice approach are moral judgments. 
Nevertheless, so far as such judgments are concerned with social morality, they are 
authoritative. I  demonstrate that if we do not go as far as we can with moral reasoning, we are 
prone to make authoritarian judgments. As an example I show how the Rawlsian method I 
discuss in Chapter 2 suffers from this problem. Then, I discuss the cases of implementing 
global taxes on natural resources and reforming EU asylum policy. Finally, in Section 5.4, I 
emphasize that the judgments of the social choice approach can always be improved with new 
perspectives and information. A stronger social choice is possible it by sustaining an 
environment for free and open-ended discussion.     
 
5.2 Social choice approach as realizing disagreement  
Gerald Gaus recognizes the importance of realizing  pervasive disagreement regarding actual 
problems of the world, such as discrimination, human rights violations, severe poverty or 
global warming when theorizing justice. He writes that  
 
 Reasonable and rational good-willed people often order proposals about justice 
differently—when they can order them at all. The claim that if we only think hard 
enough we will see that everyone actually will agree on the optimal conception of 
justice is, I think, beyond credulity. The harder we think, the more we disagree. 322  
 
Throughout this study I demonstrate  the ability of the social choice approach through 
theorizing to incorporate the pervasive disagreement that Gaus mentions . Here I aim to 
emphasize in what way  the approach  can accomplish this task better in comparison to its 
alternatives.    
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There are two main approaches that in the contemporary literature that I want to 
discuss here distinguished by their particular method of theorizing principles. The first is 
Rawlsian constructivism,323 which I discuss in Chapter 2, and intuitionism. The aim of 
theorizing, for both approaches, is to show the validity of a set of principles of justice. In the 
process they both take the point of view of others, though at different levels of theorizing. On 
the one hand, as Cohen describes, constructivists theorize principles of justice as "those that 
epistemically and/or morally privileged choosers would select in answer to the question, 
"What are the right principles for the regulation of social life?"324 Specifically for Rawlsian 
constructivism  justice is denoted as impartiality; furthermore, the aim of theorizing is to 
identify impartial principles for regulating social life.   Impartiality is achieved by bringing 
together, on equal terms, the others’ point of view. A convergence of different points of views 
on a set of principles is expected to  emerge by a set of epistemic limitations on the agents in 
the choice situation. Different conditions are spelt out by different constructivist accounts 
such as Rawls’ original position, or Scanlon’s reasonable rejection test, or Ideal Observer 
theories.325 In Rawls original position, for example, the agents in the original position 
deliberating  over the choice of a set of principles possess information regarding the facts 
about human nature and society, yet they do not know their place in it.  
On the other hand, at the level of formulation of principles, intuitionists do not include 
the point of view of the others. Cohen describes the intuitionists including himself as the 
following:  
 
                                                          
323 Here I only consider the constructivism of Rawls, which Stephen Darwall calls contractualist in distinction to 
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theorizing of principles based on impartiality, the latter theorizing is based on self-interest.    
324 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 21.  
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 we determine the principles that we are willing to endorse through an investigation 
of our  individual normative judgments on particular cases, and while we allow that 
principles that are extensively supported by a wide range of individual judgments 
can override outlier judgments that contradict those principles, individual 
judgments retain a certain sovereignty.326  
 
Intuitionists aim to have a clear understanding of their own normative convictions. 
The theorists proceed by considering counter examples to their intuitions, next revising their 
claims and then considering further counter examples.327 The points of view of others are not 
relevant in the justification of principles. For, contrary to constructivism, the aim of principles 
is not the regulation of social life, but to reach a deeper understanding of  what justice 
requires. Nevertheless, at the level of justifying a particular policy, which includes references 
to not only principles of justice but also other values and facts concerning the policy, the 
points of view of others is introduced. As I have discussed in Section 3.5.2. Cohen proposes 
the interpersonal test in evaluating the arguments for the implementation of a particular 
policy. Each given reason for the policy needs to be uttered and listened to by every segment 
of society. Only in so far as the reasons given are acceptable from every perspective of society 
can they be accepted as part of the justification.328    
Cohen antagonistically argues against fact-sensitive principles derived by the 
Rawlsian constructivism. He maintains that principles of justice are fact-insensitive and 
argues that including in the choice mechanism contingent facts and other values leads us away 
from justice. Principles derived by the constructivist method are not principles of justice, but 
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rather rules of regulation.329 Here I cannot discuss   Cohen’s argument in detail, but I want to 
emphasize, regardless of what is the correct conceptualization of a principle of justice, both 
approaches to theorizing include at different levels the point of view of others when 
considering real world problems.330    
The social choice approach I develop brings together the two kinds of requirements at 
both levels of the formulation of principles and justification of policies. As I discuss in 
Section 2.4, Sen draws on “Rawls’ lead on the basic connection between objectivity, public 
reasoning and the theory of justice.”331 Sen shares the idea of fairness based on mutual 
acceptability. Yet, he also maintains that even within the epistemic constraints of a 
constructivist mechanism, multiple principles, which all have a claim to impartiality, survive. 
Moreover, the social choice approach recognizes that the implementation of each principle is 
also prone to reasonable disagreement. To this end, the ethical perspectives are scrutinized by 
Scanlon’s reasonable rejection test and the assessment of the rankings of the impartial 
spectators with Cohen's interpersonal test.    
 Moreover, taking into account this further pervasive disagreement at both levels is 
neither   a strategic move, nor   a demand of feasibility.  The requirement is not due to the fact 
that in real world circumstances we actually need to make a decision together with others, for 
others, or that  our decision has consequences for others. Rather taking into account the 
disagreement at two levels is due to the idea that other people's perspectives and values, as 
long as they are reasonable, are constitutive of the judgment regarding the more just 
alternative in an unjust situation. As I explain in the following, this idea relates to respecting 
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others as equals and refraining from making moral demands that are authoritarian,  that is to 
say, authoritative for the wrong reasons.     
  
5.3 Social choice approach as  identifying authoritarian judgments 
Throughout the thesis, I examine three cases of comparative policy reform: the hypothetical 
case for health care policy in Chapter Two, implementing global taxes on natural resources in 
Chapter Three and reforming the EU asylum system in Chapter Four. Contrary to the 
immediate impression that these cases might create, the social choice approach I aim to 
develop is not a decision making mechanism for policy makers. Rather,  the approach is 
meant to offer a method for individuals to judge a social state as more just among its 
alternatives. The judgment then constitutes a reason for the individual taking a particular 
course of direct action, participation in a social movement, or voting for a political party. In 
addition it  supplies a rationale for expecting that others do the same.    
The judgments we reach by employing the social choice approach are moral 
judgments.  In particular, they are judgments of what Gerald Gaus calls 'social morality ' as 
they are aimed to determine the rules that we are to act upon for a shared social life .332 Gaus 
argues that 'social morality' allows us to live together in cooperative, mutually beneficial, 
social relations."333 Yet in order to achieve this task, rules of social morality have to be 
imperatival.  Such rules must enable one agent to issue demands on what to do based on 
moral authority.  This system  must give the former a higher standing in her judgments, so 
                                                          
332 The account of social morality that I employ through this subsection is offered by Gaus. It refers to the " set 
of social-moral rules that require or prohibit action, and so ground moral imperatives that we direct to each other 
to engage in, or refrain from, certain lines of conduct." Gaus, The Order of Public Reason—A Theory of 
Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World, 2. I follow Gaus in developing the problem of 
authoritarian judgments in social morality.  Although I cannot here compare his approach to the social choice 
approach, I believe the latter is a genuine candidate for the overcoming the problem.   
333 Ibid., 4.  
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that the other has reason to obey.334 The situation leads to problems when we have 
disagreements over judging courses of action. As Gaus writes,  
 
 When you assert your demand as authoritative – something that overrules my view 
of the matter – our private reason leads us to disagree on what morality requires. 
Morality does not fax its demands down from above; you are asserting your 
interpretation of the demands of morality as that which should be followed by me 
over my own interpretation. In your eyes, your demand that I must φ is not 
undermined simply because I reply that on my view of morality, I have no duty to 
φ. My reply may lead you to pause and reconsider, but if on reflection you 
determine that you were correct on this matter, you will go ahead and press your 
demand. But that means that, in the end, you are asserting that my action must 
conform to your judgment even though you cannot get me to accept that it should – 
you are overriding what I see as the thing to do and claiming that your private 
judgment is authoritative over me. You are staking a real claim to authority over 
me: your judgment on this matter is to pre-empt mine"335  
 
Making moral judgments within social morality is necessarily authoritative in the sense Gaus 
describes. When we do not share the same values and interpretation of  situations, our moral 
judgments are authoritarian, that is to say, authoritative for the wrong reasons, regardless of 
how reasonable or legitimate is the demand The reason is that the relationship between the 
one who claims to have better moral judgments assumes a position of superiority over the 
other.  This imbalance is antithetical to equally taking the point of view of others which is the 
first condition of impartiality.  
                                                          
334 Ibid., 6-9 
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 In my discussion of the Rawlsian social contract approach in Chapter 2, I show that 
the deliberative framework enables individuals to demarcate a set of legitimate actions. 
Although after  reasoning, the set of morally legitimate choices is significantly constrained, 
this method does not give us the means to distinguish within the legitimate set. The prior step 
of Rawlsian method is ideal theorizing, which specifies the first general principles that govern 
the basic structure of an ideal society. Then, in employing transitional and non-transitional 
reasoning, more particular subjects in actual circumstances are respectively theorized based 
on ideal principles. Nevertheless, I argue that due to disagreement in both identifying ideal 
principles and competing valuations in tradeoff situations in the reasoning, the method does 
not provide a determinate choice within the set of legitimate actions. Any social state implied 
by the legitimate set is morally as good as is the other.   
 Within the Rawlsian framework, when someone claims that a policy is the morally 
superior one, then she is making an authoritative judgment based on  a belief on a set of 
specific ideal principles and a particular kind of reasoning that is  applied to the principles in 
real world circumstances.336 Theorists such as Laura Valentini have recognized the limitation 
of the Rawlsian method. She writes that   
 
 Although we cannot identify with precision what distributive criterion counts as 
universally acceptable, because in principle the more than one does, we can still 
plausibly establish which distributions of freedom a just society must exclude, 
since rational agents concerned with furthering their life plans could never consent 
to them. Hypothetical consent does not enable us to determine what is perfectly 
just, but is of great help in establishing what is reasonably just or legitimate. 337  
  
                                                          
336 The two kinds of reasoning, transitional and non-transitional I discuss in Section 2.2 
337 Valentini, Justice in a Globalized World: A Normative Framework, 177. 
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Valentini's response to the inability of the Rawlsian framework to make determinate rankings 
of policies is to supplement the framework with democratic decision making procedures.  She 
delineates the process as follows: 
 
 If the outcome of hypothetical consent is underdetermined, to identify what might 
count as a mutually justifiable distribution of freedom, we should resort to 
democratic deliberation and decision. This is not to say that democratic processes 
succeed in concretely realizing the ideal of universal justifiability. As we all know, 
such processes are imperfect, and most commonly operate on the basis of majority 
rule, rather than unanimity. The point I am making is rather that such processes 
offer us the best approximation of universal justifiability in real-world 
circumstances. When hypothetical consent runs out because of reasonable 
disagreement about its outcomes, democracy begins. 338  
 
Yet, Valentini's response does not resolve the problem of authoritarian judgments relating to 
social morality that I have put forth. First, the authoritative judgments we discuss are not 
related to the political  authority of the state or a similar sovereign institution, but to the moral 
authority of the agents who have made  a moral demand. A decision making procedure, so far 
as it is inclusive, may in fact render the former kind of authority legitimate, but not the latter. 
Second, we need to determine which decision making procedure is the appropriate one for the 
problem. As Andrew Mason argues, "Existing procedures are likely to fall short of the 
standards set by a democratic conception, and there will be disagreement over the merits of 
different models of democratic decision making that is likely to be as intractable as 
                                                          
338 Ibid.,   
138 
 
disagreement over conceptions of justice—indeed the latter will feed the former"339 The 
judgment for a specific decision making procedure  will emerge as a judgment of social 
morality. In the context of disagreement, we will have the same problem of authoritative 
judgments back in our hands.  
 Gaus argues that the only instance when an authoritative judgment can be made for the 
right reasons is when the both sides of the judgment are in agreement regarding the course of 
action, yet one side is not acting according to the rules of social morality. He explains this 
kind of situations as follows; 
 
 I am dictating to you the precepts of public reason, and calling on you to act 
according to the rules of your own judgment, and not to behave inconsistently with 
yourself. A real inequality between actual persons is, of course, now being 
asserted. I claim that you are failing to live up to your own rational moral 
commitments: you are acting wrongly by your own lights as well as mine. My 
demand is based on appeal to your own reasons and your own rational moral 
autonomy. It is your failure to exercise your rational moral capacities to which I 
object, I am not seeking to override them. In this way a moral equal can make 
moral demands, and so claim moral authority over another."340  
 
 Even though, also in this situation, the one who is making the demand based on moral 
authority is still claiming to have a superior position than the other, the justification of the 
demand is shared by both of them. Gaus gives an analogy between authoritative judgments for 
the right reasons with promise keeping, "If a person makes a promise, one of the things she 
does is to give me standing to demand that she keep it: the act of promise making is one that 
                                                          
339 Andrew Mason, Rawlsian Theory and the Circumstances of Politics, Political Theory 38, n. 5 (2010): 658–
683 
340 Ibid, 29. 
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recognizes the standing of others to make demands."341 The novelty of the social choice 
approach is that it brings out the similarities in different judgments regarding specific 
questions that, at first glance, conflict. Even though there is no prior contract, the approach 
points out the ways we in fact are in agreement, but do not recognize it in the first instance. 
We may prioritize different reasonable principles of justice in general.  However, when we 
are confronted with a particular situation, we will have relative valuations of first principles 
depending on the specificities of the context. We may not see the extent of agreement due to 
our commitment to the first principles we endorse. Political rhetoric, ideological conflicts or 
simply a  lack of reasoning may prevent us from recognizing the mutual agreeable choice. 
Once the similarities between the two views are revealed by employing the social choice 
approach the demand made based on the method is authoritative for the right reasons. 
 In this study I show that for a number of cases we in fact have such agreements. In 
cases  such as these, a demand of social morality is authoritative for the right reasons. Let’s 
consider what this line of reasoning implies for the particular cases I discuss in the previous 
chapters. In Chapter 3, I compare three competing proposals for implementing global taxes on 
natural resources: Hillel Steiner’s ‘Global Fund’, Thomas Pogge’s ‘Global Resource 
Dividend’, and Paula Casal’s ‘Global Share’.  In these comparisons, I identify eight ethical 
perspectives which have a claim to impartiality as egalitarian, prioritarian, sufficientarian, 
utilitarian, libertarian, conservation of resources, as well as considerations regarding 
transitional aspects and equal respect of persons. Each perspective provides reasons for 
alternative rankings. Egalitarian, prioritarian, and conservation of resources prioritize the 
Global Share, sufficientarian, utilitarian and transitional perspective prioritize the Global 
Resource Dividend;   the libertarian perspective and perspective of equal respect  prioritize  
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the Global Fund. So far as the perspectives are reasonable, within the Rawlsian framework,   
implementation of the policy is determined by a legitimate decision making procedure. The 
ultimate decision will be morally authoritarian, for not all the agents in the process will share 
the reasons for implementing the policy; some will constitute a higher ground than do others. 
Of course, we should note that the judgment derived by the Rawlsian method and an inclusive 
decision making procedures will be  less authoritarian than a judgment that does not at all take 
into consideration the point of view of others. As I show by working through the policy 
comparison, there may be two ways to go that all agree upon: first, to reforming the Global 
Resource Dividend to an extent that it can conserve natural resources at least as well as 
Global Share can;  second, to reforming the Global Resource Dividend to an extent that it 
sustains equal respect for individuals--at least as much as the Global Fund does.      
 Similarly, in Chapter 4, I compare the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
with two policy proposals for reform: 'Turn Back' and 'Fair Share.' Regarding the comparison 
I identify six ethical perspectives by which we can value the proposals: libertarian, basic 
rights, utilitarian, equal respect, state sovereignty and solidarity. Each ethical perspective 
provides reasons for alternative rankings. Libertarian, basic rights and utilitarian perspectives 
prioritize the Fair Share. Perspectives of state sovereignty and solidarity prioritize the Turn 
Back and, equal respect, the CEAS. Reforming the CEAS concerns in the fact of the great 
number of refugee arrivals concerns the lives of all citizens of the EU Member States, as well 
as the refugees who are in great need. Many arguments are aired in the media based on 
political rhetoric of interest groups  targeting the values such as sovereignty and solidarity 
which are highly respected by the citizens. As I point out, so far as the perspectives are 
reasonable, within the Rawlsian framework, any one of the policies can be implemented. Yet, 
in this context, where the stakes are so high for all concerned, it is even more important to 
distinguish our disagreements from the reasons we in fact share based on the particularities of 
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the situation. Using the social choice approach, I show that the perspective of state 
sovereignty does not pose a moral obstacle for democratic implementation of the Fair Share. 
Moreover, I argue that we need to reform Fair Share to an extent that it takes into 
consideration the decisions of the asylum seekers as much as those of the CEAS. One way to 
do it may be possible by including in the criteria for determining the country of relocation, the 
choices of the asylum seekers. The moral demand for reforming the CEAS that I derive by 
employing the social choice approach is authoritative for the right reasons.   
 Lastly I want to point out that the social choice approach that I develop is limited so 
far as we may only employ it in comparative questions case by case. Moreover, the   sufficient 
similarity of our reasons which arises that the social choice approach aims to uncover does not 
exist for all cases. I doubt that even a systematic application of the social choice approach for 
all relevant cases can determine the basis of a social morality that is authoritative for the right 
reasons. Establishing that basis is the task of more comprehensive theorizing concerned with 
the basis of social cooperation, such as the theorizing of Rawls 'original position', or Gaus's 
theorizing.342 The method I develop may be helpful in this more complicated task by 
identifying authoritarian judgments that should not be accepted by social morality.   
 
5.4 Social choice approach as free and open ended discussion 
Another aspect of social choice approach is that the resulting judgment is always incomplete 
and relative to the current perspective and information. The inquiry is always open for 
                                                          
342 Gaus proposes a Deliberative Public Justification Principle to test the rules of social morality that ground 
social cooperation in society. It reads as the following: "L is a bona fide rule of social morality only if each and 
every Member of the Public endorses L as binding (and so to be internalized)."  ." Gaus, The Order of Public 
Reason—A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World, 27 The Member of the Public 
employed in the Deliberative Public Justification Principle "is an idealization of some actual individual; a 
Member of the Public deliberates well and judges only on the relevant and intelligiblevalues, reasons, and 
concerns of the real agent she represents and always seeks to legislate impartially for all other Members of the 
Public." Ibid., 26. I cannot describe the details of Gaus argument here. Yet the main different from Rawlsian 
theorizing is that,  for Gaus, the precise rules of social morality "is a matter of the rise of a complex coordination 
and selection process among a large group of people." Ibid., 46.   
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including new perspectives and information that enriches the discussion and improves our 
judgment; the discussion is thus dynamic and open ended.  
 The main aim of working through the two cases in this study is to show that the social 
choice approach  can offer good guidance in overcoming a number of real world problems. In 
my analysis, I include    ample information and perspectives  so as to be able achieve a 
genuine suggestion for reform. Nevertheless, the policy question may further be analyzed in 
future research. For example, in my analysis in Chapter Four regarding the question of 
reforming the European asylum policy, we may include additional up-to-date research on the 
conditions of the conflict zones that produce asylum seekers, asylum systems of the neighbor 
countries as well as the practices of the EU Member States in implementing the CEAS, and 
consider any additional perspective that evaluates social states. Moreover, what the 
perspectives imply for the particular question of reforming   CEAS is open to disagreement.  
Furthermore, the information derived by pair-wise valuations that we identify may be 
interpreted in various ways depending on the extent of similarity. We may have a critical grip 
of these questions by putting them up for public scrutiny.  
 The same considerations are also relevant for my assessment in Chapter Three of 
implementing global taxes on natural resources.  We may include up to date research on a 
number of issues that I have not addressed in my assessment such as information regarding 
tax competition and tax evasion or the international mobility of parts of the tax base.  
Additionally, disagreements regarding the valuations of social states from different 
perspective  and evaluation of the similarities need to be further assessed from  varying points 
of view.  
 Nevertheless, the fact that the judgment of social choice approach is partial and 
relative to the information and perspectives included in the assessment does not undermine its 
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normative value.    New information and values add to the previous assessment; they do not 
contradict it   although the latter constitutes a road map for better judgment.  
 Last but not least, the method of social choice approach can be achieved in practice 
only by means of an open and free framework of public reasoning. Each argument for a policy 
needs to be rigorously engaged in public for better judgment. To this end, we need to have 
actual access to unbiased information and adequate platforms for the free exchange of ideas.  
Moreover, we should be willing to incorporate the views and experiences of those who are 
distant and those with whom we have disagreements. Sustaining democratic practices as 
government by discussion, political and civil rights that enable the voice of  everyone to be 
heard indiscriminately, as well as free speech and press freedom is central in this sense.343 
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